Event Notification Report for August 18, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/15/2014 - 08/18/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49904 50349 50352 50370 50371 50375 50376

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Part 21 Event Number: 49904
Rep Org: VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Licensee: VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIMMY SHIEH
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - AP-1000 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES LEAKAGE

The following was excerpted from a fax received from Valcor Engineering Corporation:

"Background:

"Valcor was chosen by WEC [Westinghouse Electric Corporation] as a supplier to the AP-1000 for the ASME Section Ill Class 1, 2 and 3 Solenoid Operated Valves. As part of the specification requirements Valcor is required to perform qualification testing in accordance with the requirements of IEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1987 and IEEE-382-1996.

"Discovery:

"On Saturday January 11th, 2014, Valcor's lab technician discovered that the hard faced seat of an AP-1000 Solenoid Operated qualification valve had a crack through the thickness of the valve seat to the outlet port that caused the valve to leak in the closed position beyond its Technical Specification requirement (WEC Specification APP-PV13-ZOD-101). The subject valve had undergone heat rise testing to determine actuator temperatures during its specified design basis conditions. As part of the qualification process (IEEE-323) and in accordance with the test procedure the subject valve is given a factory acceptance test (FAT) at each stage of the qualification program.

"The valve design is unique to the model (V526-5631-36/40) in that the dimensional constrain resulted in a web thickness of the hard faced seat that is thinner than our standard historical valve designs. A total of eight (8) valves of this configuration (four (4) for Valve Model Number V525-5631-36 and four (4) for Model number V526-5631-40) have been delivered to Westinghouse for installation in the Sanmen and Haiyang nuclear power plants located in the People's Republic of China. Neither of these plants have loaded fuel or are operational.

"The investigation, failure analyses, and stress analyses completed to-date have not provided a firm conclusion of the root cause of the crack. Westinghouse, the purchaser who imposed 10CFR21 on the procurement document of the valve models identified in question, has been informed of the condition and current status of investigation."

Submitted by Jimmy Shieh Quality Assurance Director.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JIMMY SHEIH TO JEFF ROTTON VIA FAX AT 0944 EDT ON 08/15/2014 * * *

"Subject: An update to Interim Report initially filed on 3/12/14, revised 3/13/14

"Reference: SKA23651 previously submitted

"Investigation activities since the Interim Report:

"Computer Flow and Thermal Analysis conducted from March to April 2014.

"Finite Element Stress Analysis rerun using Computer Flow and Thermal Analysis in April 2014.

"Both analysis above suggest that the design is adequate and that stress induced by rapid temperature rise would not cause the seat to crack.

"With Westinghouse assistance and permission [two] 2 production valves were disassembled and NDE (Visual, LP, radiographic, and Eddy current) of body seat area performed during May. The examinations did not identify any defect in the valve seat area.

"Contrary to all stress/thermal analysis, cracking of valve seat was reproduced early June when one of the above mentioned bodies was subjected to the same thermal shock condition that caused the initial observed cracking. The second valve was tested at the same pressure and end temperature without the thermal shock. The valve seat remained intact without cracking.

"Westinghouse has been supporting the Part 21 investigation that Valcor is leading. Westinghouse has reviewed all metallurgy, CFD, FEA, NDE, heat rise laboratory and other data Valcor collected during our thorough investigation. All of this information is currently being evaluated by Westinghouse. At this time, the only outstanding issue is for Westinghouse to review all AP1000 transient conditions that are applicable to PV13 solenoid valves. Westinghouse anticipates having the preliminary transient research completed imminently and estimates to take until Nov. 30, 2014 to have all calculations and transient research validated.

"As stated in the original notification, the condition does not affect any operating plant. Affected valves are limited to overseas construction, none have been installed to date."

Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 50349
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0243
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DAVEY TOTTERER (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOACTIVE GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email:

"Event Description: On July 18, 2014 the Department [PA Department of Environmental Protection] performed a routine license inspection and discovered that a gauge was unaccounted for. The licensee believed the gauge was transferred to their Philadelphia plant and began to check records to try and verify its location. On August 6, 2014 the licensee reported to the Department that the gauge could not be located and is considered missing.

"Gauge Information:
Model: Filtec FT-50B
Serial Number: 2398
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 100 mCi

"Cause of the Event: Human error. No records were kept as required regarding the gauge.

"Actions: The Department plans to issue a Notice of Violation and also provide assistance in locating the gauge."

Pennsylvania Event Report ID No.: PA140019

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 50352
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: SEAN PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/09/2014
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2014
Event Time: 07:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
CHRISTIAN ARAGUAS (NMSS)

Event Text

UNPLANNED ONSITE MEDICAL TREATMENT OF A CONTAMINATED WORKER

"An employee experienced a minor thermal burn to the leg and reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid. A whole body survey of the employee's plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's work boots, 15,949 dpm/100cm2. The plant nurse allowed the employee to return to work following treatment. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the entire course of the event.

"Contamination due to uranium ore concentrates."

The licensee will notify their NRC Region 2 Inspector (Hartland) via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50370
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMY COBBS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/15/2014
Notification Time: 01:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2014
Event Time: 16:31 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 63 Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO MULTIPLE INOPERABLE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

"While performing scheduled maintenance on Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-2, Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) identified a failed capscrew on engine cylinder 1L. As part of subsequent inspections to determine whether a similar condition existed on any of the other Unit 1 or Unit 2 EDGs, a degraded capscrew was identified on EDG 2-3 cylinder 8L at 1631 PDT on 08/14/2014. No capscrew issues were identified on the Unit 1 EDGs or on Unit 2 EDG 2-1. Although all operational tests of the diesels up to the time of discovery were satisfactorily performed with no indication of degraded performance, the EDG 2-3 was declared inoperable.

