| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/10/2012 - 08/13/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 48091 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 12:19 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2012
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text METALLURGICAL SAMPLE PANS EXCEEDED VOLUME LIMIT
The following is a redacted summary of the event report provided by the licensee:
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Metallurgical samples at B&Ws NOG-L facility are contained in 'bread pans'. The bread pans are used to transport and store samples. Each bread pan has U235 quantity limits as well as spacing and volume limits for maintaining criticality controls. The volume of the bread pan is an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS).
On July 10, 2012, at approximately 1230 EDT, a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer identified during a routine quarterly audit that the bread pans in use exceeded the volume liter limit. At the time of discovery, the mass controls for the bread pans were not exceeded. Neither was there excess moderation between storage locations.
EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: Although an IROFS was lost (the bread pan volume), other IROFS (operator control of mass, operator control of interspersed moderation) were available at the time of discovery of this condition to ensure the risk of a criticality remained highly unlikely. However, 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '...the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.'
Further evaluation of the as-found condition of the bread pans indicated the licensed keff limit may have been exceeded. Therefore, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were not maintained.
There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. However, the bread pan storage area is being shutdown.
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.
STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 0845 EDT ON 8/6/2012 FROM TONY ENGLAND TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following is a redacted summary of the event report provided by the licensee:
The event was reported in 24 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 70. Appendix A. (b)(1): 'any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61'.
Upon further evaluation it was determined that keff limit in the NRC License was not exceeded. Therefore, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. This is the basis for correcting Event Notification #48091 and withdrawing the report. A conservative approach was initially taken in evaluating the event in order to ensure compliance with the specified time periods established in the regulations. A reanalysis calculated keff less than the keff safety limit in NRC License SNM-42.
Although the facility was in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. In accordance with 10 CFR 70.61 (b) and FCSS Interim Staff Guidance-12, although an IROFS was lost, the situation did not pose a safety concern that is significant enough to report to NRC. Other IROFS were available at the time of discovery of the condition to ensure the risk of a criticality remained highly unlikely. In addition, the calculated keff using an approved approach described in Section 5.2.2 of NRC License SNM-42 demonstrates compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 (d). The system remained subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety, during a credible abnormal condition.
Therefore, in accordance with the guidance of FCSS ISG-12, Rev 0, '10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A - Reportable Safety Events,' B&W is correcting Event Notification #48091 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a)(4) and withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b )(1) notification.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Stablein), and the Fuels Group OUO (via e-mail).
Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details on this event. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48152 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: AG WASSENAAR, INC
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: 212-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 08/02/2012
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2012
Event Time: 08:40 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE ()
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of Colorado via email:
"On Thursday August 2, at approximately 0840 MDT (Mountain Daylight Time) a portable gauge licensee (AG Wassenaar, Inc. License 212-01 Amendment 21) based in Denver, Colorado notified the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) Radioactive Materials Unit on-call duty officer that a gauge was missing and possibly stolen. The gauge had last been seen on Monday July 30 at 4:00 pm at the temporary work site. Upon returning to the office, the gauge user unlocked the box but became distracted and did not check-in the gauge. The gauge user then returned to his residence and parked his truck. The employee did not return to work until the morning of Thursday August 2nd, when he realized that the gauge was not in its case in the truck. The employee believes it may have been stolen from his residence on Tuesday night, however the licensee's employees are currently searching the residence, surrounding neighborhood, and last job site.
"The gauge involved was a Troxler model 3430 (gauge serial number 26071), containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 (serial #75-9099) and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be (serial #47-22450).
"The licensee was instructed to conduct a thorough search for the gauge in all known locations where it could be, and to also notify the local police should it not be found within the hour.
"Additional information and an incident report from the licensee is pending."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48155 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DEL-TIN FIBER
Region: 4
City: El DORADO State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0874-0312
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PEMBERTON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 08/03/2012
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2012
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:
"On August 3, 2012, a licensee notified the Department (Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials) that the shutter mechanism on a RONAN Model# SA1-F37 gauge (SN# 6481GQ), mounted at the apex of a mixing bin, was stuck in the open position. This was discovered during routine maintenance. Since the shutter is in the open position and does not pose an immediate safety risk, the plant continues to operate. The Department was told that even though the gauge is only accessible via man-lift, the gauge has been tagged with a caution sign. The facility has sent email notifications to all personnel as well as posting notices in the plant. The gauge contains 100 mCi of Cs-137. The facility has contacted the manufacturer and the Department will make an onsite visit to coincide with the repair. Further information will be provided as it is obtained.
"Arkansas Incident # AR-2012-005" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48174 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES M. KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/10/2012
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2012
Event Time: 18:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL BUILDING A/C UNIT MAY NOT PERFORM DESIGN FUNCTION ON LOSS OF REDUNDANT A/C UNIT
"Affected equipment includes two 4160 volt safety buses, four 480 volt safety buses, four 120 volt AC safety trains, and four 125 volt DC safety trains.
"Following an accident Class 1E AC Unit SGK05B may not be able to perform is design safety function if a single failure causes a loss of redundant Class 1E AC unit SGK05A. This is due to continued latent heat input from A train Control Room Pressurization Fan which continues to operate. SGK05A and B provide room cooling for all safety related electrical busses.
"Action Taken: Established the following compensatory measure - During accident conditions with both trains of CRVIS [Control Room Ventilation Isolation System] actuated if at any time SGKO5A trips then following completion of immediate actions Control Room pressurization fan CGK04A will be secured to reduce latent heat removal requirements for SGK05B."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MOORE TO KLCO ON 8/11/2012 AT 1058 EDT * * *
"[On August 11, 2012 at 1845 CDT, the licensee identified] this condition applies to SGK05A. Action taken: Established compensatory measures that during an accident condition with both trains of CRVIS actuated, if at any time SGK05A or SGK05B trips for any reason then, following completion of immediate actions, Control Room pressurization fan on the same train with the tripped A/C unit will be secured if the other pressurization fan is running."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Drake). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48175 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/10/2012
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2012
Event Time: 08:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2012 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
VICTOR MCCREE (RA)
BRUCE BOGER (RX)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
ERIC THOMAS (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE
At 0848 EDT, on 8/10/12, Watts Bar declared an Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), EAL Tab 4.4, based on access restrictions to the turbine building due to a toxic gas release (Ammonia). The leak has been secured. Operators are currently in protective gear in the turbine building in an effort to ventilate the residual gas from all affected areas and re-establish normal access. The gas release has caused no personnel injuries or equipment damage. The licensee continues to operation at 100% power.
Watts Bar will remain in an NOUE until the area can be ventilated and normal access is reestablished.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee has notified state and local government. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, DHS NICC, and NUCLEARSSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM NEWTON LACY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/10/12 * * *
At 1325 EDT Watts Bar terminated the Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). The Ammonia leak was due to a valve in the fill line to the Ammonia Mixing Tank not being fully closed, thereby causing the tank to overflow.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rich), NRREO (Evans), IRD MOC (Marshall). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, DHS NICC, and NUCLEARSSA via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48178 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/10/2012
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2012
Event Time: 17:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
FSME RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DRY FUEL STORAGE TRANSFER TRAILER DETECTED WITH REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION
"On Aug 7, 2012 at 1734 EDT, PPL Susquehanna personnel were in the process of releasing the Dry Fuel Storage Transfer Trailer from the Unit 1 Reactor Building 101 rail bay and detected removable contamination on the trailer.
"PPL Susquehanna Health Physics personnel identified removable surface contamination up to 30,000 dpm/100 sq cm on the transfer trailer. Gamma spectroscopy performed on smears identified the presence of Cs-137. No other radionuclides were identified on any of the analyzed smears. Cs-137, by itself, is not a nuclide characteristic to Susquehanna due to Susquehanna's high fuel integrity performance. In addition, no loose surface alpha contamination was identified.
"The area around the trailer, located in the 101 bay, has been posted and controlled as a contaminated area. Decontamination of the transfer trailer is in progress. Onsite surveys of areas that were occupied by the transfer trailer, indicate no removable surface contamination. In addition, no Susquehanna personnel contamination events have been attributed to the contamination found on the transfer trailer.
"Although the receipt of this transfer trailer was not identified as an incoming radioactive shipment to Susquehanna from its' supplier, this event is immediately reportable to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1906(d), since the Department of Transportation acceptance limits identified in 49 CFR 173.433 for this type of container are 22,000 DPM/100 sq. cm and PPL Health Physics personnel identified removable radioactive surface contamination in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 71.87(i) which refer to the DOT limits of 49 CFR 173.433.
"The final delivery carrier and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified." The licensee will be notifying the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48179 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JASON HARNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/10/2012
Notification Time: 19:44 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2012
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FLOOD BARRIER SEALS COULD NOT BE VERIFIED INSTALLED
"On August 10, 2012 during an inspection in the Air Intake Tunnel, six 4-inch conduits that carry cabling from yard vaults through the Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) to the Auxiliary Building (AB) were inspected for flood seals. This was done by opening the conduit seals bottom drain openings to inspect the condition by boroscope. These seal components are just inside the AIT from the electrical vaults. During the inspections no sealant could be readily identified. Each conduit from the yard vaults that is not sealed could potentially provide a leak path during flood conditions from the yard vaults to the Auxiliary Building via the electrical conduit. Flood water entering the Auxiliary Building could impact the decay heat removal function.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48180 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: WARREN WONKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/11/2012
Notification Time: 07:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2012
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 0730 hours EDT on Saturday, August 11, 2012, the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, Technical Support Center (TSC)/Emergency Response Facility (EOF) air conditioning system will be removed from service to facilitate the replacement of the HVAC chiller system. Unavailability of the primary chiller system will last greater than 8 hours. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 31 hours. The filtration portion of the system will not be affected by this work.
