U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 02/06/2014 - 02/07/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | Agreement State | Event Number: 49680 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: DEL-TIN FIBER, LLC Region: 4 City: EL DORADO State: AR County: License #: ARK-0874-0312 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: TAMMY KRIESEL HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 12/30/2013 Notification Time: 12:04 [ET] Event Date: 12/27/2013 Event Time: [CST] Last Update Date: 02/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO) FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE The following information was received via email from Arkansas Department of Health: "The licensee notified the [Arkansas] Department [of Health] on December 27, 2013 via email that a Ronan source holder model SA1-F37 shutter failed. The source holder serial number is M4785, and the source contains 100 mCi of Cesium-137. The problem was discovered during shutter checks. [According to the licensee], it appears the shutter handle is spinning on the shaft that rotates [to] open [and] close the shutter. [This] may be a result of a sheared pin that connects the handle to the shaft. Per the RSO, the gauge is still in use, and there have been no exposures to employees or members of the public. The RSO has notified applicable facility personnel. "The licensee indicated the manufacturer was contacted on December 27, 2013 and repairs should be performed the week of January 6th-13th. "The State of Arkansas is awaiting a written report after repairs. The State's event number is ARK-2013-013." * * * UPDATE AT 0844 EST ON 02/06/14 FROM TAMMY KRIESEL TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * * "The following updates and closes Event Number 49680. "The manufacturer, Ronan Engineering Company, sent a report to the Arkansas Department of Health dated January 9, 2014 and received on February 5, 2014 indicating repair was completed. The root cause was a top rubber seal had 'dry rotted and allowed contaminates to seep into the shutter cavity. Over time, contaminates built up to a point of binding up the shutter.' The damaged seal was replaced and the source holder was reassembled. On January 16, 2014 a routine inspection was conducted at the facility. At the time of inspection, the gauge was functioning properly. "The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event closed." Notified R4DO (Azua) and FSME Events Resource (email). | Agreement State | Event Number: 49775 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: HTS INC CONSULTANTS Region: 4 City: HOUSTON State: TX County: License #: 02757 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 01/29/2014 Notification Time: 15:39 [ET] Event Date: 01/29/2014 Event Time: 12:00 [CST] Last Update Date: 02/02/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO) FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) MEXICO (FAX) ILTAB (EMAI) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE The following was received from the state of Texas via email: "On January 29, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice from the Licensee that a Troxler model 3430 moisture/density gauge had been stolen along with a truck. The serial number is 35379. It was not believed that the gauge was the target of the theft. The truck was stolen from the parking lot while the driver was running an errand. The gauge as manufactured contains an 8 millicurie cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie americium/beryllium source. An investigation into this event is ongoing. It is unlikely that a member of the public will be exposed to hazardous radiation as the sources are still locked in the shielded position. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300." The local police and the Texas Association of Pawnbrokers were notified. Texas incident # I 9150 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49799 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND Region: 3 State: MN Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: NATHAN BIBUS HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 02/06/2014 Notification Time: 08:21 [ET] Event Date: 02/06/2014 Event Time: 07:30 [CST] Last Update Date: 02/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE "At approximately 0730 CST on February 6, 2014, 1R-22 Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor will be removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs), NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 1R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). "Unit 1 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 1R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 1R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-22 prior to removing it from service. This planned maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49800 | Facility: BRUNSWICK Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: STEPHEN W. REED HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/06/2014 Notification Time: 11:00 [ET] Event Date: 12/11/2013 Event Time: 08:18 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION | Person (Organization): ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) VALVES DURING I&C MAINTENANCE "This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1 ), is being made per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid closure of Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) valves. On December 11, 2013, at 0818 EST, an instrument technician was adjusting the output voltage of the 'A' 120-volt Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor-generator (MG) set, which is the normal power supply for the 'A' RPS bus. As the adjustment potentiometer was being moved, output voltage momentarily dropped below the setpoint of an Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) on the 'A' RPS bus. The EPA tripped and removed power from the 'A' RPS bus. Removing power from the RPS bus resulted in PCIS valves receiving a close signal. Affected valves or systems were a Reactor Water Sample valve, Main Steam Line Drain valves, Containment Atmospheric Control System valves, Drywell Equipment Drain and Floor Drain valves, and a Reactor Water Cleanup System valve. "Other systems affected were Standby Gas Treatment, Control Room Emergency Ventilation, and Radiation Monitoring on Main Steam Lines, Main Stack, Reactor Building Vent, and Main Condenser. All actuations that resulted from the loss of power to RPS Bus 'A' were completed as expected. "This event resulted from the attempt to adjust the voltage control potentiometer on the RPS MG set. When a technician attempted to adjust the potentiometer, the movement caused the RPS MG set to momentarily and unexpectedly experience a low voltage on the output, tripping the output breakers. "Power was restored to the affected RPS bus by 0858 EST on December 11, 2013, and all affected systems were subsequently returned to service. "Since no actual plant or process conditions existed which would have caused the various actuations described above, this event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) as an invalid actuation. "This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 651284) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49801 | Facility: FERMI Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: PAUL GRESH HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 02/06/2014 Notification Time: 19:17 [ET] Event Date: 02/06/2014 Event Time: 12:54 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER IN MANUAL OVERRIDE DUE TO HUMAN PERFOMANCE ERROR "At 1254 [EST] on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49802 | Facility: INDIAN POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [ ] [3] [ ] RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JOHN DIGNAM HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/06/2014 Notification Time: 20:17 [ET] Event Date: 02/06/2014 Event Time: 15:53 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/06/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): JOHN LILLIENDAHL (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANTICIPATED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START AFTER SECURING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR "This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation. "The monthly surveillance on 31 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was conducted on 6 February 2014. The EDG was unloaded and its output breaker opened at 1553 [EST]. At this time, the Non-SI Blackout Logic Defeated indication in the control room changed state from 'not illuminated' (logic defeated) to 'illuminated' (logic not defeated) without operator action. The steam-driven 32 Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump (ABFP) auto started but did not inject water into the steam generators. The discharge valves are normally closed. Operators verified normal steam generator levels and level control and that all 480VAC Safeguards buses remained energized, then secured 32 ABFP and placed it back into AUTO. "Indian Point 3 remains at full power in Mode 1. This event did not cause any change in power. "The Senior NRC Resident and the NY State Public Service Commission have been informed." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49803 | Facility: COOK Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: KELLY BAKER HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/07/2014 Notification Time: 03:04 [ET] Event Date: 02/07/2014 Event Time: 03:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 02/07/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNAVAILABILIITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE "At 03:00 EST on Friday, February 7, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance. "Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary. "TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 16:00 EST on Friday, February 7. "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility." | |