|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/30/2011 - 10/03/2011
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47291 |
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HURT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 09/25/2011
Notification Time: 19:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2011
Event Time: 18:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 1804 on Sunday, September 25, the Callaway Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) will undergo planned maintenance to replace the building's heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. This maintenance is currently scheduled to last for approximately five days, at which time the TSC will be restored to service. During this period, the TSC's HVAC system will not be able to provide positive pressure to the TSC, thus rendering it non-functional.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation while the TSC is non-functional, TSC emergency response personnel will report to their backup locations in accordance with Callaway Plant emergency planning procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the planned unavailability of an emergency response facility.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM TIM HOLLAND TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2027 EDT ON 9/30/1 * * *
"At 1804 CDT on September 25, 2011, the Callaway Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) underwent planned maintenance to replace the building's heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. While this maintenance was being performed, the TSC was unable to maintain positive pressure within the building, thus rendering it non-functional.
"This ENS update is to document that, at 1800 on September 30, 2011, the Callaway Plant TSC was returned to service following successful completion of planned maintenance on the building HVAC system.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Werner). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47292 |
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 09/26/2011
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2011
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
93 |
Power Operation |
93 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
800 MHZ RADIO SYSTEM TEMPORARILY REMOVED FROM SERVICE DUE TO DEGRADED ANTENNA
"The site's 800 MHz radio system was removed from service for approximately one (1) hour to support pre-planned maintenance to repair a degraded antenna. While the 800 MHz radio system is out of service, it will not be possible to activate any of the site's emergency sirens from any of the risk county Emergency Operations Centers nor from the plant. For the period of time that the sirens are non-functional, the three risk counties will be prepared to utilize the back-up method of route alerting to alert residents."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 47298 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BASF CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: FREEPORT State: TX
County:
License #: 01021
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 09/27/2011
Notification Time: 10:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED PROCESS GAUGE
The following information was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via e-mail:
"On September 26, 2011, the licensee reported that while preparing to enter a vessel, the shutter on a Ronan model SA-1 nuclear gauge containing 2000 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) -137 failed to shut and is stuck in the normally open position. The source serial number is 2943GK. No significant exposure has occurred due to this event. The gauge is located at a height of 150 feet on the tank. The licensee contacted a technical representative and expects to repair or replace the gauge at the end of the week. The cause for the event is under investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received IAW SA 300."
Texas Incident #: I-8887 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47306 |
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID WEBSTER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 09/30/2011
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2011
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE TESTING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
"Monticello has discovered that it has not met Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.7 relating to the largest single post-accident load reject for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG). Although the current test designated post-accident load is successfully load rejected during the surveillance, the test load rejection must be higher to bound all post-accident load scenarios. The capability of an EDG subsystem to recover from a reject of the largest single post-accident load testing has not met the requirements of SR 3.8.1.7. Therefore, both EDGs have been declared inoperable. Both EDGs are considered Functional and Available for use at this time.
"There were no automatic EDG initiation signals associated with this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 47307 |
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: RON DOCKERY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 09/30/2011
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2011
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT |
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS) |
Event Text
HYDRAULIC LEAK CONTAINED ON SITE- STATE OFFICIALS NOTIFIED
"On 9/30/11 at 0730 [CDT], the main hydraulic hose ruptured on a coal truck making a routine delivery to the CĀ600 coal pile. The PSS [Plant Shift Superintendent] was notified and it was determined that approximately 30 to 35 gallons of hydraulic fluid was released on the coal pile delivery area which is greater than the reportable quantity for petroleum products. At 0810 [CDT], the PSS made notification to the Kentucky Environmental Response Team (KERT) and a courtesy notification to the Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection (KDEP.)
