| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/22/2011 - 11/23/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 47451 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS, INC
Region: 4
City: RIDGELAND State: MS
County:
License #: MS-724-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIA McROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/17/2011
Notification Time: 16:31 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2011
Event Time: 18:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
D. JOHNSON (E-MAIL) (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THEFT OF A TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the Mississippi Division of Radiological Health (DHR) via e-mail:
"The licensee's RSO contacted DRH to report the theft of their Troxler Model 3440 (S/N 22563) nuclear gauge that was secured in the back of their white marked pick-up truck parked six spaces from the front entrance of the Wal-Mart [located in Meridian, MS]. The two gauge cables were cut and the gauge was taken out of the truck bed. All required shipping documentation was stolen out of the unlocked cab of the truck. The gauge and gauge paperwork were estimated to have been stolen around 1820 [CST]. The gauge was stored in the yellow plastic transport case with Radioactive Yellow II labels attached. The yellow plastic transport case had two locks on the outer container and two cables threaded through the top handle and locked with two separate locks on each separate eye hook.
"Meridian City Police were immediately notified by the licensee. Licensee notified Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) at 1940 [CST]. MEMA contacted DRH at 1955 [CST]. DRH notified Department of Homeland Security (DHS) who then notified FBI.
"DRH performed an inspection and investigation on November 16, 2011 at Terracon Consultants, Inc., in Ridgeland."
The gauge contained the following sources: Cs-137 (S/N 75-4297) (8 mCi); Am-241:Be (S/N 47-18403) (40 mCi)
Mississippi Report MS-11006
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47456 | Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: PFI LLC
Region: 4
City: WICHITA State: KS
County:
License #: 10-C842
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/18/2011
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2011
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTREMITY OVEREXPOSURE FROM FLUORINE-18
The Kansas Department of Health and Environmental Services provided a notification via facsimile concerning an employee working for a State licensee (PFI LLC) who apparently received an extremity overexposure of 53,010 mrem during the month of September while processing the radiopharmaceutical Fluorine-18. No additional details concerning the circumstance of how the overexposure occurred was provided in the State's report.
The Headquarters Operations Officer was unable to contact the originator of the report for additional information. |
| Research Reactor | Event Number: 47466 | Facility: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
RX Type: 20000 KW TEST
Comments:
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #: TR-5
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000184
NRC Notified By: DAVID SHAWN O'KELLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/21/2011
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
YIN XIASONG (NRR)
CINDY MONTGOMERY (NRR)
JOHNNY EADS (NRR)
CRAIG BASSETT email (R2)
| Event Text CONFINEMENT NOT MAINTAINED AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Yesterday afternoon, while performing retests on replacement control shim arm switches, reactor operators placed the reactor in a condition that would allow more than one shim control rod to be withdrawn. This violated Technical Specification 3.4.1, "Operations that require confinement." The reactor facility did not have full confinement in place at that time. The specific language of Technical Specification 3.4.1 is "Confinement shall be maintained when changes of components or equipment within the confines of the thermal shield, other than rod drop tests or movement of experiments, are being made which could cause a significant change in reactivity." Although the shim control rods were not withdrawn and the rod bottom lights never cleared, the circumstances, in the licensee's opinion, were that they could have caused a significant change in reactivity, allowing more than one control rod to be withdrawn when the reactor was not in full confinement.
The licensee notified the NRC Reactor Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47471 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRIAN STANDER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/22/2011
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2011
Event Time: 13:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF A DRYWELL-TO-SUPPRESSION CHAMBER VACUUM RELIEF VALVE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 criteria (b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"At time 1353 CST on 11/22/11, a licensed operator inadvertently bumped the Torus-to-Drywell vacuum relief Master Control Switch for the Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber vacuum relief valves from the 'close' position to the 'open' position. One of the twelve vacuum relief valves controlled by the Master Control Switch indicated an open indication. The other eleven vacuum relief valves did not operate due to having the pneumatics secured to the operator. Immediately upon recognizing the condition, the licensed operator returned the switch to the closed position. The open vacuum relief valve indication changed to the closed indication. From automatic alarm logging, the time that the vacuum relief was open was recorded as six seconds. The vacuum relief valve has a safety function in the closed position to limit the amount of bypass flow to ensure proper containment response on a postulated LOCA event and an open safety function post-LOCA to limit negative differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber. With the valve partially open, the LOCA containment response cannot be assured. This results in declaring the primary containment inoperable.
"The vacuum relief valve manual operators have air secured during normal operation. With air secured, only one of the twelve valves operated versus all twelve. A valve line-up was performed and all pneumatic supply valves were in the proper line-up. Currently, the only unusual occurrence is why there was sufficient air to the individual vacuum relief valve that caused it to operate in the open direction. This will be resolved within the corrective action program.
"Currently, all twelve Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber vacuum relief valves are closed and in the normal line-up.
"[The] NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47472 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRAD EKLUND
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/22/2011
Notification Time: 23:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2011
Event Time: 19:25 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CONTROL ELEMENT DEVIATION
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"PVNGS [Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station] [Unit 1 was in the process of Low Power Physics Testing following a refueling outage. The Unit was at 0.4 percent power and performing individual CEA [Control Element Assembly] group worth testing. Specifically Regulating Group (RG) 2 was being inserted while RG 4 was being withdrawn. During the CEA manipulations, it was identified that there was a CEA deviation on RG 2 subgroup 17 that exceeded 6 inches from the remainder of the RG. RG 2 subgroup 18 was at 134 inches withdrawn and RG 2 subgroup 17 had two CEAs at 124 inches, one CEA at 122 inches and one CEA at 118 inches withdrawn. The CEA Malfunctions abnormal operating procedure 40AO-9ZZ11 was entered and a manual reactor trip was directed by the Control Room Supervisor. The reactor was tripped at 1925 hours.
"Unit 1 was at normal temperature and pressure prior to the trip. All CEAs inserted fully into the reactor core. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The offsite power grid is stable. No significant LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. There was no loss of normal heat removal capabilities, or loss of any safety functions associated with this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed of the Unit 1 reactor trip and this notification." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47473 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KROS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/23/2011
Notification Time: 01:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2011
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | Event Text TEMPORARY LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING
"During walkdown of scheduled work it was discovered that HCV-335 (SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER INLET HEADER ISOLATION VALVE) would not be able to be manually positioned open due to a missing idler gear key.
"Upon a loss of instrument air, HCV-335 would have failed closed, interrupting shutdown Cooling flow with no ability to open HCV-335 manually.
"Alternate Shutdown Cooling pump and paths were available at the time of discovery. No loss of instrument air or interruption in shutdown cooling flow occurred while preparing to align alternate shutdown cooling. An 8 hour LCO under Technical Specification 2.8.1(3)2 was entered at 1700 CST. Alternate shutdown cooling was established on a containment spray pump as allowed by procedure. The 8 hour LCO was exited at 2306 CST. A replacement idler key has been fabricated for HCV-335."
The reactor core has been reloaded with water level greater than 23 feet above the fuel.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |