|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/09/2014 - 06/10/2014
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| Part 21 |
Event Number: 50025 |
Rep Org: CAMERON MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS
Licensee: CAMERON MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS
Region: 4
City: INDUSTRY State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHUCK ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 04/10/2014
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2014
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE |
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI) |
Event Text
PART 21 - BARTON MODEL 288A AND 289A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH DEFECT
Cameron Measurement Systems is reporting a defect affecting versions of the Barton Model 288A and 289A differential pressure indicating switches and spare switch assemblies for these products. The defect being reported is an out of specification concentricity issue with the roller that actuates the switches. This represents a switch setpoint repeatability concern.
Any additional safety significant issues that might be identified in our ongoing investigation will be addressed in subsequent advisories that will be published. If you have any questions please contact Chuck Rogers, Director of Quality and Safety, at (281) 582-9507 or Jim Greer, Engineering Manager, at (800) 291-3550.
* * * UPDATE AT 1626 EDT ON 6/9/2014 FROM CHUCK ROGERS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was excerpted from an e-mail:
"Cameron has performed switch setpoint repeatability testing which has verified that rollers, even those with out of tolerance run-out, can meet the published 0.25% repeatability specification as long as the roller moves freely along the switch operating cam. However, if the roller were to 'skid' or 'skip' on the cam, or rotate when the roller is off the cam due to vibrations such that the roller does not return to the exact same radial position when it's on the cam at the switch setpoint there may be a setpoint shift unless the roller has no run-out. A change in the switch setpoint could be as much as ñ0.32% even for the current run-out specification of 0.0003 inches. As such, given that Cameron could ship product with switch repeatability verified to be 0.25% during production testing and that an additional 0.32% could be possible due to the allowable roller run-out, a field performance of 0.57% is possible. Given wear and other uncertainties Cameron would recommend that a user consider a conservative field repeatability value for switch setpoint calculations.
"An important piece of information that was gleaned from the current testing effort is that switch repeatability testing is very dependent on the sensitivity of the calibration equipment utilized. Most calibration pressure sources and measurement displays have lags in the indication of the actual pressures applied that can cause errors and, even more critical, is the lag that occurs between the operator's response to the indication of the switch trip and the reading of the pressure source display. Cameron discovered that the observation of the indicator pointer (properly calibrated) is more accurate in verification of switch repeatability than any pressure source and electrical switch contact monitoring device we utilized. Once the switch setpoint is established, a pencil mark at this trip point on the indicator scale can be utilized to verify subsequent trip points.
"In conversations with customers that called to discuss the original Advisory concerns, Cameron became aware that some users may believe that the Model 288A and 289A switch performance is not impacted by changes in the environment where they are located. The Barton qualification for these products was a radiation augmented mild environment test program. A sample of products was exposed to 3 Mrads of radiation and then subjected to a 12G maximum seismic simulation. The products performed within specification for this limited testing at standard factory environmental conditions. In our opinion, field calibrations and switch setpoint testing should be performed at the same temperature conditions as expected when the instruments are required to perform their safety functions. Performance testing at one temperature may not necessarily ensure appropriate performance at another temperature.
"If you have any questions, want to place an order for a replacement instrument, switch actuation arm (with roller) or a switch and plate assembly, or want to begin the RMA process for an instrument factory repair please contact Mabel Loo, Customer Service Manager, Cameron Measurement Systems, City of Industry, CA at (800) 291-3550."
Notified the R1DO (Dental), R2DO (Freeman), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Werner), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50150 |
Rep Org: RI DEPT OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: PROVIDENCE State: RI
County:
License #: 7A-051-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARMA WARING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (FSME) |
| This material event contains a "Category 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIATION SOURCE STORED IN UNAPPROVED LOCATION
"On January 30, 2014, two physicists within the Department of Radiation Oncology were emailed regarding the imminent shipment of a new Iridium-192 High Dose Rate (HDR) brachytherapy source. This notification was forwarded to the RSO. The source in its original shipping package was delivered by [the transport company] directly to the department on February 3, 2014. Upon arrival of the source, a front desk staff member tried unsuccessfully to notify two physics staff members while the transporter waited. When neither of physics staff members responded to the overhead page, front desk staff signed for the package at 9:43 a.m. The front desk staff member moved the package from the front desk area to the mold room floor (Room # 039.12), which is an unsecured location.
