United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for May 2, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/01/2012 - 05/02/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47860 47881 47882 47884 47885

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Agreement State Event Number: 47860
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: RENEGADE TESTING & INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 3891-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/24/2012
Notification Time: 14:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO RADIOGRAPHER

The following information was obtained from the State of Florida via email:

"On April 16, [a licensee] employee notified [the] RSO that his 0-200 pocket detector had gone off scale ten days earlier. His film badge was immediately sent to Rad Detection Services for processing. It was reported to have 25 Rem whole body exposure. This office [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] was informed on 24 April. The RSO has tried to recreate the scenario but he can't come up with a 4.5 minute exposure scenario. RSO is considering a blood test. Licensee will provide a written report. Florida is investigating."

FL Incident No. FL 12-039

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47881
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS PEAK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/01/2012
Notification Time: 02:34 [ET]
Event Date: 04/30/2012
Event Time: 23:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 91 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN TURBINE TRIP

"On 30 April, 2012, at 2328 [EDT], DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped due to a trip of the main turbine. The cause of the main turbine trip is still under investigation.

"The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via Steam Generator PORVs to atmosphere. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive releases were experienced as a result of this event.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report.

"The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified."

The licensee stated that the trip was uncomplicated and the reactor is stable in mode 3 at no load temperature and pressure. The unit is on steam generator atmospheric relief valves because the secondary steam load on the plant was causing too much of a cool down. There is no primary to secondary steam generator leakage for the unit. The trip had no impact on Unit 1 which continues to operate at full power.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47882
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/01/2012
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2012
Event Time: 12:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FAA NOTIFIED OF REMOVAL OF STACK AVAITION OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS

"On May 1, 2012 at 12:10 EDT, Indian Point Unit 2 notified the Federal Aviation Administration that the Unit 1 Ventilation Stack Aviation Obstruction Lights were removed from service at 12:05 EDT on May 1, 2012. This is a planned evolution as Indian Point no longer requires the Unit 1 ventilation stack and plans to dismantle the stack to an approximate elevation of 167 feet which will remove the obstruction to air navigation and its associated aviation obstruction lights.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee estimates that the job will be completed September 6, 2012.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47884
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/01/2012
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/02/2012
Event Time: 08:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION SEALS

"During a review of environmental qualification records for reactor containment building electrical penetrations, six penetrations were identified that may not provide an adequate seal during worst case (Design Basis Accident (DBA)) conditions as required. These penetrations are through wall from the containment into the auxiliary building. The conditions that could cause degradation of the electrical penetration seals are not applicable to this operating mode. The station is currently in a refueling mode. This event was identified on March 2, 2012. The reportability was confirmed on May 1, 2012 at 1502 CDT."

The current penetration configuration has existed since the plant was built. The area of concern is that the Teflon connections may degrade under conditions of high radiation and high temperature during a DBA event. The licensee is investigating the extent of the condition and repair techniques.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47885
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/01/2012
Notification Time: 22:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2012
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FLOOR DRAIN BLOCKAGE ADVERSELY AFFECTS ASUMPTIONS OF PIPE BREAK ANALYSIS FOR ELCTRICAL SWITGHEAR ROOMS

"At 1300 on May 1, 2012, as a result of fire water flushing operations, it was observed that the floor drains in the 'A' and 'B' ESF (Engineered Safety Features) 4160 VAC switchgear rooms were draining extremely slow. Engineering was consulted and it was identified that the floor drains in these rooms are credited with preventing any water accumulation in these rooms as a result of internal flooding due to a pipe break. It is expected that the floor drains in the 'A' ESF switchgear room can drain approximately 134 gallons per minute (gpm) and the floor drains in the 'B' ESF switchgear room can drain approximately 208 gpm. With the floor drains partially blocked, a break in the 'A' Essential Service Water pipe in the 'B' ESF Switchgear Room would result in flood levels in the 'B' ESF Switchgear Room to exceed the maximum levels calculated in the current flooding analysis. The higher flood level may result in the inoperability of 'B' train Electrical Switchgear. The 'A' train Essential Service Water supplied equipment would be adversely affected due to the reduced flow. Consequently the pipe break would result in both ESF trains being adversely affected.

"Compensatory measures have been taken to restore system operability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, May 02, 2012
Wednesday, May 02, 2012