|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/23/2009 - 10/26/2009
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45425 |
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES W MORELAND
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 10/11/2009
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2009
Event Time: 04:50 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
REACTOR WATER LEVEL INDICATION INOPERABLE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS (Emergency Notification System) or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On 10/11/2009 at 0450 MST Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 declared both trains of the Qualified Safety Parameter Display (QSPDS) inoperable due to the discovery that an installed temporary modification (TMOD) impacted the reactor vessel level indication parameter in a non-conservative manner. The modification jumpered failed heater junction thermal connections (HJTC) at the heated and unheated HJTC points. Unit 1 has two failed detectors with TMODs installed. During a design event where these detectors would be needed, these detectors will not alarm at the correct vessel levels.
"The emergency operating procedures use this indication and pressurizer level indications (which are unaffected by this condition) to throttle safety injection flow during certain accidents. With the TMOD providing incorrect indication the operators could throttle flow when full flow should be maintained.
"In addition the QSPDS reactor level indication is used in the Emergency Plan to classify emergencies. The standard Appendix 101 to Palo Verde emergency procedures provides guidance for an alternate method for determining reactor vessel level when RVLMS (Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System) is out of service. This alternate method determines level by manually determining sub-cooled, saturation or superheated conditions based upon input of reactor vessel pressure and the "raw" QSPDS - RVLMS thermocouple temperature indications. This compensatory measure ensures that classification of events can continue to be completed in a timely manner.
"Unit 1 has entered the LCO (Limiting Condition of Operation) required action for this condition which requires at least one channel be restored to operable status within 7 days. Unit 2 is in a refueling and is not impacted at this time. Unit 3 does not have the TMOD installed. "
According to the licensee Train A TMOD which was installed 2/3/08 and the train B TMOD which was installed 12/12/08. The licensee checked the installation of these TMODs after reviewing operating experience reports from Calvert Cliffs.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1916 EDT ON 10/23/09 FROM BUZARD TO HUFFMAN * * *
"On 10/11/2009 at 12:26 MST Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 reported the inoperability of both trains of the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) due to the discovery that an installed temporary modification impacted the reactor vessel water level indication parameter in a non-conservative manner. After further Operations and Engineering review it was concluded that the modification, installed due to one inoperable heated junction thermal couple (HJTC) in each train, does not result in the inoperability of either train of QSPDS since the Technical Specification required number of heated junction thermal couples (HJTC) (two each in the upper and lower level indication) remain operable with the temporary modification installed. In addition, the Control Room operators would understand the QSPDS indication and would correctly control the plant per the emergency operating procedures using this indication along with pressurizer level indication to throttle safety injection flow during certain accidents.
"The QSPDS reactor level indication is also used in the Emergency Plan to classify emergencies and the modification would not impact this function.
"Unit 1 has exited the LCO Condition for two inoperable QSPDS reactor vessel water level instrument channels."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Okeefe) notified. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45450 |
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OR PITTSBURGH
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0190
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 10/21/2009
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 08/04/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNAUTHORIZED ORDER OF TRITIUM GAS
"Event location: Customs and Border Protection in Cleveland, OH
"Notifications: [The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] DEP got a phone call from the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] on October 6th, 2009, that there was a suspicion of unauthorized order of radioactive material. Confirmation phone call [was made] from the RSO to the DEP on October 21, 2009, after a full internal investigation to confirm suspicion of unauthorized order of tritium gas.
"Event description: On August 4,2009, an unauthorized researcher from University of Pittsburgh placed an order with 'Microtek AG' for 11.88 Curies of tritium. The order was shipped on September 11, 2009 and inspected by Customs & Border Protection (CBP) at Cleveland, OH. CBP contacted the RSO to verify the license, and the Univ. of Pittsburgh advised CBP that the shipment was an unauthorized order. The order was returned to [the] shipper (Microtek AG of Switzerland)."