"On February 14th, it was discovered that the source was not in the Radiation Oncology Hot Lab - the appropriate secured location. Upon investigation and questioning of the staff who signed for the package, the location of the source was determined at 2:15p.m. on February 14th. The source was then taken to the HDR suite by the HDR service engineer (on-site to perform the source exchange) before Radiation Safety personnel were able to perform a wipe test and survey the original shipping package. Upon arrival, Radiation Safety personnel performed a wipe test and survey of the inner shielding cask housing the source.
"ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT:
-The source in its original shipping package was inappropriately stored in the mold room for approximately 11 days, 5 hours.
-Only one female in the department has a declared pregnancy. At no point in time during this period (February 3rd- February 14th) did she enter the mold room.
- The mold room is used only for the preparation of electron cutouts or blocks used in Linac-based treatments. This room is used infrequently (~5 visits per week - about 10 to 15 minutes per visit) by radiation oncology staff (physicists and dosimetrists) wearing radiation dosimeters.
- Adjacent areas to the mold room are a clerical area on one side and hallways on the three other sides.
- Exposure information obtained from the Radiation Safety personnel who surveyed the package on Friday, February 14th were 34 mR/hr at the surface and 0.5 mR/hr at 1 meter.
- The timing of the wipe test and survey was not in accordance with the requirement that a package containing radioactive material be opened and inspected by the recipient as soon as possible (within 3 hours) after receipt.
- There was no notification directly from [the transport company] that the package was delivered.
"CAUSES OF FAILURE:
-Procedure entitled 'Opening and Receiving of Radioactive Materials' was not followed.
-Communication break-down between the front desk personnel and physics staff.
"ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
1. Establish one primary physicist and one back-up physicist to serve as the coordinator for the receipt of the radioactive package. Additional physicists within the department will be permitted access into the Radiation Oncology Hot Lab. Additionally, two physicists will sign off in the HDR source inventory logbook upon receipt of the source.
2. All physicists will be trained in accordance with departmental procedures and applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations on the process of receiving this type of package into the department and ensuring its proper storage.
3. The shipping company will be contacted to add all physicists and Radiation Safety personnel to be notified that the source has been shipped. The shipping company will also provide a tracking number for every HDR source package shipped to this facility. Another notification will be made from the transport company that the source has arrived (including delivery confirmation, signature, time & date).
4. Training of all department personnel will be performed and documented. This training will include who is authorized to sign for a radioactive package, how to identify a radioactive package, and the process that should be followed to ensure a safe transfer of the package to Rhode Island Hospital custody.
5. The policy governing the receipt of this type of material will be reviewed, revised, and disseminated upon approval.
6. If the package has not been received within 72 hours of the shipping company's notification, the primary physicist will follow up with the shipping company to determine the location of the package."
Rhode Island Event #2014-001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| Non-Agreement State |
Event Number: 50151 |
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS CANCER CENTER
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS CANCER CENTER
Region: 3
City: LEE'S SUMMIT State: MO
County:
License #: 24-32517-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE |
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) |
Event Text
ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR MEDICAL EVENT
"A patient at the Lee's Summit location in Missouri was administered the radiopharmaceutical Xofigo. The normal therapy regimen is six doses. On two of those instances (April 29 and April 1, 2014), the prescription sheet/written directive form that was used shows the units in millicurie instead of microcurie. The dosing amount of Xofigo is in microcuries. This was discovered during a routine NRC inspection on May 19, 2014. The NRC contacted us on May 29, 2014 to inform us that this was being declared a medical event. The patient received the correct dose in both instances; the error was a transcription error on the paperwork. A new form just for Xofigo administrations has been created which defaults to showing the units in microcurie."
The licensee notified R3 (Bramnik).
