United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for July 11, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/10/2012 - 07/11/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48065 48068 48080 48082 48087

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Agreement State Event Number: 48065
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: THOMAS BROTHERS INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: NORTH ANDOVER State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENATH TRAEGDE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/03/2012
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2012
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

DISCARDED COMPASS CONTAINING RADIUM FOUND

The following was received via email from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

"A military compass containing approximately 10 microcurie of Ra-226 was improperly discarded via trash by an unknown person and was detected at the Maine Energy Recovery Company in Biddeford, ME on June 28, 2012. The State of Maine Radiation Control Program notified our Agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] and transfer back to the place of origin was arranged. This was Thomson Brothers Industries.

"The truck was off loaded at that site and the source was discovered by a contracted health physics consultant. We received notification of the discovery of the source from the consultant at 10:49 am on June 29, 2012.

"Our Agency is currently assisting Thomson Brothers Industries in making arrangements for the proper disposal/transfer of the compass."

* * * UPDATE AT 0837 ON 7/10/12 FROM TRAEGDE TO SNYDER * *

"The compass was confiscated by the [Massachusetts] Radiation Control Program on 7/6/12 and given to a Massachusetts licensee for disposal. This action closes this event."

Notified R1DO (Burritt) and FSME Events Resource (e-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48068
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BRUKER AXS HANDHELD, INC
Region: 4
City: KENNEWICK State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0282-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDIN KETTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/03/2012
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2012
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
CANADA (FAX)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST SEALED SOURCES

The following was reported from the state via e-mail:

"During a routine six-month inventory, the licensee was unable to locate four (4) sealed sources, of which one has an activity that exceeds exempt quantities. The last known person using the sources was contacted on June 5, 2012 to determine if they were in his possession. He indicated that the previous x-ray RSO had found them and returned them to the source locker. However, the former x-ray RSO indicated that in-fact he did not locate the sources. Management and the materials RSO was notified and an investigation was initiated.

"All staff members were questioned and asked to check around their work areas. The assistant RSO checked all devices, pigs, the source cabinet and surveyed the entire facility, including shipping and receiving, with a micro-R survey meter. None of the sources were located on any disposal or transfer records.

"The sources were used in a prototype instrument called Plombix, designed to operate with an exempt source in the shape of a washer, and were used only for in house experiments. The missing sources were designed for this prototype instrument and do not fit all other instruments at this facility.

"Washington Department of Health corrective action is pending.

"The Assistant RSO indicated that sufficient controls are not in place to maintain control of sources stored outside the source locker, and that a single company source custodian will be assigned for all sources.

"Source Number: 1;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CD-109, 0.000000194 Ci, 0.000007178 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: 1112-35.

"Source Number: 2;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CD-109, 0.000064 Ci, 0.002368 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: D1-472.

"Source Number: 3;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D ;
Radionuclide: CO-57, 0.000005 Ci, 0.000185 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: RFQ482-3;
Serial Number: C9-333.

"Source Number: 4;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CO-57, 0.000000122 Ci 0.000004514 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: 1096-28.

"Reference Number: WA-12-047"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48080
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/10/2012
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2012
Event Time: 02:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID GROUP 5 ISOLATION DUE TO FAILED TEST SWITCH DURING SURVEILLANCE

"At 0236 CDT on Tuesday, July 10 2012, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) U3 Isolation Condenser System automatically isolated due to a inadvertent partial Group 5 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation, causing the inboard isolation valves to close. The PCIS isolation was caused during the performance of DIS 1300-07, 'U3 Isolation Condenser Steam/Condensate Line High Flow Calibration,' due to a failed test switch. The test switch failed to bypass the PCIS signal generated during the surveillance. All valves responded as expected due to this condition.

"The isolation condenser was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A was entered. HPCI was verified to be operable to satisfy the requirements of TS 3.5.3, Condition A.2. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) due to a condition occurring that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed for residual heat removal."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48082
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/10/2012
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2012
Event Time: 00:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On May 19, 2012, at 0006 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), two fuses were inadvertently contacted with a spiral notebook in panel 9-42 of the auxiliary instrument room. The two blown fuses resulted in a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) partial Group 6 isolation. The partial Group 6 isolation caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment subsystems 'A' and 'C', the initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation subsystem 'A', and the isolation of the inboard Group 6 valves and ventilation dampers.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the partial actuations were invalid.

"The affected equipment responded as designed. On May 19, 2012, at 0130 hours CDT, Operations personnel reset the partial Group 6 isolation.

"There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of these events.

"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 554165.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48087
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN GENEVA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 02:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2012
Event Time: 22:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF ERDS DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK MODULE FAILURE

"A 'Communications Network Module' failed rendering the Emergency Response Display System (ERDS) incapable of transmitting data to the NRC. ERDS is out of service for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected emergency response facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage. The module was removed from service and ERDS was restored at 2325 [EDT]."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, July 11, 2012
Wednesday, July 11, 2012