Event Report ID No: PA090033 |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45451 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
Region: 4
City: AUSTIN State: TX
County:
License #: L00485
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/21/2009
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION ON A PACKAGE
Packaged vials of Sulfur-35 were delivered to the University of Texas with an indicated removable contamination of 10,000 dpm per swipe on the outside of the package. The vials of sulfur were reported as frozen with 1600 dpm per swipe. A lead pig located in the package indicated 600 dpm per swipe. There was no other reported contamination on the package.
A Texas incident report number will follow.
* * * UPDATE AT 1136 EDT ON 10/22/2009 TO PARK FROM TUCKER * * *
The following report was provide by the State via e-mail:
"On October 21, 2009 at 1735 [CDT] the Agency [Texas Dept of State Health Services] received a telephone call from [Redacted] the Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] for the University of Texas. [The RSO] stated that a package had arrived at the University of Texas facility in Port Aransas, Texas, and was found to have removable contamination on the outside of the package. The package was shipped as expected and contained vials of Sulfur-35, and did not appear to be damaged. The vials that contained the radioactive material were packed in dry ice and were still frozen when the package was opened. Swipes taken on the outside of the package, as part of the arrival survey, indicated contamination of 10,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm). Contamination levels on the vials in the package were 1,600 dpm. The contamination level on the lead pig shielding the vials was 600 dpm. Removable contamination on the inside of the package was between 1000-2000 dpm. All contamination levels are reported as per swipe, but [the RSO] was unsure of the areas that were swiped. No contamination was detected on personnel involved at the receiving facility. [The RSO] was not convinced that the contamination came from the package because none of the vials appeared damaged, and the highest contamination levels were located on the outside of the package. He stated that they are still investigating and may request assistance from the Agency to identify the radionuclide. It was shipped by [a common carrier] from PerkinElmer, but [the RSO] was unaware of the location it was shipped from. The common carrier tracking number given was [provided], but when tracked online using the [common carrier] website, the package was not in the system. The Agency is awaiting further information from the licensee's investigation."
Notified the R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME (McIntosh).
Texas Incident Number: I-8680 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45456 |
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK HUBBARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/22/2009
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2009
Event Time: 17:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
JAMES WIGGINS (NRR)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
DOYLE (DHS)
HEYMAN (FEMA) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO INOPERABLE DIESEL GENERATORS WHILE DEFUELED
"While the reactor was defueled as part of a refueling outage the 'A' Emergency Diesel was declared inoperable due to a failed speed switch. 'A' Emergency Diesel was the required emergency power source while the 'B' Emergency Diesel and its associated safeguards buss, NB02, were inoperable for scheduled maintenance. With both emergency diesels inoperable a Notification of Unusual Event was declared on the 'Loss of Electrical Power/Assessment Capability'.
"Technicians are currently replacing the failed speed switch. It is estimated that the 'A' Emergency Diesel will be restored to operable status by 2200 CDT."
The licensee notified the State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also stated a press release will be issued.
* * * UPDATE AT 0456 ON 10/23/2009 FROM MARK JENKINS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
Additional problems were found during troubleshooting and a power supply is being replaced. This should be completed about 0600 CDT followed by a diesel test.
Notified the R4DO (O'Keefe) and NRR (Lee).
* * * UPDATE ON 10/23/2009 AT 0907 FROM RICK HUBBARD TO JOE O'HARA * * *
The "A" EDG has been returned to service. The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 0740 CDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (O'Keefe), NRR (Lee), IRD (McDermott), DHS (Kettles), FEMA (Biscoe). |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45458 |
Rep Org: HILTI INC.
Licensee: HILTI INC.
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN SCHOFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JOHN THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O. TABATABAI(e-mail) (NRO) |
Event Text
POTENTIAL DELIVERY OF NONCONFORMING WASHERS
Hilti provided notification of a potential delivery of nonconforming washers supplied with expansion anchors type Hilti Kwik Bolt KB3 SS316, 1/4" and 3/8" diameters, all lengths. Chemical analysis of provided samples showed the nonconforming washers were made of grade SS430Ti stainless steel instead of the specified grade SS316.
