| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/01/2014 - 04/02/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 48745 | Rep Org: DRESSER-RAND
Licensee: DRESSER-RAND
Region: 1
City: WELLSVILLE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: D. G. MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/12/2013
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
PART 21 RX GROUP (E-MA)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - DEFECTIVE RAW MATERIAL USED TO MANUFACTURE VALVE STEMS
Dresser-Rand is reporting that one of its vendors supplied annealed material instead of the specified heat-treated material. Dresser-Rand used the defective raw material to manufacture valve stems for Terry Type Emergency Feedwater pump drive turbines. Dresser-Rand has verified that the annealed material is not acceptable for the finished product.
The two customers (Wolf Creek Nuclear Plant and Callaway Nuclear Plant) that received the affected parts have been notified of this issue and have confirmed that the components in question are not in service at their facilities. The remaining material and affected parts have been quarantined at the Dresser-Rand plant in Wellsville, NY.
All questions should be addressed to:
Joe Menichino
Manager, Navy/Nuclear Product Engineering
37 Coat Street
Wellsville, New York, 14895
Phone: (585) 596-3406
jamenichino@dresser-rand.com
* * * UPDATE FROM JOE MENICHINO TO CHARLES TEAL ON 3/11/13 AT 1614 EDT * * *
The following was excerpted from a facsimile received from Dresser-Rand:
"DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT OR NON-COMPLIANCE
"Specific designs of steam turbine control valve stems are made from heat treated ASM 5663M Inconel Bar raw material. Certifications associated with heat numbers of certain inventory of this material indicate that the material vendor incorrectly supplied material in an annealed condition (AMS 5662M).
"POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARD OR NON-COMPLIANCE
"Valve stems are used to control steam turbine speed and power. The valve stems must be free to move within the guiding assembly during operation. Stems are made using materials that have the correct material properties to reduce the risk of failure. The use of inconel raw stock in an annealed condition is unacceptable for steam turbine valve stems due to the risk of unacceptable wear and strength characteristics which could lead to sticking or tensile failure in the mating guide bushings within the valve assembly.
"ADVICE TO EFFECTED CLIENT RELATED TO THIS REPORT
"For those affected sites identified, locate and return the material to Dresser-Rand immediately."
Affected facilities include Point Beach, Clinton, Wolf Creek, Cooper, Callaway, San Onofre, and Prairie Island.
Notified R1DO (Dentel), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Powers), and the Part 21 Group via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM ED GRANDUSKY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1510 EST ON 2/28/14 * * *
The following was excerpted from a facsimile received from Dresser-Rand:
"DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT:
"This is an addendum to Part 21 Reports Log# 2013-008-00 and Log# 2013-008-01. Another Vendor certification has been discovered for valve stem material that indicates the annealed condition-lnconel was supplied in lieu of the heat treated that is specified.
"ENGINEERING EVALUATION & RECOMMENDATIONS:
"1- Complete review of all Vendor certification for this material to make certain no more.
Discrepant material was used in the manufacture of these stems.
"2- Identify all DR part numbers that were made using the affected heat numbers.
"3- Notify affected customers and recall non-compliant parts.
"Potential Affected Part Numbers:
"800777-001 Rev. NA
"800768-701 Rev. A
"800768-702 Rev. A
"800858-001 Rev. E
"800740-701 Rev. A
"800746-001 Rev. B
"800739-001 Rev. NA
"800743-001 Rev. A
"801061-701 Rev. A
"800741-701 Rev. B
"800744-001 Rev. NA
"800745-001 Rev. NA
"800748-001 Rev. A
"800742-001 Rev. B"
Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Hagar), and the Part 21 Group via email.
* * *UPDATE FROM ED GRANDUSKY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1520 EDT ON 04/01/2014 * * *
The following information is excepted from a facsimile provided by Dresser-Rand:
Specifications for valve stems provided to Palo Verde (Part Number W800743-001), Tihange 2 (Part Number W800746-001), Catawba (Part Number W800746-001), and Davis Besse (Part Number (W800746-001) call for the material to be heat treated AMS 5663M Inconel Bar. Certifications associated with another heat number of material indicate that the vendor supplied material in an annealed condition (AMS 5662M). The lower mechanical properties of the AMS 5662M could lead to shorter operating life for these stems.
The material certification for all Inconel valve stems has been reviewed back to the first Inconel stem made by Dresser-Rand. No new corrective actions were deemed necessary. The four sites listed above should locate and return the valve stems immediately to Dresser-Rand for evaluation.