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50152 |
Rep Org: RI DEPT OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: CARDIOVASCULAR INSTITUTE OF NEW ENGLAND
Region: 1
City: PROVIDENCE State: RI
County:
License #: 7b-137-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARMA WARING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (E-MA) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CALIBRATION SOURCE
"On February 12, 2014, the nuclear cardiology and radiation safety staff concluded, a Cesium-137 Rod
Source; 1059 microCi on November 11/11/2003; Manufactured by Bench Mark; Serial Number: BM0837- 002-23; Model Number: BM08, was lost.
"Following discovery of the lost source, the nuclear cardiology staff and this consultant conducted an extensive search of the nuclear cardiology imaging room and hot lab in an effort to find the source. Unfortunately, we were unsuccessful in locating the calibration rod. The lost source was routinely stored in the locked hot lab cabinet in a leaded pig. The only time the source was removed from the leaded pig was to perform daily calibrations of the well counter. Through our internal investigation we were unable to ascertain the event that attributed to the missing source.
"Subsequently, contacted [the Rhode Island Department of Health], to provide official notice that the source was lost. At the time of the incident, the activity of the source was calculated at 0.083 microCi. On February 21,2014 a replacement Cs-137 Button Source; 6.60 microCi on 12/18/2009; Manufactured by NEN was added to the Sealed Source Inventory. The new source is stored in the locked hot lab cabinet in a leaded vial. The new source is used for instrument calibrations on the well counter. The nuclear cardiology staff will conduct a daily inventory of the sealed sources to assure completeness."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50155 |
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: McARDLE GANNON ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: NORTHBOROUGH State: MA
County:
License #: 48-0518
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUG CULLEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2014
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (E-MA) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE DAMAGED AT A JOB SITE
The following report was received via fax:
"The Troxler gauge operator was in the process of calibrating the instrument for use at a temporary job site in Northborough, MA, and during this procedure the gauge was run over by a work vehicle. The operator of the gauge called and notified the RSO of McArdle Gannon Associates, our Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program], and Troxler of the incident.
"The gauge operator provided the location of the incident, the model number of the Troxler Gauge (Model 3440), and indicated that the sources were located in the shielded gauge housing when struck by the work-vehicle. The Troxler Model 3440 contains two isotopes; Am-241, and Cs-137 with activities of 44 and 9 mCi, respectively. The operator also indicated that a safety perimeter was being established around the incident site using stakes and caution tape.
"An Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] inspector arrived at the site, and determined exposures were 63 mR/hr at contact, and approximately 0.4 mR/hr at a distance of 1 (one) meter. The device and vehicle which struck the device were surveyed for contamination, with all results indicating background levels. The inspector also identified that the Am-241 and Cs-137 sources were accounted for within the device.
"The licensee has contacted the gauge manufacturer and arrangements are underway for a leak test and safe transport of the gauge to the licensee's authorized storage location in Pembroke, MA, and eventual disposal of the gauge.
"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] investigation remains open." |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50156 |
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: NORTH FLORIDA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: GAINESVILLE State: FL
County:
License #: 2980-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE FROM A Y-90 PROCEDURE
The following report was received via email:
"[The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] received a call from [the licensee's RSO] regarding an underdose incident on a patient. During the procedure, the technician noticed bubbles in the administration line, and stopped the procedure. It was estimated that the patient only received 4 mCi out of the 16 mCi dose prescribed. [The licensee's RSO] will be sending a full report of the incident to this office. [The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] will assign an inspector to investigate."
Florida Incident Number: FL 141-046
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50157 |
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PREMIER NDT
Region: 4
City: RANGELY State: CO
County:
License #: 116201
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERI HALL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2014
Event Time: 10:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
After attempting to retract the source during radiography operations, the radiographer noticed elevated radiation levels. The radiographer set up a boundary and notified the RSO. The RSO determined that the source was not fully retracted but was able to retract the source. The RSO was in a 40 mr/hr area for about 5 minutes. The licensee will send the camera to the manufacturer for repair.
