Event Notification Report for October 2, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/01/2014 - 10/02/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50396 50484 50485 50488 50489 50490 50502

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50396
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ALEX RIVAS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/24/2014
Notification Time: 03:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION OUT OF SERVICE

"At 0039 [CDT] on 8/19/14, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 identified that 2TE-451A and 2TE-451C Cold Leg Temperature RTDs were out of service. Technical Specification 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Action Condition C for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable was entered. Action Condition C requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If completion time in Action Condition C cannot be met, Action Condition D will be entered, which requires entry into Action Condition E. Action Condition E would require Unit 2 to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours thereafter.

"Unit 2 is being shut down to effect repairs within the 7 day required action completion time for Action Condition C. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications. The Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * RETRACTION FROM ALEX RIVAS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2337 EDT ON 10/1/14 * * *

"Point Beach is retracting EN# 50396 made on August 24, 2014 at 0323 EDT. Technical Specification 3.3.3. Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Action Condition C for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable was entered. Action Condition C requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Unit 2 TE-451A and TE-451C Cold Leg Temperature RTDs inoperable condition was corrected and the plant returned to power before expiration of the 7 day period specified in Condition C of Technical Specification 3.3.3. Reference example (3) Failure that was or could have been corrected before shutdown was required, of Section 3.2.1, Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications of NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (McCraw).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50484
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: MANUFACTURING SCIENCES CORPORATION (MSC)
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #: S-01046
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILLY FREEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/23/2014
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
LAURA DUDES (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THERMAL EVENT SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER SPRINKLER SYSTEM

The following report was received from the State of Tennessee via email:

"Event description: Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRH) was notified on September 23, 2014, by a representative from [Manufacturing Science Corporation] MSC that there had been a thermal incident in the chip/turnings oxidizer that triggered the sprinkler system. The Oak Ridge [OR] Fire Dept. responded. The sprinkler system released ~200 gallons of water which was contained within the bermed area. The incident was contained sufficiently that the OR fire department left the facility prior to 1000 [EDT]. MSC changed pre-filters upstream of the HEPA filters, the HEPAs did not appear to need changing. MSC felt that this incident is required to be reported per TN State Regulations for Protection Against Radiation (SRPAR) 0400-20-05-.141(2)(c)4, in that the event potentially involved 'an unplanned fire or explosion damaging any licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material when:
(i) The quantity of material involved exceed five times the lowest annual limit of intake specified for the material in Schedule RHS 8-30 in Rule 0400-20-05-.161, and
(ii) The damage affects the integrity of the licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material.'

"There was no release to the environment, no personnel contamination, and no injuries.

"Notifications: [State] Oak Ridge Fire Department. Press release has not been issued at this time. TN DRH has not received any media inquiries at this time."

No fire or smoke was observed.

State Event Report ID #: TN-14-181

UPDATE FROM BILLY FREEMAN TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0921 EDT ON 9/24/14:

The following was received via email:

"Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRH) was notified on September 23, 2014 by a representative from MSC that there had been a thermal incident in the depleted uranium (DU) chip/turnings oxidizer that triggered the sprinkler system. The Oak Ridge Fire Dept. responded. The sprinkler system released ~200 gallons of water which was contained within the bermed area. The incident was contained sufficiently that the OR fire department left the facility prior to 1000 EDT. MSC changed pre-filters upstream of the HEPA filters the HEPAs did not appear to need changing. MSC felt that this incident is required to be reported per TN State Regulations for Protection Against Radiation (SRPAR) 0400-20-05-.141(2)(c)4. in that the event potentially involved 'an unplanned fire or explosion damaging any licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material when:
(i) The quantity of material involved exceed five times the lowest annual limit of intake specified for the material in Schedule RHS 8-30 in Rule 0400-20-05-.161, and
(ii) The damage affects the integrity of the licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material.'

"They are not certain of the quantity of DU involved. There was no release to the environment, no personnel contamination and no injuries.

"Notifications: [State] Oak Ridge Fire Department. Press release has not been issued at this time. TN DRH has not received any media inquiries at this time."

Updated information: The material involved was Depleted Uranium.

Notified R1DO (Gray), FSME MOC (Dudes), FSME Events Resource (email)

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Agreement State Event Number: 50485
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: BOSTON UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0062
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/23/2014
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Category 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DELIVERED TO WRONG ADDRESS

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"Boston University Medical Center's (BUMC) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported by telephone to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (MA RCP) on 9/23/2014 that a shipment of Iridium-192, in the form of brachytherapy sealed sources containing approximately 10 curies, was delivered by [the shipping company] to the wrong address, a non-BUMC address at [redacted], Boston, MA on 9/8/2014.

"The RSO reported that the package, a yellow III package, was accepted by a mail room employee of the non-BUMC address on 9/8/2014; that BUMC was contacted on 9/8/2014; and that BUMC transferred the package to BUMC less than one hour after the package was delivered to the wrong address.

"The RSO reported that BUMC is conducting an investigation and attempting to contact [the shipping company] and that all radioactive materials that were supposed to have been in the package were accounted for.

