U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 06/14/2012 - 06/15/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | Agreement State | Event Number: 48003 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM Licensee: CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY-SACRAMENTO Region: 4 City: SACRAMENTO State: CA County: SACRAMENTO License #: 0703-34 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KEN FUREY HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 06/07/2012 Notification Time: 14:18 [ET] Event Date: 05/07/2012 Event Time: [PDT] Last Update Date: 06/07/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO) FSME VIA EMAIL () MEXICO VIA FAX () | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM SIGNS The following information was received by facsimile: "A biannual tritium sign inspection during the week of 5/7/2012 disclosed four tritium signs had been removed during a renovation of Mendocine Hall during the third week of January 2012 by the contractor. All attempts to locate the signs have been exhausted. "The missing signs are as follows: Serial # 263374 Model # BX1711OWHSGN 7.5 curies Serial # 263373 Model # BX1711OWHSGN 7.5 curies Serial # 263387 Model # BX1711OWHSGN 7.5 curies Serial # 263388 Model # BX1711OWHSGN 7.5 curies "Date of manufacture for all signs is 5/2/2004." California 5010 Number: 060712 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48019 | Facility: BRUNSWICK Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/13/2012 Notification Time: 01:38 [ET] Event Date: 06/12/2012 Event Time: 17:57 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): DAVID AYRES (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF THE PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM "At 1757 EDT on 6/12/12, Brunswick Nuclear Plant experienced a fault on the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) uninterruptible power supply (UPS) electrical bus 'A'. This resulted in a loss of site Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The cause of the fault is not yet understood and under investigation. No other major plant effects occurred and no major plant evolutions are planned. "During the loss of SPDS, the emergency response capability of that system was lost to the site. During the loss of ERDS, the automatic data transfer feature of that system was lost for transmissions to the NRC, however manual data transfer is still available. During the loss of the PPC, automatic core thermal power averaging and automatic core thermal limit monitoring was lost. Manual calculations are available for these functions. "Unit 1 SPDS was restored to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at 1949 EDT. Unit 2 SPDS was restored to the EOF at 2030 EDT. ERDS and PPC remain unavailable with troubleshooting in progress. Both units reduced power to 98% as a conservative measure. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." * * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MILLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 0257 ON 6/14/12 * * * "The Unit 1 and 2 ERFIS, SPDS, and ERDS functions were restored by approximately 0630 hours on June 13, 2012, after an alternate power supply configuration was established. In addition, the PPC functions were restored by approximately 1630. Compensatory actions will be maintained until the UPS 'A' bus is restored and returned to normal configuration. The Brunswick Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been briefed on the compensatory actions in place. "Investigation of this condition will be documented in the corrective action program in Condition Report (CR) 542704. "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified." Notified R2DO(Ayres) | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48023 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: THOMAS BRADFORD HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/14/2012 Notification Time: 00:18 [ET] Event Date: 06/13/2012 Event Time: 17:45 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): DAVID AYRES (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE "On 6/13/12 at 1700 CDT, it was determined that valve 2-FCV-73-81 (HPCI steam line warm-up valve) was not capable of performing its intended primary containment isolation valve function. This determination was made during performance of a prompt determination of operability for a steam leak from a missing adapter on a Furmanite injection port in the valve packing area. To meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 action requirements for an inoperable primary containment isolation valve, 2-FCV-73-2 (HPCI inboard steam isolation valve) was closed at 1745 hrs., rendering U2 HPCI inoperable. As a result TS 3.5.1 actions were entered. "This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B) and (D) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident.' "It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D). "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "This event has been entered into the Licensee's Corrective Action Program as SR 565729." Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 had a 4-hour shutdown action statement which was satisfied when the HPCI inboard steam isolation valve was closed. Technical Specification 3.5.1 action statement is a 14-day shutdown LCO. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48024 | Facility: OYSTER CREEK Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-2 NRC Notified By: STEVEN JOHNSTON HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/14/2012 Notification Time: 09:53 [ET] Event Date: 06/14/2012 Event Time: 06:07 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): HAROLD GRAY (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE AND OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO SITE EMERGENCY BUILDING "At 0607 hrs. EDT, a vehicle struck a pole on Route 9, immediately in front of the site, causing a loss of power to the Technical Support Center (TSC). At 0615 hrs., the Fire Brigade was dispatched to investigate reports of a 'smoldering' transformer behind the Site Emergency Building (SEB) and Oyster Creek Administration Building (OCAB.) At approximately 0708 hrs., the on-scene Fire Brigade Leader called the local fire department, because, in his determination, it was an event or situation that was related to the health and safety of the onsite personnel. At 0717 hrs., the local fire department came on-site in response to the call. Upon investigation, it was found that the transformer was smoking due to overheating. There was no fire and no Emergency Action Level (EAL) was applicable for this event. Due to the notification and response of the local fire department, a 4-hour report is required per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). "At 0731 hrs., power was restored to the TSC and the TSC was restored to a fully operable condition. Due to the loss of the power to the TSC for greater than one hour (time required for TSC staffing), an 8-hour report is required in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). "The NRC Senior Resident was on-site and notified of the event." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48026 | Facility: FARLEY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: BLAKE MITCHELL HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/14/2012 Notification Time: 18:48 [ET] Event Date: 06/14/2012 Event Time: 13:53 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): DAVID AYRES (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR OUTAGE "During a maintenance task to replace a main control board annunciator power supply an electrical short occurred while installing a jumper. This caused two circuit breakers to trip and a loss of all control room annunciators. The cause of the short was identified and corrected. The two circuit breakers were closed and the annunciator function was restored at 1358 CDT resulting in a total out of service time of 5 minutes. The unit was at a stable 100% power during the loss of annunciators." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |