U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/02/2012 - 10/03/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | Agreement State | Event Number: 48329 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: BURLINGTON HOUSE MILL Region: 4 City: MONTICELLO State: AR County: License #: GENERAL Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/21/2012 Notification Time: 16:09 [ET] Event Date: 09/20/2012 Event Time: 18:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/02/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO) FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI) DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING OHMART BETA GAUGE The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email: "While conducting an investigation of a citizen's allegation on September 20, 2012, the Department [Arkansas Department of Health] recovered a generally licensed device in a scrap yard in Dermott, Arkansas. The device is: "Ohmart Beta Gauge: Model BAL Gauge Serial Number: 3780BC Isotope: SR-90 Activity: 25 millicuries "This device was retrieved and transported to the Department's [Arkansas Department of Health] storage location in Little Rock at approximately 1800 CDT on September 20, 2012. "Ohmart provided information concerning the shipment date (12/1994) and the location. The device was shipped to Burlington House Mill in Monticello, Arkansas. Ohmart also informed the Department [Arkansas Department of Health] that a second device had also been shipped with this source. The source holder serial number for this device is 3779BC. "Health Physicists visited the old Burlington site after finding the device in the scrap yard in Dermott, Arkansas. "Health Physicists returned on September 21, 2012 to the Monticello and Dermott areas to search in locations where the second device may have been disposed. At the time of this notification, the Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers the second device to be missing. "The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] has notified the Mississippi Department of Health. "The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] is still investigating and searching for the missing device. An investigation is on-going to identify the possible owner of the devices. "The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event open at this time pending the completion of the investigation." Arkansas Incident Number AR-2012-009. * * * UPDATE AT 1014 EDT ON 10/02/12 FROM ROBERT PEMBERTON TO S. SANDIN * * * The following update was received from the State of Arkansas via email: "On October 1, 2012, while conducting a follow-up investigation of allegation ARK-2012-009, the Department recovered the second generally licensed device originally shipped to the Burlington House Mill in Monticello, Arkansas. The device is described as follows: Manufacturer: Ohmart S.O. : AR940603068A Source Holder: BAL Source Serial Number: 3779BC Isotope: Sr-90 Activity: 25 mCi Date 12/94 "The device was retrieved from property on East Calhoun Street, Monticello, Arkansas and transported to the Department's storage vault in Little Rock. "The device housing was not damaged and preliminary wipes of the device showed no removable contamination. "An investigation is on-going to identify the possible owner of the devices. "The Department considers this event open at this time pending the completion of the investigation." Notified R4DO (Powers), FSME RESOURCE and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48337 | Rep Org: AIR FORCE MASTER MATERIAL LICENSE Licensee: AIR FORCE MASTER MATERIAL LICENSE Region: 1 City: ROSSLYN State: VA County: License #: 42-23539-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: MAJOR DAN SHAW HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/24/2012 Notification Time: 09:10 [ET] Event Date: 08/25/2012 Event Time: 09:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | Person (Organization): GREG WERNER (R4DO) FSME EVENT RESOURCE (E-MA) ILTAB (E-MA) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text GENERALLY LICENSED NICKEL- 63 SOURCE MISSING The following information was provided by the Air Force Medical Support Agency via email: "Per 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(2)(ii), we are providing a written report for the loss of radioactive material. The loss of material was reported on 24 Sep 2012; 1) telephonically to NRC Operations Center, Event No. 48337 and 2) via E-Mail to NRC, Region IV (Ms. Cook). The following information addresses the reporting requirements: "Description of the licensed material: The subject device contained nickel 63 (Ni-63), one source, at 15 milliCuries. The source is encapsulated in a hollow brass cylinder which in turn is sealed in a ceramic shield as referenced in Sealed Source & Device Registry (SS&DR) NR-0163-D-102-E, dated 19 Oct 2010. This generally licensed device (GLD) was used by USAF Security Forces Personnel (802nd SFS) of Lackland AFB, San Antonio, TX. "Description of circumstances for loss: The missing Ionscan 400B was added to the Installation Radiation Safety Officers inventory of all GLDs on Lackland AFB in May 2010. The serial number of the missing source is 10859. It was surveyed semi-annually until November 2011. At that point, the Lackland AFB installation radiation safety officer was told that particular device had been sent in October 2011 to the manufacturer for maintenance along with four (4) other devices. In November 2011, three (3) of the repaired devices had been returned from maintenance and were checked. The remaining two (2) units were assumed to still be at the manufacturer. During the May 2012 leak test/ inventory of GLDs, the two (2) devices were assumed to still be at the repair facility. The Lackland AFB Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) again raised the question as to the location and was assured the two (2) devices would be returned soon. In August 2012, when the devices had not been returned, the unit initiated a concerted effort to find the devices. The Air Force Radioisotope Committee was contacted to report the missing devices. "Statement of disposition: One (1) device has been located at the manufacturer's repair facility. According to Smith's Detection personnel, the serial number of the other missing device (10859) is not a valid serial number. The device in question with that serial number was inventoried and leak tested in May 2010, November 2010 and May 2011. The USAF believes that this is a valid serial number for the missing Ionscan. "Exposures to individuals: Because the device contains Ni-63, which is sealed and incorporated into the Ion Mobility Spectrometer assembly, the radiation level surrounding the device would be indistinguishable from background and dose to radiation workers or the general public is and will be negligible. "Actions taken: Numerous contact has been made with Smith's Detection to attempt to locate the missing device. Lackland personnel have used their chain of command to determine if the source was transferred to any other Air Force location. The storage area where the devices were stored have been searched. During the next 30 days, all Security Forces equipment will be moved to another location and special attention will be devoted in an attempt to locate the missing Ionscan. To date, the source has not been located. "Procedures/measures