| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/13/2014 - 03/14/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49702 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL LONG
HQ OPS Officer: GEROND GEORGE | Notification Date: 01/08/2014
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2014
Event Time: 10:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY - NON-FUNCTIONAL AREA RADIATION MONITORS
"At [1010 PST] on 1/08/14, during performance of a surveillance the power supply for ten area radiation monitors in the Reactor Building was found with voltage out of specification. As a result, the affected area radiation monitors were declared non-functional. This condition represents a major loss of assessment capability and is being reported as such under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted until the power supply is restored.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM JASON LOVEGREN TO JIM DRAKE ON 01/10/2014 AT 0214 EST* * *
"The power supply voltage has been restored to specification per applicable station procedures. All affected area radiation monitors have been declared functional. Compensatory measures have been suspended."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 3/13/14 AT 1853 EDT FROM JOHN KAINEG TO DONG PARK * * *
"Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following:
"Energy Northwest performed an evaluation for the reported out-of-specification voltage condition for the power supply to several radiation monitors in the Reactor Building. The evaluation concluded that the voltage deviation from the -24 VDC set point was small and within the calculated uncertainty for the instrument, and did not result in equipment failure. Therefore, it was concluded that the radiation monitors were functional and that the reported major loss of assessment capability did not occur."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49774 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM McGUIRE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 01/29/2014
Notification Time: 14:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2014
Event Time: 11:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY WAS TEMPORARILY BLOCKED OPEN
"Title: Door Opened Under Administrative Control Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of Safety Functions to Control the Release of Radioactive Material and Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
"On January 29, 2014, it was determined a door credited as a Secondary Containment Boundary was temporarily blocked opened multiple times since January 25, 2014 under administrative control. Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 'Secondary Containment' is applicable and requires the system to be restored to operable status within 24 hours. In each instance where the door was blocked open, the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 were entered and complied with.
"NUREG 1022 Revision 3 states inoperability of a single train system is reportable even though the plant's Technical Specifications may allow the condition to exist for a limited time. Although the plant was operated within the licensing basis, since Secondary Containment was rendered inoperable, Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1030 EDT ON 03/13/14 FROM THOMAS CLEARY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"The purpose of this call is to retract the report made on January 29, 2014, Event Number 49774. Event Report number 49774 describes a condition in which the Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) Secondary Containment was voluntarily rendered inoperable under administrative control.
"Using the criteria of NUREG-1022 Rev. 3, this condition report is not related to inoperability being due to one or more personnel errors, including procedure violations; equipment failures; inadequate maintenance; or design, analysis, fabrication, equipment qualification, construction, or procedural deficiencies and was declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing and done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's technical specifications. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 49774 is being retracted.
"The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49783 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: EDWIN MICHAEL SOCHA
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 02/01/2014
Notification Time: 14:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2014
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM DOOR BLOCKED OPEN FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"Door in Control Room boundary blocked open for scheduled maintenance. No impact as door is opened under administrative control OP3314F, Section 4.24. Door has been closed following maintenance.
"Door opened under administrative control could have prevented the fulfillment of Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.
"A door credited for Control Room Boundary was blocked open under administrative controls as part of a Pre-Planned maintenance activity. Technical Specification 3.7.7, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, is applicable and allows 'The Control Room Envelope (RE) boundary may be opened under administrative control'
"NUREG 1022, Revision 3, states inoperability of a single train system is reportable even though the plant's Technical Specifications may allow the condition to exist for a limited time. Although the plant was operated within the licensing basis, since the Control Room Envelope was rendered inoperable, Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State government, and Local government.
* * * UPDATE AT 1030 EDT ON 03/13/14 FROM THOMAS CLEARY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"The purpose of this call is to retract the report made on February 1, 2014, NRC Event Number 49783. Event Report number 49783 describes a condition in which the Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) Control Room Envelope was voluntarily rendered inoperable under administrative control.
"Using the criteria of NUREG-1022 Rev. 3, this condition report is not related to inoperability being due to one or more personnel errors, including procedure violations; equipment failures; inadequate maintenance; or design, analysis, fabrication, equipment qualification, construction, or procedural deficiencies and was declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing and done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's technical specifications. Therefore, this condition Is not reportable and NRC Event Number 49783 is being retracted.
