Event Notification Report for September 04, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/03/2013 - 09/04/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
49321493224931949522
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49321
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 16:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 16:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 49322
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FOX NDE LLC
Region: 4
City: DILLEY State: TX
County:
License #: 06411
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: FOX NDE LLC
Region: 4
City: DILLEY State: TX
County:
License #: 06411
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE PREVENTS SOURCE RETRACTION IN A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The State of Texas submitted the following information via email:
"On September 5, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that on September 4, 2013, a radiography crew was unable to retract an iridium - 192 source into a QSDA 880 D exposure device. The failure was caused when the camera fell from a pipe it was set on and hit the ground crimping the guide tube at the outlet nozzle of the camera to a point where the source could not pass through the tube at the crimp.
"The radiographers isolated the area, and contacted their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The RSO went to the location to recover the source. The RSO stated that he had to cut both the guide tube and the drive cable so that the guide tube connection to the camera could be broken and the connector removed. The cable was then threaded through the camera and the cable pulled by hand to return the source to the fully shielded and locked position. The camera was returned to the licensee's facility for further inspection.
"No one involved in the event received an exposure that exceeded any regulatory limit. No member of the general public was exposed to any radiation due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9110
The State of Texas submitted the following information via email:
"On September 5, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that on September 4, 2013, a radiography crew was unable to retract an iridium - 192 source into a QSDA 880 D exposure device. The failure was caused when the camera fell from a pipe it was set on and hit the ground crimping the guide tube at the outlet nozzle of the camera to a point where the source could not pass through the tube at the crimp.
"The radiographers isolated the area, and contacted their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The RSO went to the location to recover the source. The RSO stated that he had to cut both the guide tube and the drive cable so that the guide tube connection to the camera could be broken and the connector removed. The cable was then threaded through the camera and the cable pulled by hand to return the source to the fully shielded and locked position. The camera was returned to the licensee's facility for further inspection.
"No one involved in the event received an exposure that exceeded any regulatory limit. No member of the general public was exposed to any radiation due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9110
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49319
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: AARON MICHALSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: AARON MICHALSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/04/2013
Notification Time: 04:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 04:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2013
Notification Time: 04:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 04:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/04/13 to the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes performance of planned outside air intake valve electrical repair. The planned work activity duration is approximately 12 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event poses no threat to the public or station employees."
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/04/13 to the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes performance of planned outside air intake valve electrical repair. The planned work activity duration is approximately 12 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event poses no threat to the public or station employees."
Part 21
Event Number: 49522
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: LIMITORQUE
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF MCCONKEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: LIMITORQUE
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF MCCONKEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/08/2013
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2013
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - MACHINING ERROR IDENTIFIED IN GEARED LIMIT SWITCHES
The following is a summary of information received from Flowserve via facsimile:
"On September 4, 2013, in-house inspection of Limitorque SMB Geared Limit Switch (GLS) cartridges revealed a machining error in a subcomponent used in the GLS. The deviation was caused by a dimensional error concerning the location of a drilled hole in a drive pinion shaft. This error results in a reduction of gear tooth engagement inside the GLS which could potentially reduce the service life of the GLS causing a loss of function. To date, Limitorque's investigation of this machining error has not shown this deviation to be significant enough to affect the safety related function of the GLS. However, Limitorque has requested all switches certified for nuclear safety related service which were manufactured in the designated time frame be returned for inspection and replacement as needed."
The components were sent to Perry Nuclear Generating Station.
The following is a summary of information received from Flowserve via facsimile:
"On September 4, 2013, in-house inspection of Limitorque SMB Geared Limit Switch (GLS) cartridges revealed a machining error in a subcomponent used in the GLS. The deviation was caused by a dimensional error concerning the location of a drilled hole in a drive pinion shaft. This error results in a reduction of gear tooth engagement inside the GLS which could potentially reduce the service life of the GLS causing a loss of function. To date, Limitorque's investigation of this machining error has not shown this deviation to be significant enough to affect the safety related function of the GLS. However, Limitorque has requested all switches certified for nuclear safety related service which were manufactured in the designated time frame be returned for inspection and replacement as needed."
The components were sent to Perry Nuclear Generating Station.