| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/10/2014 - 02/11/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 49782 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY LLC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE COULD NOT BE RETRACTED
The following was received from the state of Texas via email:
"On January 31, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that while performing radiography at a field location a radiography crew was unable to retract a 19 curie iridium - 192 source into a SPEC 150 exposure device. The radiographers were testing a pipe when a second pipe fell on the guide tube and crimped it enough that the source could not pass by it. The radiographers contacted their manager and informed them of the problem. Two individuals qualified to retrieve sources went to the location. They were able to reshape the guide tube enough to retract the source. The work was being conducted in a shielded shooting bay, therefore there was no exposure to any member of the general public. The highest exposure to anyone involved with the event was 60 millirem. No overexposure occurred. The guide tube was disposed of. The exposure device was tested with a new guide tube and functioned normally. The exposure device was returned to service. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident # I-9152 |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49813 | Rep Org: ABB INC
Licensee: ABB INC
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 02/10/2014
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2014
Event Time: 17:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - INSTRUCTION LEAFLET FOR SUBJECT RELAYS MAY BE DEFICIENT
The following Part 21 Report was received via facsimile:
"On December 12, 2013, ABB determined that that its Instruction Leaflet 41-682.11 (effective September 2002) for the subject relays may be deficient with regards to the external diagram connection.
"With the relay connected per the typical connections shown in the instruction leaflet and the relay having verified a synchronous condition for a period of time ranging from several minutes to hours, the main element contact identified as 'CVX-1' may become stuck in the closed position. Again, this situation is dependent on each customer's control power connection scheme and may be more prevalent in certain applications, such as fast bus transfer or tie breaker applications. In cases where the contact remains closed, it may result in an unwanted connection of two asynchronous systems when the command to connect them is issued, leading to equipment damage and possible bodily injury or death. We will be updating our instruction leaflet in February 2014, to reflect the addition of an interposing contact in the control circuit to prevent this condition.
"ABB's records indicate that 15 relays were supplied to Exelon (Clinton Nuclear Station), 4 relays were supplied to Duke Energy (Oconee Nuclear Station) and 10 relays were supplied to ABB d.o.o. (Slovenia).
"ABB has determined, as of the date of this notification, that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.2l(b), is making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, in accordance with 10 CFR 21(a)." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49814 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RONALD BLECKNER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/10/2014
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2014
Event Time: 16:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/10/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 88 | Power Operation | Event Text SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY AFFECTING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY
The licensee also reported an additional 8 hour Non-emergency report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)
"On February 10, 2014, [at 1650 CST] Monticello station personnel identified a vulnerability where a single failure could result in the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) picking up load on the essential busses in a time frame longer than what is required by Monticello Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement [TS SR] 3.8.1.12. This surveillance requires that on a simulated or actual loss of off-site power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal, the Emergency Diesel Generators auto-start from standby condition and energize permanently connected loads in approximately 10 seconds. The single failure vulnerability could result in the EDGs energizing the connected loads in a slightly longer time period based upon actual test data (< 11 seconds).
"As a result, Technical Specification SR 3.8.1.12 was declared not met and both EDGs were declared inoperable. Monticello has subsequently isolated the single failure vulnerability and declared the EDGs operable. The station remained in a safe condition during the discovery of this vulnerability. Both EDGs remain available and functional [and operable], off-site power remains available, and the plant continues to operate in a normal condition with no initiating events present."
The single failure vulnerability was associated with the 1AR 13.8KV transformer logic. The 1AR transformer is one of three off-site power sources. 1R and 2R meet the TS requirements for Off-site power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer. | |