"This event is reportable under Criteria P in Appendix D of USEC procedure UE2-RA-RE1030 as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRCĀ11Ā2607; PGDP Event Report No. PADĀ2011Ā16; NRC Worksheet No.; Responsible Division: Operations" |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 47308 |
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 09/30/2011
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2011
Event Time: 11:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(5) - DEV FROM ISA |
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS) |
Event Text
EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION DIFFERENT THAN ANALYZED IN THE ISA
"During a review of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and criticality evaluation assumptions for a floor cleaning scrubber used in the Dry Conversion Process facility, it was determined that an equipment configuration was different than that analyzed in the ISA. Field verification of the floor cleaning scrubber recovery tank determined that its capacity was greater than the safe volume limit referenced in the analysis. The tank volume is credited as an IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] in the ISA summary. Based on a review of this as-found condition, discovered at approximately 1120 EDT on September 29, 2011, it was determined that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"The tanks for the floor cleaning scrubbers were inspected and no unsafe condition existed. Operation of the equipment has been suspended pending additional review and implementation of corrective actions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency and New Hanover County Emergency Management. |
| Non-Agreement State |
Event Number: 47309 |
Rep Org: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Licensee: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Region: 3
City: DAYTON State: OH
County:
License #: 42-23539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LT. COL. DAVID SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 09/30/2011
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2011
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X |
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL () |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
LOST AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE
During a visual inspection of a source storage area at the Wright-Patterson AFB, 88th Medical Group, the licensee was unable to locate a 12 mCi Am-241 source. A rad survey was conducted but the source was not located. A search of the nuclear medicine area was performed with negative results.
The source was last leak tested in July, 2002, then placed in storage. The last visual inspection where the source was identified was performed in September, 2009. The source was slated for disposal. The licensee is searching through their records to determine if the source, in fact, was sent to a disposal facility.
The licensee notified Jackie Cook, R4DNMS.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 47310 |
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 10/01/2011
Notification Time: 00:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2011
Event Time: 08:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN |
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS) |
Event Text
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING A LOSS OF ONE LEG OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY
"Description: At 0854 CDT on 09-30-11, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that water was observed in the #5 withdrawal position scale pit during the completion of the monthly test of the C-310 scale pit water detection system alarm module. The alarm module was being tested per procedure, when the module was found with the visual alarm (a red light) on at the local panel in the #5 withdrawal position room. In response to the alarm, the scale pit hatch was opened and the water detection sensor cable was observed to be at least partially submerged. Immediate investigation found the sump pump breaker to be tripped; when the breaker was reset the pump actuated and water was immediately removed. At the time of the occurrence, product withdrawal was in progress in the #3 and #4 withdrawal position room, and no cylinder was present in the #5 withdrawal position room. The source of the water was found to be a leaking steam condensate valve above the #5 withdrawal room ceiling. The water had drained to the concrete pad outside the building and then along the scale cart rails, eventually finding its way into the #5 scale cart pit where it gradually accumulated. Because the C-310 Scale Pit Water Detection Alarm did not function as credited, it is in violation of NCSE 032 (NCSA 310-004). Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-11-2610; PGDP Event
"Report No. PAD-2011-17
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is low, even though the event made it possible for the level of pre-existing water to exceed the safe geometry limit. Although it is normal case for overall PGDP operations to have assay up to 5.5 wt.% 235U, the actual assay of product withdrawal operations during the period in question remained no higher than 2.0 wt. % 235U. At that actual assay, the depth of water necessary to support a criticality would have been more than 7.21 inches, which might have been credible but in itself would have remained a very unlikely possibility due to the slow ingress rate and high probability of detection and mitigation by personnel performing routine activities in that area.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to happen, a significant breach in the process system integrity would have to occur. After the breach, fissile UF6 and its reaction products would have to react with pre-existing water to form fissile solution. There would have to be a sufficient depth of water in the pit to support a criticality (e.g. more than 3.68 inches of water at 5.5 wt. % 235U).
