| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/01/2013 - 04/02/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 47975 | Rep Org: ABB INC
Licensee: ABB INC
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/29/2012
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP ()
| Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION - PROTECTIVE RELAYS MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR HARSH ENVIRONMENTS
The following report was received via fax:
"During the commercial grade dedication process for a unit that was returned for repair, the unit was found to be in nonconformance with ABB specifications. The ABB specifications require that two (2) particular components, integrated circuits (ICs) of plastic construction, are replaced with 2 ICs of ceramic construction during the assembly process. The chips found on the harmonic filter circuit board (HF Board) of the relays were of plastic construction. While plastic ICs are approved for use in commercial relays, they have not been qualified for safety-related applications. Relays in this condition will function normally in mild environments, but have not been qualified for harsh environments, or for elevated radiation environments."
The affected solid state relays are 27N and 59G shipped between August 1, 2010 and October 15, 2010.
"Eighteen (18) Relays (Material number: 211T4175-HF-1E) were sold to ABB Florence who in turn shipped the same to Detroit Edison's Fermi 2 Power Plant."
* * * UPDATE FROM TAUZER TO SNYDER AT 1730 EDT ON 4/1/13 * * *
The supplier has concluded that the solid state relays with the plastic encapsulate are qualified for Class 1E applications.
"ABB Coral Springs is providing this letter to close the interim report and notice of deviation from specification requirements associated with Solid State Relays 27N and 59G dated May 29, 2012 (Event ML12153A030).
"As stated in the interim report, one of the actions to be completed was the qualification and testing of representative plastic ICs to confirm acceptability and use in safety-related applications.
"This letter is a follow-up notification that the plastic IC qualification and testing is complete, and based upon the results, we have concluded that the ICs with the plastic encapsulate are qualified for Class 1E applications specific to the subject relays.
"Affected customers have been notified."
Notified R3DO (Daley) and Part 21 Reactors (Email). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48848 | Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: IIG, MINWOOL, LLC
Region: 1
City: PHENIX CITY State: AL
County:
License #: 986
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WALTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/25/2013
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2013
Event Time: 08:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INTERNAL LEAD SHIELDING OF GAUGE SOURCE HOLDERS MELTED
The following information was received via facsimile:
"The Alabama Office of Radiation Control received a call at 0820 CDT on 3/25/13 from Dr. Michael Hensley of RSO Services (AL license No. 1482), a gauge service company. He had been contacted by IIG, MinWool, LLC in Phenix City, AL (AL license No. 986) to assist them with an issue. The licensee melts rock in a cupola to make insulation. The cupola has two Ohmart Model SR-A devices, one at the top and one at the bottom of the cupola, each containing a 100 mCi Cesium-137 source. The cupola was superheated to about 3,500 degrees Fahrenheit above the operating limits for the Model SR-A devices. It is believed the lead shielding in the devices liquefied, but because the source holders are sealed, the lead was contained inside the devices and did not leak out.
"Dr. Hensley surveyed the devices and found a maximum reading of 2.5 mR/hr at 12 inches from the back of the device which was located at the top of the cupola. This is lower than the design maximum exposure of 4.8 mR/hr with a 100 mCi source per the SSDR. The shutters on both devices were still operable, and were closed and locked. Dr. Hensley will remove the devices and prepare them for shipment to Ohmart."
Alabama Incident No.: 13-09 |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48863 | Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC.
Licensee: INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.)
Region: 4
City: NEBRASKA CITY State: NE
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN F. BROSEMER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2013
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS
Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure. This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.
The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.
Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.
* * * UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13 * * *
"Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.
"Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.
"IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:
"Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
"IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.
Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps."
Contact Information:
John F. Brosemer; President
Integrated Resources, Inc.
113 South 9th Street
Nebraska City, NE 68410
Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48871 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GORDON ARENT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/01/2013
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/11/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
NRR 50.55 COORD (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction | Event Text INSTRUMENTATION LINES NOT INSPECTED COMPLETELY FOR PROPER SLOPE
"WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Unit 2 (under construction) determined that a portion of a number of instrumentation lines within multiple systems may have not been inspected completely for proper slope. This condition may have resulted in sense lines being installed with less than the 1/4" per foot minimum slope. No confirmed examples have been identified that would have created a substantial safety hazard at this time. However, walkdowns and evaluations are still underway to confirm that no substantial safety hazards exist. If any examples are found, they will be corrected prior to system turnover to Plant Operations. Therefore, at this time, the safety significance remains indeterminate. This issue has been documented in TVA's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report 680826 and is being conservatively reported as a programmatic breakdown by WBN Unit 2 under 10 CFR 50.55(e)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48872 | Rep Org: ABB INC.
Licensee: ABB INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text POTENTIAL ISSUE CONCERNING THE ZPA RATING FOR 3 PHASE RELAY TYPE SSC-T
"This letter is to notify you of a potential issue concerning the ZPA [Zero Point Acceleration] rating for our three phase relay type SSC-T.
"During a Customer Audit (week of February 4, 2013 by ABB Inc., Florence, S.C.), we discovered that our Class 1E Certification database showed the ZPA rating of our three phase SSV -T and SSC-T relays was 5.6g, while our most recent qualification (dated June 14, 2012) determined that the ZPA rating was 4.79g.
"A review of our Purchaser records for the last ten years indicates that one (1) affected relay was sold to WESCO:
"SSC-T relay completed 10/5/2007, order number 3365-960825 and serial number 11835.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchaser of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensee evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact ABB Technical Support at 954-752-6700." | |