| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/24/2012 - 04/25/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47857 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: AL BOSTIC
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/21/2012
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2012
Event Time: 05:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES FAIL TO SHUT
"At approximately 0515 EDT on April 21, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant [HNP] was in the process of a normal plant shutdown for a refueling outage. HNP was at 0% power in Mode 4. During OST-1046, MSIV Operability Test, 'B' and 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV), failed to close from the main control board.
"At 0648 EDT an April 21, 2012 'B' MSIV shut immediately after the instrument air supply was isolated.
"At 0938 EDT an April 21, 2012 'C' MSIV shut after the instrument air supply was isolated.
"The cause of the equipment failure is not yet known but is currently being investigated. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C), inability to isolate and mitigate a radioactive release, and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The plant continues to remain shutdown at 0% power. Other equipment functioned as expected including the turbine isolation valves."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CAVES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1258 EDT ON 4/24/12 * * *
"Investigation into the condition revealed the instrument air supply to the MSIVs was isolated at 0530 EDT and 'B' MSIV indicated [drifted] shut at 0607 EDT. The plant is currently in Mode 6, Refueling, and the investigation is ongoing."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47859 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL KOMM
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/24/2012
Notification Time: 07:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2012
Event Time: 01:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVs)
"During restoration of Unit 1 reactor protection system (RPS) following preventive maintenance (PM), a link was closed on February 25, 2012 at 0138 EST that resulted in the automatic actuation of the standby gas treatment (SGT) trains for Units 1 and 2 and the automatic isolation of the associated SCIVs (Secondary Containment Isolation Valves). The instruments that input to the actuation logic were in the tripped condition during the performance of the PM with links opened to preclude the automatic response of the SCIVs. The PM procedure did not contain the necessary steps to ensure that the associated instruments that input into the actuation logic were reset prior to reclosing the links that were previously opened to disable their input to the logic. Reclosing the first link associated with a Unit 1 reactor building high radiation monitor trip resulted in an actuation signal that caused the Unit 1 and 2 SGT trains to automatically start as designed, Unit 1 and 2 reactor building normal ventilation to shut down and the Unit 1 and 2 SCIVs to automatically close. This actuation was therefore not the result of a valid signal. The automatic actuation of the SGT system and the isolation of Unit 1 and 2 SCIVs are considered an invalid actuation since the parameters that cause this actuation to occur had not been exceeded. For this reason the actuation is considered invalid and a report to the NRC is not required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv); however, because the secondary containment isolation signals affected containment isolation valves in more than one system (Unit 1 and 2 components affected) the event is reportable as required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2). A licensee event report (LER) is required, but a telephone notification is allowed by 10CFR50.73. In the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. The affected procedure(s) will be revised to ensure the affected instruments are reset prior to returning the system to service to preclude recurrence during the performance of future RPS PM activities.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated as designed. The SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 47861 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/24/2012
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2012
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
GORDON BJORKMAN (NMSS)
| Event Text CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED MEDICAL TREATMENT
"Westinghouse Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) staff responded to an operator who was exposed to dilute nitric acid (30%) on the left forearm and left foot. Employee was cleaning scrubber piping in the conversion area of the plant when exposed to the nitric acid solution containing uranium. The employee was treated within the onsite medical facility where decontamination was performed. Medical, emergency response and health physics procedures were followed. Upon completion of the decontamination efforts, the smearable alpha reading was < 50 dpm/100 cm2 and alpha direct reading on forearm was 818 dpm/100 cm2, on foot direct alpha reading was 280 dpm/100 cm2. Medical staff recommended transfer to the hospital for further treatment. Westinghouse followed contaminated injury protocols and had the employee transported to the hospital emergency room via ambulance. A Westinghouse health physics (HP) technician accompanied the employee to the hospital. Surveys were conducted of the ambulance and all results were below established limits. Material Safety Data Sheets for the nitric acid and uranium were provided to the hospital in accordance with procedures. Hospital report describes injury as, 'irritation noted over the left forearm as well as over the left anterior part of the foot and dorsal part of the foot ...some mild orange discoloration noted to these areas.' Employee was monitored for a period of time, given treatment for pain, and then released from the hospital.
"Immediate Actions: Initial investigation into the event is ongoing. This event has been entered into the Facility Corrective Action Process Issue # 12-115-001. Local county authorities and state authorities are aware of this event." | |