| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/04/2011 - 03/07/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46521 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MERT PROBASCO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/05/2011
Notification Time: 09:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2011
Event Time: 01:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On January 5, 2011, at 0120 hours, with the reactor at 100% thermal power and steady state conditions, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNSP) declared the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system inoperable due to the RCIC suction isolation valve from the Torus/Suppression Pool (RCIC-26) failing to go fully closed during planned surveillance testing. The RCIC-26 is a motor-operated valve (MOV) and its normal position is closed. The RClC-26 valve is redundant to the RCIC-25 valve, and is not the credited containment isolation valve. The RCIC-26 valve has a safety function to be (manually) opened during certain event mitigation scenarios requiring a transfer of suction sources from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the Torus.
"Based on the valve failing to fully close during MOV stroke time testing per PNPS Procedure 8.5.5.4, the RCIC system was declared inoperable at 0120 hours and the appropriate LCO was entered. The RCIC-26 was subsequently returned to a full open position, caution tagged and the RCIC system was declared operable. The LCO was exited at 0200 hours. An investigation of the event is underway and continuing.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified.
"This is an 8-hour notification made in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee will notify the State of Massachusetts.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOSEPH LYNCH TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1946 EST ON 3/4/11 * * *
"Event Notification 46521 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were satisfied pending the evaluation of RCIC System operability.
"On 01/05/11, at 0120 hours the RCIC System was declared inoperable due to uncertainty of RCIC System Operability when the Torus/Suppression Pool Suction Valve (RCIC-26) failed to go fully closed during planned surveillance testing. The valve was restored to the full open position and the valve was declared operable based on capability to meet the required safety function to fully open when RCIC pump suction from the suppression pool is required.
"The apparent cause evaluation concluded that valve failure was the result of high relay contact resistance in the closing control circuit components of the valve breaker. This failure prevented the valve from fully closing but had no affect on capability to open the valve. Surveillance testing verified that capability to open the valve was not affected.
"Corrective action was completed to clean or replace the control circuit relay contacts. Post work testing confirmed capability to open and close the valve. An extent of condition for similar breaker control circuit components was also performed. All relevant technical information is documented in the corrective action system.
"The failure observed did not affect the valve's required safety function and did not impact RCIC System operability. Thus there was no impact on nuclear safety. This event is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) .
"Event Number 46521, made on 01/05/2011, is being retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Anthony Dimitriadis) |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46577 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County: SUFFOLK
License #: RCN01762
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/31/2011
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL DOSE EXCEEDING ANNUAL OCCUPATIONAL DOSE LIMIT FOR ADULTS
The following was received via email:
"On 1/13/11, the licensee reported to the agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] a potential dose exceeding the adult occupational total effective dose equivalent limit of 5 rem. The situation causing this event occurred during late December 2010, when a number of emergency repairs within a cyclotron were conducted over several days. The potential for overexposure was suspected on 1/5/11. A dosimeter exposure readings report of the [Optically Stimulated Luminescence OSL] was received by the licensee from the dosimeter service, after quick read, on 1/13/11. Affected individual's annual TEDE reported at 5457 mrem. Exposure (1596 mrem) obtained by official [OSL] dosimeters worn during cyclotron repair operations differed significantly from exposure (620 mrem) obtained by electronic dosimeter worn simultaneously during cyclotron repair operations. Electronic dosimeters are used by individuals for real-time readings during the repair operations. The licensee removed affected individual from any potentially high exposure operations.
"Investigation ongoing. Intermediate and draft reports have been received. Awaiting final written report by licensee.
"The Agency considers this event to still be OPEN."
Massachusetts Event # 01-9454.
Notified R1DO (Dwyer) and FSME (McIntosh).
* * * UPDATE FROM TONY CARPENITO TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1441 EST ON 03/03/11 VIA EMAIL * * *
"Subsequent on-site agency inspection performed. Licensee submitted follow-up report [on] 2/28/11.