Notified R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford), and the 10CFR Part 21 Group via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49955 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NATIONAL TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Region: 4
City: NEWARK State: CA
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PREDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/24/2014
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2014
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING NICKEL 63 SOURCE
The following information was received via email:
"Operations Manager of National Technical Systems, NTS- Silicon Valley, contacted RHB [California - Radiation Health Branch] Sacramento and reported that their analytical equipment, manufactured by Particle Measuring Systems, used for analyzing gases by ionizing them with a 10 milliCi Nickel-63 source was leaking. The Nickle-63 source leakage was discovered in their recent leak test that was performed in anticipation of shipping the unit to the calibration lab. This resulted in a reading well above the 11,000 DPM limits (it was 4.8 million DPM inside the outflow fitting of the equipment). National Technical Systems shipped the detector cell and equipment to Particle Measuring Systems for disposal. National Technical Systems conducted surveys in the area where the unit was stored and used, and no Nickel-63 contamination was found. According to the radiation safety officer of Particle Measuring Systems, the contamination was contained inside the outflow part of the equipment.
"Equipment Manufacturer: Particle Measuring Systems; Equipment Name and Model: Air Sentry II, Chlorides Monitor
"Based upon disposal and appropriate surveys, this item is closed." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49957 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: LSU, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-0001-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/25/2014
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST HANDHELD TRACE DETECTOR CONTAINING NI-63 SOURCE
The following information was received via facsimile:
On the evening of March 11, 2014, the LA Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) received a notification from Louisiana State University (LSU) that they had sent a Smiths Detection model Sabre 5000 handheld trace detector, containing 15 mCi of Ni-63, to the manufacturer for repairs. The device was sent by common carrier. The device was repaired and sent back to the common carrier's distribution center. The common carrier's records show that on December 20, 2013 at 1832 CST, the device was delivered and left at the front door of 3south LLC, the local distributor of Smiths Detection products. The records at 3south do not show receipt of the device. A claim was filed and the resolution took several weeks. The device was never located by the common carrier or the local distributor. The device was replaced by Smiths Detection.
DEQ considers this event closed.
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-140002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49979 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL DUNDEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 04/01/2014
Notification Time: 02:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2014
Event Time: 00:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO ELECTRICAL ISSUE
"At 0026 on 04/01/2014, following the turbine shutdown and removal of the main generator from service in preparation for refueling outage 16, Seabrook had a reactor trip and all control rods were fully inserted. The trip was caused by an electrical issue that caused 345 KV bus 6 to deenergize and power was lost to the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs). The in-house busses transferred to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) supplies and the momentary loss of power to in-house Bus 1 caused 2 reactor coolant pumps to trip, generating a 2 loop loss of flow reactor trip signal. The exact cause of the initiating electrical issue is being investigated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Emergency feedwater actuated at 0035 due to a low low water level in steam generator 'C'. Plant equipment response is being evaluated and the plant is stabilized in Mode 3 with decay heat removal through the steam dump system to the condensers. There was no release and the emergency feedwater system is being restored to standby.
"The event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49980 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: P.C. MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 04/01/2014
Notification Time: 10:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2014
Event Time: 06:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FATALITY ON SITE
"At approximately 0616 CDT on April 1, 2014, a supplemental employee at Wolf Creek developed a personal medical condition. Wolf Creek Emergency Medical Technicians on site responded and an ambulance transported the individual to an offsite hospital. The individual was located in one of the office areas inside the protected area. The offsite hospital declared the individual deceased upon arrival on April 1, 2014.
"The individual was outside the Radiological Controlled Area. No radioactive material or contamination was involved. This notification is being performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State and Coffey County. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49982 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/01/2014
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2014
Event Time: 06:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text VENTILATION FAN FAILURE AFFECTING RHRSW/ESW PUMP OPERABILITY AND EDG OPERABILITY
"At 0645 on the morning of April 1, 2014, with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100 percent power, the Control Room received an alarm associated with the ventilation system for the 'B' division of the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) and Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump room. Investigation identified that the ventilation exhaust fan (73FN-3B) associated with this pump room had tripped due to thermal overload. The overload relay was reset at 0704 and the fan automatically started; the fan is currently operable. During this period, the fan would not have automatically started.
"The ventilation systems for the RHRSW and ESW pump rooms are not included in the JAF Technical Specifications (TS), nor are they in the JAF Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The ambient temperature limit in the RHRSW and ESW pump room was never challenged. However, with 73FN-3B non-functional, it is procedurally required to declare 10P-1B (RHRSW Pump B), 10P-1D (RHRSW Pump D) and 46P-2B (ESW Pump B) inoperable. The 'B' ESW pump cools the 'B' EDG subsystem, which would therefore also be inoperable. During this period, the 'A' EDG subsystem was inoperable for an emergent issue. Because the 'A' and 'B' EDG subsystems were concurrently inoperable for a period of approximately 45 minutes, this condition resulted in a loss of safety function for the Emergency Diesel Generators, which is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)."
Both affected emergency diesel generators were in the same division with another redundant division operable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State of New York. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49984 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JAMES COX
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/01/2014
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2014
Event Time: 13:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNIT 2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTERLOCKED DOORS OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY
"On April 1, 2014, at 1357 hours, the Control Room was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (between the Unit 2 Reactor Building and Unit 2 Turbine Building) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable.
"This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." | |