"The MA RCP plans to perform inspection upon this event. This event is considered by MA RCP to be open."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

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Agreement State Event Number: 50488
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: INTEGRATED TESTING & ENGINEERING COMPANY OF DFW METRO INC
Region: 4
City: EULESS State: TX
County:
License #: 06525
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/24/2014
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST THEN FOUND

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On September 23, 2014, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee of the loss of a Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge, serial #6329, containing a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-Be source, serial #47-2502, and a 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) Cs-137 source (serial #40-3459). The licensee stated a technician was traveling when his tailgate fell open and the container holding the locked gauge fell off the truck. The gauge was improperly secured in the back of the truck. He turned around to go back to the intersection but the gauge was missing.

"On September 24, 2014, a company called the licensee informing them that they found the gauge in the road. The gauge was returned to the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9238

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Agreement State Event Number: 50489
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PREMIER NDT SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: NEW RAYMER State: CO
County:
License #: CO 1162-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRICE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/24/2014
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2014
Event Time: 19:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE

The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:

"Event description: The department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] was notified via phone on 9/23/2014, at approximately 1845 [MDT] by the Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] of Premier NDT Services, Inc. (license # CO 1162-01) that a radiography crew was unable to retract the source assembly to its fully shielded position and secure it in this position at a temporary job site.

"At approximately, 1900 [MDT] on 9/23, the RSO reported to the department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] that the source had been retracted to it fully shielded position by working the crank back and forth a few times. It was about a quarter turn to get the source into position and have the exposure device lock engage. The source was not fully extended outside of the camera but was in the camera enough to close the outlet port cover.

"The radiography camera was surveyed and it was determined that the source was in fact in its fully shielded position prior to transporting the camera back to the licensee facility.

"The department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] visited the licensee facility on 9/24/14, at approximately 0930 [MDT] and interviewed licensee staff including the radiography crew.

"It was determined that the radiography assistant had not properly surveyed during the approach to the camera to verify that the source was in fact in its fully shielded position and that he disconnected the guide tube prior to realizing that the source was not fully shielded. When he attempted to disconnect the drive cable he realized that the exposure device lock was not engaged properly and the crew retreated to a safe distance.

"There were two assistant radiographers and a radiographer present and their pocket dosimeters read 10, 9 , and 20 mrem after the event. It appears unlikely that this is an overexposure event. The time in which the crew was in close proximity to the camera with the source out of its secured position was less than 5 minutes total and the time in which the crew member was in contact with the camera was less than a second to disconnect the guide tube and close the outlet port cover and another second when he attempted to disconnect the drive cable.

"It is suspected that this was a malfunction of the device. The camera (QSA 880 Delta), drive cables, and guide tube are being sent back to the manufacturer for diagnosis.

"The department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] is preparing a Notice Of Violation for multiple items and is expecting a full report from the licensee within 30 days including dose estimates."

Event Report ID No.: CO14-I14-26

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Agreement State Event Number: 50490
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DESERT NDT, LLC
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: 06462
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/24/2014
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE

The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On September 24, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that on September 22, 2014, there had been a radiography source retraction failure at a temporary field site. A pipe had fallen from a stand onto the guide tube, causing a crimp. The source was retrieved by squeezing the crimp with pliers, allowing retraction. The individual performing the retrieval received 387 mrem according to a pocket dosimeter. The camera was a SPEC 150 (sn 1599) with an Ir-192 source at 49 Ci (sn VG010). Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9237

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50502
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/01/2014
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2014
Event Time: 01:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
CYBER ASSESSMENT TEA (EMAI)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PARTIAL LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS IN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY AND JOINT INFORMATION CENTER

"At 0750 EDT on October 1, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified that site Information Technology (IT) personnel were being mobilized to investigate a potential voice and network loss at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC). Site IT personnel were notified by offsite IT resources at 0727 EDT on October 1, 2014 of the issue that was first identified by IT monitoring software at 0124 on October 1, 2014.

"The site IT personnel that responded to the EOF and JIC reported to site Control Room and Emergency Preparedness (EP) personnel at 0845 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet was unavailable at both the EOF and the JIC. This loss of connectivity would prevent the ability of the EOF Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer (including the Site Parameter Display System) and other network-based plant parameter display systems.

"Site IT and EP personnel determined that the following communications equipment was not impacted by the connectivity issue:

- Dedicated Offsite Agency Phones (primary method for contacting state and local agencies)
- Commercial Phones and dedicated bridge line (primary method for contacting other site Emergency Response Facilities)
- FTS-2001 Phones (e.g., ENS and HPN lines)
- ERDS

"Additionally, EP personnel verified with Dose Assessment Office personnel that dose assessment and dose monitoring functions from the EOF could still be performed without delay.

"Site IT personnel reported to the Control Room at 1135 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet had been restored to a fully functional status.

"While site and fleet IT personnel continue to address and verify all appropriate corrective actions have been taken to prevent recurrence of the connectivity issue, the site has employed appropriate compensatory measures to ensure that the verbal transmission of key plant parameters from the site (Technical Support Center or Control Room) to the EOF is recognized and maintained.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021