| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/12/2012 - 12/13/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48550 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM EASTRIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/02/2012
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2012
Event Time: 11:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 15 | Power Operation | Event Text 60-DAY REPORT - INVALID AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AND NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PUMP ACTUATION
"The Unit-2 AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation generated a Unit-2 turbine trip signal. The Unit-2 turbine was already tripped, but the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater and 2B Nuclear Service Water pump started. AMSAC actuation occurred during calibration of AMSAC actuation pressure switches."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TIM JOHNSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/11/12 AT 1550 EST * * *
"This notification retracts an eight (8) hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) which was made December 2, 2012 and documented as NRC Event Notification (EN) # 48550. The December 2, 2012 actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was initially reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system as listed in paragraph 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) has subsequently determined that the actuation signal, which was caused by a test signal during calibration of the AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation pressure switches, constitutes an invalid actuation as described in Revision 2 of NUREG-1022 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73). Specifically, valid actuations result from signals initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. A test signal is not representative of an actual plant condition and was therefore an invalid actuation signal and does not meet the NRC 8-hour reporting criteria under paragraph 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6).
"In addition to retracting the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6) notification, MNS is notifying the NRC Operations Center that the December 2, 2012 event met the reporting criteria specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Specifically, an invalid actuation of the auxiliary feed water system occurred while the systems was in service. The event did not involve an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor was critical; therefore, MNS is opting to notify the NRC Operations Center within 60 days in lieu of a 60 day written licensee Event Report (LER), as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"This notification satisfies 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) reporting requirements in lieu of a written LER. The 2A and 2B trains of the auxiliary feed water were actuated by an invalid signal. Each train's actuation was complete and systems operated as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sykes). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48557 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: WINFIELD ALLOY, INC.
Region: 1
City: LAWRENCE State: MA
County:
License #: NONE
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE PACKARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 12/04/2012
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIUM DIAL COMPASS REJECTED AT RECYCLING FACILITY
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via fax:
"Abstract:
"10/24/12 - Metal load rejected at recycling facility. Reported to CRCPD. [Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors]
"11/7/12 - Compass with suspected Ra dial was recovered from trash load.
"12/4/12 - Compass was identified as 13.8 microCuries Ra-226. Compass was worn on wrist and was labeled Sperio Magneto Company."
* * * UPDATE VIA FAX FROM JOSH DAEHLER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1534 EST ON 12/6/12 * * *
"The compass source is now stored in Rockland, MA, pending disposal, in accordance with Atlantic Nuclear's specific radioactive materials license No. 56-0477. The compass source is reported by Atlantic Nuclear to have passed a leak test; be of excellent condition; and to exhibit a dose rate of approximately 8 to 10 microrem/hr at one meter from the source, as measured by a calibrated ion chamber. The compass source appears to be of type that was designed to have been worn on a wrist or attached by hook to a belt or lanyard."
Notified R1DO (Jackson). Notified FSME Events Resource via E-mail.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48562 | Rep Org: ARCELORMITTAL
Licensee: ARCELORMITTAL
Region: 3
City: EAST CHICAGO State: IN
County:
License #: 13-03086-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SACOTT BUSH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 12/05/2012
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED TO CLOSE
During a maintenance outage, the shutter on a fixed gauge failed to close. The specific gauge information is as follows:
Make: Texas Nuclear
Model: 5010
Source: 1000mCi Am-241/Be
The gauge is used for weighing purposes. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer, Thermo Fisher, who is scheduled to arrive on-site at 1000 EST on 12/6/12. There were no personnel exposures involved and the area containing the gauge has been posted to prevent employees from entering inadvertently. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48574 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 12/10/2012
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2012
Event Time: 14:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY - TSC/OSC UNAVAILABLE
"Unavailability of TSC/OSC Ventilation System due to Ventilation Fan (FN-1) failure to start.
"On Monday, December 10, 2012, at 1414 hours with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 100% core thermal power, the Technical Support Center (TSC)/Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency ventilation system was declared non-functional due to the failure of a fan (FN-1) to start during a scheduled surveillance (8.B.24). The balance of the TSC/OSC ventilation is not affected by this event and remain available.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable due to inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC/OSC personnel to the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) and the Control Room. In the event of a declared emergency, all OSC personnel will report to the Control Room Annex. TSC minimum staffing will report to the Control Room and all other TSC staff will report to the EOF.
"The troubleshooting is being worked as a high priority and is conservatively scheduled to be completed by 1900 hours on Wednesday, November 12, 2012. A follow-up to this notification will be made when the TSC/OSC is returned to functional status or if the maintenance effort is significantly extended.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE FROM PROBASCO TO KLCO ON 12/12/2012 AT 1817 EST * * *
"This is an informational update to notification EN# 48574 made on Monday December 10, 2012.
"On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 at 1550 [EST] with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 100% core thermal power, the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency ventilation system was returned to functional status following repair and successful post maintenance testing of the fan (FN- 1). Notification has been made to the Emergency Response Organization that the normal facility activation capability has been restored.
"Additionally, in our initial notification there was a documentation error in that we stated November 12, 2012 as the expected return to service vice the correct date of today, December 12, 2012.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector that the TSC/OSC emergency ventilation has been restored to functional status."
Notified the R1DO (Holody). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48581 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/12/2012
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 02:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text 60 DAY REPORT- INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"Event Summary: On October 13, 2012, at approximately 0218 [EST], a full reactor scram signal was received in the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) control room. At the time of this event, the plant was in cold shutdown (Mode 4) and refueling outage 20 (R20) was in progress. The scram signal occurred because Reactor Vessel Scram & Primary Containment Isolation Level Transmitter (02-3LT-101C) and Reactor Vessel Scram & Primary Containment Isolation Level Transmitter EQ (02-3LT-101D) momentarily failed downscale, and then immediately recovered.
"02-3LT-101C is an 'A' division component and 02-3LT-101D is a 'B' division component. Therefore, both the 'A' and 'B' divisions of reactor protection actuated providing a full reactor scram and outboard primary containment isolation signal. AOP-15, 'Isolation Verification and Recovery' verified that the proper containment isolation response was received. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because it resulted in the invalid actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor was already shut down.
"Apparent Cause: A Failure Mode Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation were performed to determine the most likely cause of both level transmitters to momentarily spike downscale. It was concluded that the most probable cause was due to a worker inadvertently coming into contact with the level transmitters' exposed sensing lines. Contributing to this event was the misjudgment by the Operations individual reviewing the work package, on the risk significance of the instrumentation in the vicinity of the work area. As a result, the work area was not constructed in a manner to preclude interference with the level transmitters or associated sensing lines.
"Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions were to walk down the affected instrument lines to ensure no damage had been caused. Additional corrective actions were to install signs near the level transmitters and exposed sensing lines. The signs denote that sensitive instrument lines are present. Future corrective actions include a walk down by engineering and operations to identify other areas in the plant where sensitive instrument lines are present and place additional signs or barriers as appropriate."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48583 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/12/2012
Notification Time: 19:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2012
Event Time: 15:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT
"While attempting to swap Technical Support Center (TSC) power supplies the TSC air handling unit circuit breaker tripped rendering the TSC unavailable for emergency assessment. An emergent work order has been planned to restore the TSC air handling unit to operational status."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee also notified state, local and other government agencies. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48584 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNNIE EDWARDS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/12/2012
Notification Time: 23:25 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2012
Event Time: 19:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text RISK OF POSSIBLE FLOODING TO ERCW BUILDING DURING DESIGN BASIS FLOOD
"At 1914 EST on 12/12/12, TVA determined that Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 were at risk of flooding into the ERCW [Emergency Raw Cooling Water] Station Building during a design basis flood due to conduit penetrations not being filled with material required to make the building water tight. The lack of a barrier would allow flood waters to enter the ERCW building at a rate greater than the sump pumps can remove creating a condition that could result in the ERCW pumps being unavailable to perform their design function during a flood event above plant grade.
"This condition places both units in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety [10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B)], and could prevent the fulfillment of the safety related function of ERCW needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition [10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A)].
"Compensatory actions are being established to be capable of removing or limiting water that could leak into the building during the event. The required safety related equipment is currently operable. There are no indications of conditions that might result in a flood in the near term."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition. | |