"Exposure Device:
Make: QSA Global, Inc.
Model: Delta 880
Serial #: D 8543
"Source:
Make: QSA Global, Inc.
Model: A424-9
Serial #: 14620C
Radionuclide: Ir-192
Initial Activity: 104.9 Ci
Initial Date: May 8, 2014
Current Activity: 85.3 Ci
Current Date: May 30, 2014"
Colorado Incident Number: I14-13
* * * UPDATE ON 6/5/14 AT 1200 FROM CHERI HALL TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"Below are the dosimeter results for everyone involved in the 5-30-14 incident. Month (5-1-14 to 5-31-14)
"Radiographer: DDE [deep dose equivalent]: 55 mrem; LDE [lens dose equivalent]: 55 mrem; SDE [shallow dose equivalent]: 55 mrem
"Assistant: DDE: 105 mrem; LDE: 107 mrem; SDE: 107 mrem
"RSO (performed retrieval) DDE: 11 mrem; LDE: 11 mrem; SDE: 10 mrem"
Notified R4DO (Taylor) and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50159 |
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: ELKO State: NV
County:
License #: 05-11-0041-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2014
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (E-MA) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - A FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER DISCONNECTED FROM ITS HANDLE
The following event was submitted via e-mail:
"While completing the annual inventory checks, it was discovered that the handle of a Berthold Cs-137 source, S/N: 281, Model No. LB7440, with an activity of 281 mCi, had separated from the shutter mechanism. The shutter was closed and was verified with a RadEye B20 S/N: 0520. This source has been moved and put in storage until the shutter can be fixed. A visit has been scheduled for the repair, with the manufacturer. Documentation will be provided upon completion of the repairs."
Nevada Report #NV-140014 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50180 |
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: EDWARD BURNS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 06/08/2014
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2014
Event Time: 16:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO TRITIUM DISCOVERED IN ONSITE WELL
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) because Dresden Nuclear Power Station is in the process of informing the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (lEMA) and Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) of recent groundwater monitoring results at Dresden Station. Additionally, the station intends to issue a press release.
"As part of the Station's extensive environmental monitoring and sampling program, sample results from an onsite sampling well near the 2/3 contaminated water storage tank (CST) indicate elevated levels of tritium. This is an on-site leak, requiring the notification of the State of Illinois. Based on sampling data obtained, the tritium is currently confined to Exelon property.
"The IEPA/lEMA regulation requires notification when a release to soil, groundwater or surface water goes offsite at greater than 200 pCi/L or remains on-site greater than 0.002 Curies. Based upon the sampling results from the monitoring well near the 2/3 CST with a concentration of approximately 0.0000013 Curies/liter it is likely that the 0.002 Curie on-site threshold has been exceeded.
"The Station continues to track this issue by monitoring the existing wells and initiation of mitigative actions to contain any release and ensure it remains on-site. At this time, the source of the tritium has not been identified. Investigation continues to determine if an off-site release occurred.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1951 EDT ON 6/9/2014 FROM THOMAS DITCHFIELD TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At 1830 [CDT], the station notified IEPA/IEMA, pursuant to 35 ILL. ADM. Code 1010.202, that from the time period of April 2, 2014, to June 8, 2014, elevated levels of tritium existed at the discharge of the plant. As part of the site investigation that was done in response to the event reported in EN 50180, it has been determined that no greater than 0.1 Curies were discharged from the site. The majority of this discharge was to the Kankakee River via the sewage treatment plant effluent. A small amount, determined to be less than 2%, was discharged to the Morris Illinois sewage treatment facility. This release is associated with the elevated tritium levels discovered on June 7, 2014 and reported to the IEPA on June 8, 2014.
"The system is currently isolated, and is not discharging to the Kankakee River.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Daley). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50182 |
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DIEGO SUAREZ
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 06/09/2014
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2014
Event Time: 07:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/2014 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
RADIATION MONITORING SAMPLE RACK DECLARED NON-FUNCTIONAL
"At 0715 hours PDT on June 9, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures were implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available.
"This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector." |
|