"The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49877 | Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: RENOWN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 16-12-0016-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2014
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE MEDICAL EVENT WITH Y-90 SIR-SPHERES MICROSPHERES
The following information was received by email:
"On February 21, 2014 a physician in the department of Interventional Radiology (IR) at Renown Regional Medical Center in Reno, NV prescribed a patient with 26.73 mCi of Y-90 to the liver. This isotope is listed on the RAM license 16-12-0016-01 as item K, sealed sources (Sirtex Medical Limited SIR-Spheres microspheres). This case was approached in the same manner as the previous 20+ cases. The physician felt that the entire dose was appropriately delivered, therefore he went to air and flushed the catheter. The case was ended without incident. After the dose calculations were performed, it was found out that only 54.2% of the dose was delivered. The technicians investigated the delivery system and found that the majority of the undelivered isotope was in/around the 3-way stop system. The company representative [SIRTex] was [at the licensee's site] and after lengthy discussion with the physician, it is felt that the stop might have been defective. The patient and the referring physician were notified."
Nevada Event: NV140006
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49908 | Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: ASCO VALVE, INC.
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LISA SCHICHLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - UNSEATING OF VALVE SPRING ON SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE
"This concerns an evaluation being performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding a malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSPV), which has been observed to impair control rod scram performance. As stated herein, GEH has not concluded that this is a reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 21.21(d). The SSPV manufacturer (ASCO Valve, Inc.) has not yet concluded its own investigation under 10CFR 21, and the results of that investigation are needed as input for the GEH evaluation. The manufacturer has issued an Interim Report, which provides confidence that this condition is limited to a very small portion of the suspect population.
"A malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve was attributed to the disengagement of the valve spring from the valve plunger. The effect of the malfunction is to degrade scram performance of an affected control rod. The safety significance of this condition cannot be determined at this time, but several mitigating and compensatory functions have been identified."
This evaluation affects Fermi 2, Columbia, Dresden 2-3, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, and Browns Ferry 1-3. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49909 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN PANAGOTOPULOS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2014
Event Time: 06:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM SAMPLE CONCENTRATION OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS
"On March 13, 2014 at 0631 EDT, sample analysis of the Standby Liquid Control System tank yielded a sodium pentaborate concentration outside the technical specification [TS] limits, rendering both subsystems inoperable. The sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be 4 parts per million low, at 13.598% by weight, below the required concentration of 13.6% by weight. The Standby Liquid Control System tank concentration was diluted during restoration activities following planned maintenance of the B Standby Liquid Control System pump. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Chemical addition to the Standby Liquid Control System tank is in progress to restore the sodium pentaborate concentration to within technical specification limits."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49910 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK DEWIRE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 14:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2014
Event Time: 09:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text APPARENT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DOOR INTERLOCK MALFUNCTION
"At 0937 EDT on March 13, 2014, Operations determined that both the inner and outer secondary containment airlock doors, on the 50 foot elevation of the reactor building, had been simultaneously opened for approximately one minute. This event occurred while an employee was exiting secondary containment at the same time when an employee was attempting to enter secondary containment. Upon recognition of the condition, the employees took action to secure both doors. The apparent cause of this event was malfunction of the secondary containment airlock door interlock. However, upon investigation no failures of the interlock could be identified. The interlock was satisfactorily tested multiple times following the event.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. With both doors open, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 of Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment, was not met, rendering secondary containment inoperable. At the time at the time of the condition, Unit 1 was engaged in Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) and was crediting Secondary Containment as Operable.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The safety significance of this is minimal. Secondary containment was only inoperable for approximately one minute. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The door interlock was investigated and tested multiple times with no abnormalities noted.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
The licensee is establishing a door watch as a compensatory measure. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49911 | Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
Licensee: QUALTECH NP
Region: 4
City: KILONA State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN JARRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.
"On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.
"The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.
"Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.
"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49914 | Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM JOACHIMCZYK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 18:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2014
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"A review of industry Operating Experience identified that there were unprotected DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building to other separate fire areas. Fuses used to protect the motor power conductors appear to be inadequate to protect the control conductors. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one area can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.
"This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
. | |