"Because two Unit 2 EDGs were inoperable concurrently, this is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Per the requirements of TS 3.8.1, with two EDGs inoperable, a plant shutdown was commenced at 2031 PDT on 08/14/2014. Therefore, this condition is also being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

"Offsite power remained available throughout this condition. EDG 2-2 remains out of service as part of its scheduled maintenance window.

"This condition did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.

"A press release is planned.

"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee also reported event notifications for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Control of Rad Release and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation.

The licensee plans to continue the shutdown to Mode 3 and is developing plans to return one of the two inoperable EDGs to operable status by the time the unit reaches Mode 5.

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Part 21 Event Number: 50371
Rep Org: ABB, INC
Licensee: ABB, INC
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/15/2014
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

NOTICE OF DEVIATION REGARDING K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY CLOSE LATCH

The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received from ABB, Inc:

"This letter provides notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with a secondary close latch, part number 716610K01, used in K-Line 225/800 and 1600/2000 amp electrically operated Model 7 circuit breakers. This does not affect previous models of these same breakers that have not been upgraded to include the interlocking primary and secondary close latches. It also does not affect manually operated Kline breakers or K3000/4000 circuit breakers. Information is provided as specified in 10CFR21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4).

"Notifying individual: Jay Lavrinc, Vice President & General Manager, ABB (Medium Voltage Service), 2300 Mechanicsville Road, Florence, SC 29501

"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part number 716610K01 secondary close latch. This secondary close latch is used on new legacy K-Line Model 7 electrically operated circuit breakers. It is also used during breaker refurbishments when a secondary close latch is required to be replaced because of damage or wear. The secondary close latch is available as a component part and is also used in K-Line Model 7 up-grade kits.

"If a breaker is sent in for refurbishment the primary and secondary latches are replaced unless it is required in the customer PO that they not be replaced unless they are damaged or worn.

"Nature of the deviation: During outgoing inspection a breaker went trip free during the operational phase of the testing procedure. The inspector found that the cam attached to the top of the secondary close latch, 716610K01, was not properly riveted in place. The head of the rivet was not pushed down flush against the side of the cam. Since the rivet was not seated properly, the other end of the rivet did not project through the other side of the latch and therefore the bradded end of the rivet was not deformed in a manner to sufficiently apply the required holding force to keep the cam in its proper and secure operating position.

"Corrective actions include:
a. Perform 100% inspection all part number 716610K01 secondary close latches in inventory to identify the nonconforming latches. (Action complete)
b. Trained inspectors and breaker assemblers on identifying this condition (Action Complete)
c. Contact primary vendor to investigate cause and correct on future orders. (Action Complete)
d. Verified that this is the only assembly with bradding that this vendor provides. (Action complete)
e. Notification of the potential existence of this deviation to affected customers (Action to be completed by 18 August 2014)

"Affected Customers: Constellation Energy, DTEEnergy, Entergy Operations, Exelon Corporation

"Recommendations: It is recommended that affected Licensees that have received latches that were identified as having been provided from parts that fall under this notification take the following actions:

"If the latch is in their inventory as a component, in a kit or in a breaker that is not currently in use it is suggested that the secondary trip latch be inspected for this condition. Inspection should include visual inspection of the rivets to confirm they are properly seated and bradded and physical manipulation of the cam to determine that it is securely held in place in the assembly.

"If a suspect latch is installed in a breaker that is currently installed and energized we recommend that at their next maintenance cycle, the secondary close latch in the breaker be inspected for this condition.

"We currently cycle Kline breakers that are refurbished approximately 55 close/open operations before they ship from the Florence facility. New breakers get at least that many operations or more. If a breaker has shipped out of the Florence facility during this period it is unlikely that the breaker would get through inspection without failing with a latch that is improperly riveted. ABB cannot guarantee that no latch on a breaker that shipped is affected but we do not see it as a likely occurrence with the testing that the breaker is subjected to prior to shipment. There have been no field failures reported that were attributed to this manufacturing issue."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50375
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK GILBERT
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/15/2014
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2014
Event Time: 12:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On 8/15/2014 at 1218 CDT, the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System was undergoing its monthly surveillance testing. With the 'B' fan running, as part of the surveillance, the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment Mode Select Switch was taken to Manual. This renders the 'A' SBGT subsystem inoperable. Almost simultaneously the 'B' fan Flow Indicating Controller went blank and flashed an error message although indicated flow through the 'B' train remained at 4073 SCFM. Based on the indication seen on 'B' controller, regardless of flow, the 'B' SBGT subsystem was also declared inoperable. In accordance with the surveillance the 'A' SBGT mode switch was placed back in the AUTO position on 8/15/2014 at 1220 CDT, restoring that train to operability. The 'B' SBGT was still considered inoperable based on its flow indicating controller being blank and flashing an error message. For a period of two minutes both SBGT subsystems were considered inoperable which is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SBGT system to control the release of radioactive material. This is considered a 8-hour reportable event per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) 'Any event or condition that at the time discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'

"During the 2 minutes that 'A' SBGT was in Manual, the 'B' SBGT train maintained 4073 scfm train flow which is at the required flow rate per STP 3.6.4.3-01B. In addition, the 'A' train could have been initiated manually at any time during that 2 minutes by the operator who was stationed at the panel performing the surveillance."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50376
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRIAN DEVINE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/17/2014
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2014
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On 8/17/2014 at 0400 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency ventilation system was identified as inoperable. Troubleshooting of this equipment found a blown control power fuse. The system has been restored to operational status as of 0555 EDT on 8/17/2014.

"If an emergency had been declared and TSC activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. The station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC emergency ventilation system was returned to service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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