to rectify future loss: The installation radiation safety officer will reinforce the policies outlined in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 40-201, Managing Radioactive Materials in the United States Air Force for procurement and shipping and receiving of radioactive material. The shipper will require receipt confirmation from the manufacturer when items are shipped for maintenance or repair." THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Agreement State | Event Number: 48340 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM Licensee: SOUTH STATE INC Region: 1 City: BRIDGETON State: NJ County: License #: RAD110001-507 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: PATRICIA GARDNER HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/25/2012 Notification Time: 10:10 [ET] Event Date: 09/25/2012 Event Time: 01:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO) FSME EVENT RESOURCE (E-MA) D. JOHNSON VIA EMAIL (ILTA) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST HUMBOLDT DENSITY GAUGE The following report was received from the NJ Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Environmental Radiation via facsimile: "Licensee: South State Inc. "Event date and time: September 25, 2012 at 01:00 am "Event location: NJ Turnpike Interchanges 1-3 N-S "Event type: Lost density gauge - Humboldt Model 5001EZ Serial No. 2872 (Am-241 44 mCi and Cs-137 11 mCi) "Notifications: NJDEP BER and NJDEP Hotline "Event Description: South State Inc. reported a missing density gauge on September 25, 2012 at 01:29 am. South State was working on the NJ Turnpike. South State reported that the gauge was lost somewhere between exits 1 and 3 on the north or south bound lanes of the turnpike. Additionally, South State is looking along the route that was taken from their office on 202 Reeves St in Bridgeton, NJ and the turnpike. "As of 9:00 am this morning, the gauge has not been recovered and the search continues. "Media attention: None "NJ Event Report ID No: 12-09-25-0129-19" * * * UPDATE ON 9/26/12 AT 1239 EDT FROM PATRICIA GARDNER TO DONG PARK * * * The following report was received from the NJ Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Environmental Radiation via email: "The Humboldt Model 5001EZ Serial No. 2872 has been recovered. The gauge is back at the licensee's (South State Inc.) facility. There is no observable damage to the transportation case and/or the gauge. The NJ State Police assisted with the recovery. Details of the event are being summarized and the NMED event report will be updated when completed." Notified R1DO (Bellamy), FSME, and ILTAB (Johnson) via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48364 | Facility: KEWAUNEE Region: 3 State: WI Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: JACK GADZALA HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/01/2012 Notification Time: 12:12 [ET] Event Date: 10/01/2012 Event Time: 07:40 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/02/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT-OF-SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE "On October 1, 2012, at approximately 0740 hours [CDT], the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. "The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. "This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." * * * UPDATE AT 1020 EDT ON 10/02/12 FROM JACK GADZALA TO S. SANDIN * * * "On October 2, 2012, at approximately 0828 hours [CDT], the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. "The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 7 hours. "This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R3DO (Passehl). | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 48366 | Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Comments: LEU CONVERSION FABRICATION & SCRAP COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL Region: 2 City: RICHLAND State: WA County: PENTON License #: SNM-1227 Agreement: Y Docket: 07001257 NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/02/2012 Notification Time: 20:56 [ET] Event Date: 10/02/2012 Event Time: 07:30 [PDT] Last Update Date: 10/02/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION | Person (Organization): KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO) PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS) | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITIONS MAY LEAD TO INTERMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE EVENTS "On Friday 9/28/2012, while completing ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] meetings on a new process, several accident sequences were identified that had the potential for creating ocular exposures that could lead to intermediate consequences in accordance with 10CFR70. The sequences involved uranyl nitrate (UN) solutions. IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] were identified for the new process. "As a follow-up to this activity, on 10/02/2012, plant safety personnel reviewed existing ISA accident sequences for other process systems where UN solution is present and at 0730 [PDT], reported to the EHS&L Manager that similar loss of containment accident sequences in other process systems were determined to be 10CFR70 low consequence events within the approved existing ISA. "This report is being made under 10CFR70 Appendix A, criterion (b)(1) which states, 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' "10CFR70.61 (4)(e) states in part, '...Each engineered or administrative control or control system necessary to comply with paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of this section shall be designated as an item relied on for safety.' "While this report is being made based on the treatment of UN sprays to the eye, this scenario can be applied to other hazardous chemicals falling under the scope of the ISA treatment. "Based on information obtained during the ISA activities for this new process, two other types of accident sequences documented in the existing facility ISA as 10CFR70 low consequence events need to be re-evaluated with respect to the 10CFR70 consequences of concern thresholds. These types of accident sequences are dermal contact and inhalation of liquid aerosols. These two types of accident sequences are being re-evaluated throughout the plant. The status of this re-evaluation effort will be reported in a 30-day follow-up report to this initial notification. "The personal protective equipment (PPE) that is used to provide protection to workers during work evolutions and the safety protocols for limiting exposures to UN are not categorized as IROFS for some of the existing processes. The PPE and safety protocols used by AREVA based on 40 years experience for these types of scenarios are considered to be adequate. AREVA's re-evaluation of these scenarios will be utilized to confirm their adequacy, or if applicable, to identify needed enhancements. "This discrepancy has potentially existed since 10/18/2004. This report does not involve potential criticality accident scenarios. "Corrective Actions in Progress: 1) verify that appropriate spray shields/deflectors are in place, 2) verify existing safety protocols that are in place are adequate, and 3) update the safety analysis and implementing documents to declare as IROFS the appropriate PPE and safety protocol." The licensee will be notifying Region 2. | |