Potentially affected utilities or plants are: PSE&G Nuclear; Pilgrim; Brunswick; Arizona Public Service; Waterford 3. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45459 |
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
J.THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O.TABATABAI (e-mail) (NRO) |
Event Text
INTERIM REPORT ON THERMOSTATIC VALVE FAILURE ON PALO VERDE EDG
"This interim report is being issued because Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) is not able to complete an evaluation of an identified deviation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21.21. The evaluation is expected to be completed no later than November 30, 2009.
"ESI began an evaluation of a thermostatic valve element failure on August 24, 2009. Palo Verde Nuclear Plant notified ESI of the failure as a result of a failure analysis they were performing on a thermostatic valve that had been removed from the lube oil system of their 2A-EDG. The element was in service since April 2008 and Palo Verde verified operation of the element prior to installation.
"The Palo Verde failure analysis determined that one of two elements within the valve was defective. The element failure was attributed to wax leakage past the diaphragm seal on one of two power pills within the element. Evidence of mechanical binding of the piston is believed to have caused the wax leakage. If the piston was jammed, the expanding wax could have overĽpressurized the diaphragm seal leading to wax leakage. The failure analysis noted the following to support piston binding:
- The piston was initially difficult to remove from its guide tube.
- A gouge was observed on the piston surface.
- The rubber plug within the power pill exhibited brass machining chip debris.
"ESI has been coordinating with Palo Verde and the manufacturer (AMOT) to complete our evaluation and to determine if this is a generic issue or if it is an isolated incident.
"To date, no other similar failures with AMOT thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI."
Palo Verde has Cooper Bessemer KSV-20T diesel engines that use one 6" thermostatic valve in the engine jacket water system and one in the engine lube oil system to regulate system temperatures during engine operation. The thermostatic valve is an AMOT model 6HAS. The AMOT thermostatic valve element (P/N 9760X) is the defective part. ESI did not provide any information on other nuclear power plants that have EDGs that utilize this model thermostatic valve. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45460 |
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT COUNTS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 16:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT |
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
SAMSON LEE (NRR) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK AND AFTER-THE-FACT UNUSUAL EVENT
"On 10/23/09 at 1633, North Anna Unit 1 was placing Excess Letdown in service per 1-OP-8.5 due to a small unquantifiable throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B. At 1634 [the licensee] entered action of TS 3.4.13 due to what appears to be an Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger tube leak. The Component Cooling Water Head Tank [level] increased from 59% to 79% and the VCT [Volume Control Tank] level dropped 20 % indicating approximately 260 gallons of RCS had flowed into the Component Cooling Water System. At 1638 Excess Letdown was removed from service and the leak was terminated. At 1718 [the licensee] commenced ramping Unit 1 from service [TS Required Shutdown] to comply with TS 3.6.1, 'Containment Integrity' due to the throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B."
The licensee has placed the normal letdown system back in service while the plant is being shut down. The throughwall leak on 1-CH-TV-1204B is relatively small and unquantifiable compare to the tube leak on the excess letdown heat exchanger. The licensee plans to proceed to Mode 5 to repair both the Letdown valve and the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger tube leak.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM COUNTS TO HUFFMAN AT 1831 EDT ON 10/23/09 * * *
The licensee determined that it exceeded EAL SU6.1, Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 10 gpm, for 4 minutes but currently does not meet the EAL Criteria. This requires the licensee to make a 1-hour notification that it has classified the event after-the-fact as an unusual event but did not actually declare the unusual event .
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the Virginia Department of Emergency Management. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45461 |
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN MACINTYRE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
POST LOCA RECIRCULATION VALVE POSITION INTERLOCKS
"During the current Unit 2 fifteenth refueling outage (2R15), with the core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool, the containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches were found not to perform correctly. Initial investigation has determined that the valve position sensing interlock switches were left incorrectly set during the Unit 2 fourteenth refueling outage (2R14).
"In the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident, (LOCA) this condition would have prevented Residual Heat Removal (RHR) flow from reaching containment spray, high head and intermediate head safety injection pumps following alignment to long term recirculation from the containment sump without additional operator action.