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The two process conditions relied upon for double contingency are mass and geometry.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Product withdrawal assay at the time of the event was no higher than 2.0 wt% U235. However, no UF6 release occurred.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Geometry is controlled in the second leg of double contingency by limiting the level of pre-existing water that might be present in the scale pit. Water accumulation is considered normal case in the NCSE by acute or by chronic sources. The NCSE credits the Scale Pit Water Detection Alarm to provide detection of chronic water accumulation in the scale pit. The alarm is set to actuate before the water level exceeds 2.5 inches in the pit. The geometry parameter limit is 3.68 inches assuming the worst-case possible enrichment of 5.5 wt.% 235U. The alarm is credited to provide early indication, and result in prompt mitigation, of water ingress to the pit before the NCS parameter limit is exceeded. Since the alarm was not functional, and the ingress rate was sufficiently slow that ingress was not easily detectable, there was no reliable means in place to detect and mitigate the ingress of water into the pit. The sensor and local panel light performed their intended function; however, it is the ACR audible and visible alarms that are controlled as AQ-NCS equipment and not the local panel light and buzzer. With the alarm out of service, continued ingress of water to the pit could have resulted in exceeding the geometry parameter limit for water depth before detection and mitigation. NCS entered the scale pit for inspection shortly after notification of the discovery and after the water had been drained. NCS observed that the water level at the lowest point in the pit may have reached 2.5 inches. Based on those inspections, it is likely that the water level remained below the 3.68-inch level, but there was no definitive way to prove the maximum height that might have occurred throughout the period of time when the alarm was not functional. Therefore, for conservatism it is assumed credible that the geometry parameter limit was violated during the lime the alarm was not functional.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: The sump pump was immediately activated by resetting its breaker, which restored the water level in the pit below the 2.5 inch administrative limit, thus removing the hazard of this incident. The #5 withdrawal position scale pit will be checked twice per shift beginning on 9-30-11 in accordance with procedure due to the ACR alarm being out-of-service." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47311 |
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN W. MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 10/01/2011
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2011
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF ERDS CONNECTIVITY DUE TO A COMPUTER ISSUE
"On 10/1/2011, for a period of approximately 4 hours between 1600 EDT to 2000 EDT, the capability of transferring Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) information to the NRC Operations Center was lost for Brunswick Units 1 and 2. The cause was attributed to a software issue affecting communication between plant process computing and the network server. This constituted a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47312 |
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 10/02/2011
Notification Time: 01:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2011
Event Time: 01:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
98 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO TRANSFORMER FAULT
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). On October 2, 2011, at approximately 0100 hours [EDT], the Perry Nuclear Power Plant commenced a controlled plant shutdown. The shutdown was due to the anticipated investigation and expected repair time of the Unit 1 startup transformer exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) Required Action completion time.
"On September 29, 2011, at 0529 hours [EDT] the Unit 1 startup transformer failed due to an internal fault, which required entry into TS 3.8.1 Action A.2 for one required offsite circuit inoperable. The determination has been made that the required action, which is to restore the required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status, cannot be met by the required completion time and a plant shutdown is being initiated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee expects to have the Unit offline between 1300-1400 hours [EDT] and plans to issue a press release. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47314 |
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 10/03/2011
Notification Time: 05:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2011
Event Time: 03:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
99 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNIT 2 ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.0.3 AFTER DECLARING ALL THREE CONTAINMENT RECIRC FAN COOLERS INOPERABLE
Indian Point Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 (TS Required Shutdown) at 0345 EDT on 10/3/11 after declaring all three Containment Recirc Fan Coolers Inoperable due to insufficient Service Water (SW) flow through SW Headers 1, 2, and 3 during the quarterly surveillance test. At 0438 EDT, Unit 2 commenced a controlled shutdown. The licensee has shifted SW flow to Headers 4, 5 and 6 and is in the process of re-performing the test. If the test is successful, they will exit TS 3.0.3. Unit 2 is currently stable at 99% reactor power.
The licensee informed state agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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