United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for June 27, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/26/2012 - 06/27/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47884 48008 48033 48034 48048

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47884
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/01/2012
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2012
Event Time: 08:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS

"During a review of environmental qualification records for reactor containment building electrical penetrations, six penetrations were identified that may not provide an adequate seal during worst case (Design Basis Accident (DBA)) conditions as required. These penetrations are through wall from the containment into the auxiliary building. The conditions that could cause degradation of the electrical penetration seals are not applicable to this operating mode. The station is currently in a refueling mode. This event was identified on March 2, 2012. The reportability was confirmed on May 1, 2012 at 1502 CDT."

The current penetration configuration has existed since the plant was built. The area of concern is that the Teflon connections may degrade under conditions of high radiation and high temperature during a DBA event. The licensee is investigating the extent of the condition and repair techniques.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KROS TO PETE SNYDER AT 1523 ON 6/26/12 * * *

"On review of CR 2012-01947 by a new Project Manager, who was brought in as a subject matter expert on HELB/EEQ, and issue was identified with the 530 primary containment electrical penetration feed-throughs used for non-CQE devices. The CR [Condition Report] correctly notes that under the original accident testing, the Teflon seals failed, and water was noted leaking from these penetrations.

"On further review, the following was noted: Due to the design of the penetration feed-throughs, when the inboard Teflon seal fails (as it is expected to, due to high level of radioactivity in the primary containment, following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)), the atmosphere of the primary containment will be introduced to the penetration assembly, first through the failed seal or seals, and then through the weep hole between the inboard and outboard seals of the feed-through. This will put the same high level of radioactivity in direct contact with the outboard seals, resulting in the failure of its Teflon Seal. This would result in approximately 530 breaches of the Primary Containment during post LOCA conditions. The existing vendor analysis does not assume any contribution to the outboard seal exposure from the mixing of containment atmosphere with the penetration air after the failure of the inboard seal. This is probable, as each feed-through has a weep hole. Once the inboard seal fails, the penetration will be filled with containment atmosphere to equalize the pressure, which will bring the associated noble gas and Iodine fraction in proportion, into the penetration."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Clark)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 48008
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PASS CHRISTIAN State: MS
County:
License #: MS-409-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/08/2012
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME VIA EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE SHUTTER NOT FULLY CLOSING

The following information was received by e-mail:

"Licensee notified DRH [Mississippi Department of Radiological Health] about a Ronan X92 Continuous Level Gauge, Serial No. 9479GG with source Holder Model SA1-F37. Licensee suspects the source shutter may not be closing 100% due to elevated readings of 7 mR/hr with the shutter in the closed position."

* * * RETRACTION FROM JASON MOAK TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/26/12 AT 1558 EDT * * *

This report is retracted based on the fact that the gauge "did not fail to function as designed. No maintenance was performed on the gauge. The service representative did not find a problem with the gauge shutter or radiation fields."

Notified R4DO (Clark), FSME (e-mail).

Mississippi Incident Number: MS-12002

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

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Agreement State Event Number: 48033
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NUQUEST, INC.
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #: 1022-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/18/2012
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2012
Event Time: 02:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME via E-mail ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BURST VIAL OF Tc99m IN NUCLEAR PHARMACY

The following information was received via email:

"On Friday, June 15, 2012, at approximately 0230 Mountain Daylight Time (MDT), a nuclear pharmacy licensee located in Grand Junction, Colorado, had a vial containing approximately 1.9 Ci of liquid Tc99m burst and likely volatilize following placement on a heating block as part of compounding activities for preparation of cardiac imaging (Sestamibi) radiopharmaceuticals. The pharmacist, who also serves as the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), notified the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) Radioactive Materials Unit on-call duty officer several hours later at approximately 1000 MDT on Friday, June 15.

"Following the initial notification to CDPHE, a secondary phone interview of the pharmacist was conducted. It was determined that the burst container resulted in contamination of the pharmacist, compounding area (generator room), and areas within the main pharmacy. The pharmacist was the only person in the facility at the time of the incident. Other staff - primarily courier personnel - arrived after the incident, and provided some assistance but reportedly did not enter the pharmacy lab area. As a result of the ruptured vial, radiation survey instruments in the laboratory became contaminated, which required the licensee to borrow instrumentation from a local hospital licensee. Sometime following the incident, the pharmacist initiated limited decontamination activities of himself (glove and lab coat removal/exchange) and the area. The pharmacist reportedly continued with the preparation of some radiopharmaceutical materials following the incident. Additionally, following gross decontamination activities at the pharmacy, the pharmacist left the licensee facility to shower and change clothing at his residence.

"During phone interviews with the licensee, CDPHE requested that the pharmacist obtain a urine sample, prepare for the return and processing of personal dosimeter badges and arrange for a back-up pharmacist. The pharmacist was directed to not conduct work involving radioactive material, pending further evaluation of internal and external dose.

"In response to the incident, CDPHE dispatched the on-call duty officer from the Denver office to the Grand Junction area on Friday afternoon. (NOTE - Grand Junction, Colorado is approximately 5.5 hours drive time from the Denver CDPHE office). CDPHE staff met with the licensee pharmacist/RSO on the morning of Saturday, June 16, 2012 to evaluate the situation and perform surveys of potentially impacted areas and personnel. A whole body scan of the pharmacist was conducted at a local hospital nuclear medicine department in the later morning of Saturday, June 16. Personnel surveys of the pharmacist and the scan did not indicate the presence of radioactive material. Further details and information are being gathered.

"No members of the public were believed to have been exposed above public dose limits as a result of the incident, and radioactive materials are believed to be contained within the lab area, with the exception of minor contamination discovered near the back door to the pharmacy.

"The Department continues to investigate the incident and is gathering additional information."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48034
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: KUMAR AND ASSOCIATES, INC
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: 778-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/18/2012
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2012
Event Time: 14:15 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"On Friday, June 15, 2012, at approximately 3:15 p.m. MDT (Mountain Daylight Time), a portable gauge licensee (Kumar and Associates, Inc.; Colorado License No. 778-01, Amendment 14) based in Denver, Colorado notified the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) Radioactive Materials Unit on-call duty officer that a gauge being used on a construction site had been damaged by heavy equipment earlier in the day (~2:15 p.m. MDT). The licensee reported that heavy equipment backed up and rolled over the gauge and the gauge technician was unable to retrieve or move the gauge in time. According to the licensee, and based on visual observation, the source capsule area at the end of the rod appeared intact and not significantly damaged as a result of the incident. Neither the source nor source rod were separated from the body of the gauge. The source rod, however, could not be retracted back into the shielded position and was transported back to the licensee facility in that manner.

"The gauge involved was a Troxler model 3440 (gauge serial number 32754), currently containing approximately 6.2 mCi (decayed from 3/1/2001 assay date) of Cs-137 (serial #750-8100) and 40 mCi (5/28/99 assay date) of Am-247:Be (serial #47-28951).

"At the time of the notification by the licensee to CDPHE at approximately 3:15 pm MDT, the gauge had already been returned to the licensee's facility. CDPHE requested that a leak test be performed on the gauge sources before any further actions are taken and that the licensee consult with a licensed repair facility or manufacturer for proper shipment of the damaged gauge.

"Additional information and an incident report from the licensee is pending."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 48048
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE HEMATITE
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 3
City: HEMATITE State: MO
County: JEFFERSON
License #: SNM-33
Agreement: N
Docket: 07000036
NRC Notified By: KEVIN DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/26/2012
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2012
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - ALL SAFETY ITEMS UNAVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)

Event Text

DRUM MISTAKENLY SET ASIDE WITH NO CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS

During the excavation of the burial pits area the licensee has requirements that 2 people survey the excavated materials. Excavated material was placed into a 5 gallon plastic container. After placing the material into the container a reading is taken on the bottom of the container in counts per minute which is then equated to a gram level (mass) of material present. If the mass of material is less than 15 grams (about 300,000 counts per minute) then no criticality safety controls are required.

One container, packed to a level of 325,000 counts per minute, was put aside briefly near a waste bin where those materials requiring no controls can be placed. Both people assigned to the work mistook this container for a container requiring no controls. A level of 325,000 counts per minutes equates to a mass of 20 grams of Uranium 235. At that level this item was far from the amount of material needed for a criticality accident but additional controls were required.

When the personnel realized their mistake they took that container to another area for overpack into a drum that provides additional spacing needed to provide additional criticality safety protection. At this time the container has the appropriate level of controls. The amount of material present was small enough that it could not have caused a criticality accident.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, June 27, 2012
Wednesday, June 27, 2012