"The RHR function, including the long term recirculation from the containment sump, was not adversely affected by this condition. Also, containment spray, high head and intermediate head safety injection from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) was not adversely affected by this condition.
"Unit 2 containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches have been correctly set and are being retested during the current 2R15.
"Unit 1 containment recirculation sump valve interlock position switches have been verified as correctly set to be capable of performing their design function by testing performed during the last refueling outage.
"This condition will be reported in a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45462 |
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: M. W. MCBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 12:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITIES
"On Friday October 23, 2009, at approximately 1205 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) evacuated Building E-50, which includes the SONGS [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). This Building is located outside of both the Protected Area and the Owner Controlled Area. The evacuation was initiated due to personnel reports of a smoky odor in Building E-50. SONGS Fire Department responded to the incident and, at approximately 1222 PDT, the majority of Building E 50, including the EOF, was cleared for personnel to re-enter the building. SCE is continuing to investigate the source of the smoky odor.
The EOF was considered unavailable (but fully functional) for approximately 17 minutes.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45463 |
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT HADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
SMALL CIRCUMFERENTIAL INDICATIONS FOUND ON TWO REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATIONS
"On October 23, 2009 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on two penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Both require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. Each of these penetrations has a small circumferential indication near the toe of the J-groove weld. The indications are not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 43 of 66 penetrations have been examined; all of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage.
"The plant is currently shutdown and in an undefined mode as the fuel has been offloaded from the reactor to the spent fuel pool. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45464 |
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN COUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 22:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2009
Event Time: 17:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
83 |
Power Operation |
60 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY RELIEF VALVES DID NOT OPEN AT REQUIRED SETPOINT
"Online testing of the secondary side pressure relief valves revealed that 3 valves did not open at the required pressure set point on the initial tests. All valves did open on subsequent tests at a higher pressure and have been restored to operable status. These 3 valves and 3 other similar valves were installed during the last refueling outage and it is concluded that all 6 valves have the same set point drift failure mechanism. All 6 valves are assumed to have been inoperable at some time during the last operating cycle. The steam generator design analysis specifies a minimum pressure relief capability to prevent a failure of the steam generator and subsequent potential loss of decay heat removal capability. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to remove residual heat. An engineering analysis is in progress to determine the actual impact on the safety function.
"Per Technical Specifications 3.4.1.2.3, reactor power was reduced to below 66.3% due to the remaining 3 inoperable relief valves."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 45465 |
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. A. GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO |
Notification Date: 10/24/2009
Notification Time: 12:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JOHN THORP(e-mail) (NRR)
O. TABATABAI(e-mail) (NRO) |
Event Text
POTENTIAL AGGRESSIVE WEARING OF ROD CLUSTER CONTROL ASSEMBLY GUIDE CARDS
"Aggressive wearing of the RCCA [Rod Cluster Control Assembly] guide card has been observed at an international plant. Such aggressive wear has not been observed in any US plants. If this issue were to remain uncorrected, it is possible for enough wear to occur during the life of the plant that the RCCAs could become unguided and may not properly insert into the core. It has not been concluded whether there is a safety hazard which would result from this deviation." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 45466 |
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WAYNE EPPEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 10/24/2009
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2009
Event Time: 13:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2009 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF MINOR OIL SPILL
"A light film of oil was discovered on the recycle canal of the plant water ways. The source was from residual oil on the deck of a small barge parked on the canal. Snow melt-off carried the oil into the canal. The barge is being used to dredge the canal. The quantity was estimated at less than 1/2 cup [of oil]. The oil is being cleaned up with oil absorbent booms and pads. The oil was contained to the plant water ways and was not discharged to the Mississippi River.
"Xcel Energy Services was notified. Xcel notified the National Response Center (Rpt #921543) and the Minnesota Division of Emergency Management (Rpt #107021). The licensee has covered the barge to prevent any further spill and will continue to monitor conditions."
The NRC Resident has been notified. |
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