"In order to ensure habitable conditions in the TSC/EOF, as a compensatory measure, a temporary chiller system will be onsite to maintain habitability in the event of emergency facility activation and will remain onsite until such time that the TSC/EOF ventilation system has been returned to service.
"Emergency Responders assigned to these facilities and all offsite agencies have been informed of this scheduled maintenance and will be informed of any updates.
"Alternate emergency response facilities will remain available in the event that relocation is necessary.
"TSC/EOF ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1400 hours EDT on Sunday August 12, 2012.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48181 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD VIGNEAH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/12/2012
Notification Time: 01:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2012
Event Time: 00:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 66 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO ULTIMATE HEAT SINK EXCEEDING TEMPERATURE LIMIT
Millstone Unit 2 reported that it is in a technical specification shutdown condition based on the ultimate heat sink average water temperature exceeding a temperature limit of 75 degrees Fahrenheit. The ultimate heat sink is supplied by water from Niantic Bay. At the time of this report, the bay water temperature is slightly below the 75 degree temperature limit but the time average calculation for the ultimate heat sink temperature limit still exceeds 75 degrees.
The Ultimate Heat Sink Technical Specification, TS 3.7.11.a, requires the unit to be in hot shutdown within 6 hours when the average temperature limit is exceeded. The licensee is in a slow power ramp-down while monitoring the ultimate heat sink average temperature for water temperature conditions to drop below the limit. The high heat sink temperatures are based on natural environmental conditions and not from plant operation.
Millstone Unit 3 is not impacted at this time.
The licensee has notified State and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0518 EDT ON 8/12/12 FROM WOLLERY TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee reported that it had exited the Technical Specification LCO based on a current average heat sink temperature below 75 F. However, the licensee will hold power at 65% to ensure the temperature is stable and will remain below the limit during the day shift.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1001 EDT ON 8/12/12 FROM NICHOLS TO HUFFMAN * * *
At 0943 EDT on 8/12/12, the average ultimate heat sink temperature on Unit 2 exceeded the 75 degree limit again. The licensee re-entered TS LCO 3.7.11.a and commenced to shutdown the unit from a starting power level of 65%. The licensee plans to proceed to Hot Standby in compliance with the TS action statement even if the heat sink temperature drops back below the TS limit.
The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1650 EDT ON 8/12/12 FROM PATRICK SIKORSKI TO JOHN KNOKE * * *
At 1645 EDT on 8/12/12, Unit 2 is in Hot Standby and the heat sink temperature is below the 75 degree limit.
The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48182 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TODD MULFORD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/12/2012
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2012
Event Time: 04:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text DEGRADED CONDITION REPORTED BASED ON THE DISCOVERY OF PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"Following a planned shutdown to investigate the source of elevated Primary Coolant System (PCS) Unidentified Leakage, the Mode 3 PCS walk-down identified a steam leak on CRD-24, Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRD), pressure housing. The leak is ~ 1 foot above the CRD to Reactor Head flange. The leak was observed from the Refueling floor deck and appears to be coming from an area of the CRD with no bolted connections. Leakage from this area is unexpected and the mechanism of failure is not understood at this time. Closer examination of the leak is expected to occur in parallel with plant cool-down.
"The plant entered T.S. 3.4.14 (PCS Operational Leakage) Condition B. at 0418 EDT hours this morning and this requires the plant to be placed in Mode 5 within 36 hours. The leakage is considered Pressure Boundary Leakage. Operations is in progress of performing the plant cool-down from Mode 3 to Mode 5."
The licensee discovered this condition following a shutdown the morning of 8/12/12 to investigate unidentified primary coolant leakage of about 0.3 gpm that had been recently trending upwards. Plant conditions are currently 400 degrees F with primary system pressure at about 1000 psi.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspect |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48183 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN FLESHMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/12/2012
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2012
Event Time: 12:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO FULLY INSERTED CONTROL ROD WHILE OPERATING
"Calvert Cliff Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Control Element Assembly (CEA) #9 fully inserted (CEA dropped) into the core. Technical Specification 3.1.5, Action B was entered and requires the CEA to be realigned within 2 hours. With this action not met Technical Specification 3.1.5, Action C requires the Unit be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours. A plant shutdown has been initiated in accordance with this Technical Specification. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. (b) (2) (i) Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also notify local government agencies. | |