"Cause Description: Misinterpretation of licensee's pre-existing policy restricting workers when YTD [year-to-date] annual exposures approach in-house limits and over-reliance on real-time electronic dosimeters worn specifically during potentially high exposure operations.
"Precipitating factor: Over-reliance on real-time electronic dosimeters worn specifically during potentially high exposure operations.
"Corrective Action: Licensee to implement policy re-write to minimize subjective misinterpretations, change full-time dosimeter exchange frequency to obtain more current year-to-date exposure totals, replace current job-specific dosimeters with different type of dosimeter better suited to monitor type of work involved, apply administrative correction factors to readings of job-specific dosimeters to obtain more conservative real-time results.
"The individual [involved in this event was] removed from potentially high exposure operations during investigation and re-instated several weeks later on 3/3/11.
"Although the Agency considers this specific situation to be closed, it will be revisited during future inspections."
The report did not state whether an over exposure actually occurred.
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and FSME (McIntosh).
* * * UPDATE FROM TONY CARPENITO TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0832 EST ON 03/03/11 VIA TELEPHONE * * *
The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program determined the individual received a dose of 5457 mrem.
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and FSME (McIntosh). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 46655 | Rep Org: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS SWANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/04/2011
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2011
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP ()
| Event Text PART 21 - ERROR IN VALVE BODY DRAWING
The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert Duke Energy that as of February 25, 2011, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation which may affect the performance of the applicable equipment provided to McGuire Nuclear Station. Specifically, an error was discovered on valve body drawing V112298, when, during a revision process on Revision B of the drawing, a dimension was omitted that set the depth of the valve shaft bearing bore. This error resulted in a greater possible variation of bearing position in the valve shaft bore. If the error was large, the valve could not be assembled which was not the case for these valves. The valves assembled without incident and passed the operational testing, including a seat leakage test, with no anomalies. In the case that the bearing position error was slight, it is possible that the seal and disc could experience more wear than normal and increased leakage would result. Because these valves are equipped with manual operators, Fisher expects that these valves will not be cycled enough to experience any of the potential problems described above.
This equipment included NPS 4, Class 150, Fisher Type A11 Butterfly Valve Assemblies equipped with Fisher Leverlock Manual Actuators. The NPS 4, A11 is a butterfly valve that uses internal bearings (located on either side of the disc) to provide a radial wear surface for shaft rotation and also serve as a centering system for the disc in the waterway. Centering of the disc is accomplished with a wear surface on the end of the bearings adjacent to the side of the disc. Lateral positioning of the disc is accomplished by controlling the length of the bearings and the depth of the bored holes in the body that accept the bearings.
Fisher has revised the drawings to ensure that this issue is corrected. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46656 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/04/2011
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/03/2011
Event Time: 15:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text 60 DAY TELEPHONE NOTIFICATON CONCERNING INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(1) to report four closely-spaced invalid actuations of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"Four events of unplanned actuations of general containment isolation signals affecting containment Isolation valves in more than one system occurred during planned transfers of power between the normal and alternate power supply for the 3A 480V Shutdown Board. The first event occurred on January 3, 2011, at 1515 hours Central Standard Time (CST), with Unit 3 in a forced outage and at 0 percent power (0 MWT). The electrical power to the 3A Reactor Protection System (RPS) was interrupted during the planned transfer of the 3A 480V Shutdown Board from its normal supply to its alternate power supply. During the transfer, the alternate feeder breaker did not close. An attempt was made to return to the normal power supply; however, the normal feeder breaker did not initially close but did close on re-attempt. This resulted in the interruption of power to the 3A 480V Shutdown Board, which caused the 3A RPS to de-energize, resulting in a half scram and the actuation of Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8, and the initiation of Trains A, B, and C Standby Gas Treatment and Train A Control Room Emergency Ventilation.
"Plant conditions, which require PCIS actuations and the associated system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation level, or high area temperature), did not exist; therefore, the actuation was invalid. The affected equipment responded as designed.
"On January 3, 2011, at approximately 1620 hours CST, Unit 3 Operations personnel restored 3A RPS power and re-aligned affected equipment, as appropriate. This event was entered in the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 305070.
