| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/12/2014 - 08/13/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 50339 | Rep Org: MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: BOZEMAN State: MT
County:
License #: 25-00326-06
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURTIS HOFER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/04/2014
Notification Time: 11:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/03/2014
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CANADA (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISSING NICKEL-63 SOURCE
"On July 3, 2014, Montana State University's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) went to remove the Ni-63 sealed source (14 mCi) from a Varian Model 3400, Serial #13762 (Source Serial #A1059), Gas Chromatograph/Electron Capture Detector (GC/ECD) that was in storage. The RSO is in the process of disposing of all unwanted/unused sources. Upon arriving, the RSO found that the GC/ECD was no longer in CB 28 [Chemistry/Biochemistry Room 28] as it was three months earlier during the semi-annual sealed source leak test inspection. None of the individuals occupying the space had any idea what happened to the device.
"An email, including a picture of the device was sent to all personnel in both the transferor (Land Resources/Environmental Science) and transferee (Chemistry/Biochemistry) departments. In addition a lab by lab search of all chemistry labs was conducted by the RSO. As of this date, the GC/ECD has not been found. The RSO is in the process of continuing the search on the rest of the campus.
"Ni-63 is a low energy (67 keV) beta emitter. The beta energy necessary to penetrate the skin is 70 keV. Therefore, it is very unlikely for anyone to receive a dose from it unless it was broken open and injected, ingested, or inhaled.
"Corrective actions:
1. Two other unused GC/ECDs were picked up by the RSO and taken to his secure lab for removal of the Ni-63 sources to prevent the incident from happening again.
2. The three remaining GC/ECDs are being required to be put on active protocols.
3. During the search for the missing GC/ECD, another GC/ECD was revealed to be in another lab which has not been registered with the RSO. Therefore, the RSO has requested that all Principal Investigators (PIs) report all radiation producing equipment to him immediately.
4. The RSO is also currently meeting with each PI using radioactive material to verify they do not have the missing GC/ECD nor are there any other unreported radiation producing devices on campus.
5. The RSO has also placed a notice on all GC/ECDs stating, the RSO must be contacted prior to relocating this device.
6. All personnel in labs containing radiation producing equipment will be trained to report to the RSO any relocation of these devices.
7. The RSO has been placed under disciplinary action by the Director of the Office of Research Compliance.
8. The RSO will be conducting a search of the remainder of the MSU campus to locate the missing GC."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50340 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION TESTING AND ENGINEERING, INC
Region: 4
City: NORTH HIGHLANDS State: CA
County:
License #: CA 5927-34
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PREDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/04/2014
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2013
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received via email from the State of California:
"The current corporate RSO (will also to be assigned as the future RSO for this license) contacted RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] to report incident that happened on 08/30/13. The RSO was conducting an audit of the program and learned that one of their gauges (Troxler model 3411, S/N 4089, containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241 was run over by a compactor at the Lower Butte Creek Levee Project on 08/30/13. The field technician had reported the incident to the RSO [at the time of the incident]. The rod was broken, however, the source was contained within the shielded part of the gauge assembly. The technician brought the damaged gauge back to the licensee's storage facility and it was stored there until it was picked up by PNT on July 24, 2014. The RSO failed to inform the incident to RHB within 24 hrs. and the incident was reported to RHB almost a year later. The licensee is in the process of changing the RSO to the corporate RSO. Recently, the new RSO has provided refresher training to all the gauge users. The facility will be cited for failure to report the incident per CCR 30295 (b) and 10 CFR 30.50 (b) and for failure to follow procedures."
CA Report No: 072414 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50342 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: NORTH SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT0600485
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SPENCER WICKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2014
Event Time: 18:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF SOURCE TO RETRACT
The following information was received via E-mail:
"The Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) of Mistras reported to the Division of Radiation Control (DRC) that a radioactive source could not be returned to the shielded position in a radiography camera. The radiography technician failed to connect the guide tube to the stiff extension they were using to make superimposed exposures. When the technician cranked out the source, he cranked the cable past the assembly gear and could not retrieve the source. The technician then roped off the area of the incident to ensure individuals did not enter a high radiation area, and informed personnel at the refinery that an incident had occurred. The ARSO was then contacted and informed of the situation. The ARSO arrived on the scene of the incident and performed surveys near the exposure device to determine what the high and low levels of radiation were. The ARSO selected a spot where he could reach the radiography camera's crank handle that was in an area with a dose rate of 4 mR/hr.
"The ARSO used a hack saw to cut the crank handle off of the guide tube. Once the crank handle was removed, the ARSO pulled the guide cable to retract the source back into the camera's shielded position. The camera was then surveyed and returned to the licensee's storage facility. No personnel involved in the incident received exposures in excess of the regulatory limits.
"On May 30, 2014, at approximately 5:00 pm [MDT] the DRC inspectors arrived at the Mistras's facility. The inspectors interviewed personnel involved in the event and collected statements. The inspectors took photographs of the exposure device, collimator, and performed surveys of the camera. The inspectors confirmed that the radioactive sealed source was stopped in the camera's shielded position.
"Radiography exposure device information: Model INC-100, S/N 4419."
The radiography camera contains a 68 Curie Ir-192 source. The event took place at the Chevron refinery located at 2351 North/1100 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Utah Event Report ID No.: UT140002.
* * * UPDATE FROM SPENCER WICKHAM TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1919 EDT ON 8/12/14 * * *
The following event update was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Radiation Control via email:
"No personnel involved in the incident received exposures in excess of the regulatory limits. On May 30, 2014, the day after the incident, DRC inspectors interviewed personnel involved in the event and collected statements. The inspectors took photographs of the industrial radiography exposure device and performed surveys of the device. The inspectors confirmed that the radioactive sealed source was stopped in the device's shielded position."
Notified R4DO (Campbell) and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50344 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STRUCTURAL METALS, INC.
Region: 4
City: SEGUIN State: TX
County:
License #: 02188
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON FIXED GAUGE
The following report was provided from the State of Texas via Email:
"On August 5, 2014, the licensee notified the [Texas Department of State Health Services, Investigation Unit, Radiation Branch] Agency that it had discovered it was unable to close the shutter on a Berthold model LB300ML fixed nuclear gauge that contains a 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source. The licensee stated it had experienced a loss of power on August 3, 2014, that resulted in the loss of control of the flow of molten steel. The licensee stated when it was able to get to the gauge on August 5th and discovered that some steel had spilled onto the top of the gauge's knobs and prevented shutter closure. The licensee stated that the source housing was not damaged and the source had not been compromised. The licensee also reported it has not yet been able to get to the shutter on a second gauge (same model and source) due to the steel spillage. It is anticipating the steel will be cleared within the next 1-2 days so it can make a determination on the status of the shutter on the second gauge. The gauges normally operate with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee stated it had already scheduled a routine service call for August 7th, for its gauges. The licensee will have the technician make needed repairs to the disabled gauge(s) while they are at the facility. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9218
* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1247 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *
"On August 6, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency that it was finally able to access the second gauge, Berthold LB300ML containing 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source, referred to in the initial report. The licensee reported that the shutter on this second gauge was binding (cause unknown at this time) and they were unable to close it. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee will include this shutter for evaluation/repair when the service technician comes to its facility on 08/07/2014. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Werner) and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50355 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH STINSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 05:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 04:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
ABY MOHSENI (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
VICTOR McCREE (R2RA)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT FOR A HALON RELEASE NEAR THE TSC AND EOF
The licensee declared an Unusual Event because of a halon discharge in the simulator. This potentially affects access and habitability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The Unusual Event was declared under HU3.1 "toxic, corrosive, asphyxiate, or flammable gases in amounts that have or could have adversely affected normal plant operations." The fire brigade has been dispatched to determine whether a fire actually exists.
The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 0707 EDT ON 8/12/2014 FROM DAVID FASCHER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 EDT.
"Halon discharged into the plant simulator. There was no actual fire. Offsite assistance was requested. Local fire department and ambulance are on site. The TSC and EOF have been activated.
"The halon discharge into the simulator building is not impacting normal plant operations where the ERO [Emergency Response Organization] capabilities and staffing are still required. Therefore, activation for UE [Unusual Event] is being terminated."
The Incident Commander released the building for normal access at 0717 EDT.
The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease), IRD (Gott), and NRR (Thomas). Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1218 EDT ON 8/12/14 FROM CRAIG OLIVER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER * * *
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: This is an update of a previous notification which was made by telephone to the [NRC] Operations Center at approximately 0504 EDT per Event Number 50355.
"At approximately 0421 EDT on 08/12/2014, the Halon fire suppression system in the Plant Simulator actuated by releasing the Halon. A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0432 EDT on the basis that a release of toxic or asphyxiating gas had occurred on site (Emergency Action Level HU3.1). Emergency response personnel reported to the site and prepared to perform emergency response activities.
"The site fire brigade was dispatched. The local fire department was called and emergency personnel were dispatched to the site.
"The reason for the Halon discharge is not known at this time and is under investigation. No actual fire was observed. The Plant Simulator is located in the same building with the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) and primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Since the Halon discharge occurred in this building, the site incident commander restricted access to these two primary Emergency Response Facilities, rendering them unavailable for use. The NOUE was terminated at 0700 EDT. Normal access to the TSC and EOF was restored at 0717 EDT.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: This event had no effect on the operating units, and there was no adverse impact on nuclear safety or on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Offsite fire department personnel assisted by on site fire brigade have validated that no fire condition existed. The building has been ventilated and normal access restored. The failure of the Halon System is being tracked for restoration in accordance with station fire protection documents."
Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Daytime EO (Thomas). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50356 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI POTENTIAL INOPERABILITY DISCOVERED DURING POST MAINTENANCE TESTING
"At 0238 hours [EDT] on Tuesday, August 12, 2014, with Pilgrim Station at 100 percent power in the Run Mode with reactor coolant pressure at approximately 1025 psig and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System previously removed from service for maintenance, a condition with the potential to impact the operability of the HPCI System was discovered. The HPCI System was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. Upon HPCI initiation, the indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator FI-2340-1-1 was 0 Gallons Per Minute (GPM) with the flow controller in the manual mode. The indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator Fl-2340-1-1 remained at 0 GPM throughout the duration of the surveillance. Alternate flow indication indicated the expected HPCI flow rate. The flow controller in manual was capable of controlling at the demanded HPCI turbine speed. The HPCI turbine speed was manually varied with a corresponding change in the HPCI flow computer point reading. Activities to restore the flow indicator capability are in progress.
"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause of the flow indicator issue.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee will be notifying the state. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50357 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SEACOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 13:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SITE STACK RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
Millstone removed their site stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, from service for scheduled maintenance. Expected duration of maintenance is 8 hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the town of Waterford. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50358 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GENE DAMMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 12:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
"At approximately 1248 CDT, on August 12, 2014, Emergency Planning was notified by the siren vendor that Pierce County inadvertently actuated sirens at 1239 [CDT] while performing a cancel test. Fifty two (52) of the 123 sirens were actuated county wide for approximately 15 seconds before Pierce County could cancel activation. Per F3-5.2, Response to a False Siren Activation, this requires a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) 4 hour non-emergency report. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during this time. The sirens remain in service. No press release is planned at this time.
"The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector." | |