"Subsequent related failure to transfer events of the 3A 480V Shutdown Board occurred on January 4, 2011, at 2321 hours, on January 5, 2011, at 0448 hours, and on January 5, 2011, at 0841 hours. In each event the plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and the associated system initiation did not exist; therefore, the actuations were invalid. In each of the three subsequent events the affected equipment started and functioned successfully with one exception. During the last event, Main Control Room indication of a Secondary Containment outboard isolation damper closure was indeterminate (i.e., double-lit). The damper was declared inoperable, and the associated Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.2 Action was taken. [A} work order [was] issued to investigate the problem repaired a damper limit switch. This problem was entered in the Corrective Action Program as PER 305062.
"PERs were generated for each of these events (PER 305865, PER 305421, and PER 305893). All of these events were consolidated into PER 305070.
"The Browns Ferry NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46657 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TODD LYNCH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/05/2011
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2011
Event Time: 10:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION RELATED TO FISH KILL
"At 1045 the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) control room was notified by an Xcel Energy environmental specialist that a fish kill count was conducted on the morning of 3/5/11 following reactor shutdown. In accordance with the MNGP water appropriations permit for fish kill in the Mississippi river, the environmental specialist will be notifying the State of Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.
"Notifications made to above government agencies meet the reporting criteria established in 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to government agencies has been or will be made.
"Total fish kill was determined to be approximately 100 fish downstream of the plant's discharge canal. Fish kill was the result of cooldown of water being discharged to the river from the plant's discharge canal. All temperature limits specified in the plant's water appropriation permit were met throughout the shutdown. There was no release of any chemical or radioactive materials to the environment."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying appropriate state and local authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46658 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PATRICK RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/06/2011
Notification Time: 01:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2011
Event Time: 23:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SPURIOUS SIREN ACTIVATION
"One of the 37 Prompt Notification System sirens surrounding the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF)/Nine Mile Point (NMP) sites spuriously activated at 2315 EST.
"The Oswego County 911 Center notified the Nine Mile Point Emergency Preparedness Department of the inadvertent siren activation.
"Repair technicians have de-activated and silenced the faulty siren as of 0107 EST.
"The cause of the inadvertent siren activation is not understood at this time. The issue has been entered into the site's Corrective Action Program."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Oswego County 911 Center, and the Public Service Commission. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46659 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM RESTUCCIO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/06/2011
Notification Time: 01:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2011
Event Time: 23:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SPURIOUS SIREN ACTIVIATION
"The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) to notify the NRC of the inadvertent actuation of one Oswego County emergency notification siren at approximately 2315 EST on 3/5/11. Initial notification to the JFA [James A. Fitzpatrick] Control Room of the siren activation was via on-site security personnel and verified with Oswego County 911 Center. The faulted siren was alarming intermittently and repair personnel were dispatched to correct the problem. At 0107 EST, power to the affected siren was de-energized by off-site repair personnel.
"Sirens affected provide coverage to Oswego County. The sirens are utility owned and shared with the Nine Mile Point site.
"In the event the sirens are needed the county has it's Hyper-Reach (911 call back system) on standby.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46660 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL REIMERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/06/2011
Notification Time: 19:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2011
Event Time: 16:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO SECONDARY SODIUM CONCENTRATIONS EXCEEDING CHEMISTRY LIMITS
"This is a 4-hr Non-Emergency notification to the NRCOC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center] for an event that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"On 3/6/11 at approx 16:20 [EST], Steam Generator sodium concentrations started to rise and exceeded 3-ONOP-071.1 (Secondary Chemistry Deviation from limits) Action Level 3 criteria (250 ppb Sodium). The plant power was reduced to 25% per 3-ONOP-100, Fast Load Reduction, and a manual plant trip [was] initiated per procedure at 16:44 [EST]. Unit [3] is stabilized in Mode 3, and [the licensee] is performing secondary clean-up."
All rods fully inserted. All safety systems functioned as required. The reactor trip was uncomplicated. Unit 4 was unaffected by this event.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |