| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/21/2009 - 05/22/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43100 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: KRAZAN AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: ONTARIO State: CA
County:
License #: 6809-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 01/15/2007
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2007
Event Time: 19:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
ILTAB Email ()
Mexico Email ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"On January 15, 2007, about 10:00 am, the [California] DHS Duty Officer received a call regarding a stolen Troxler, Model 3430 Moisture/Density Gauge (SN 35954), containing a nominal 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241. The gauge user went to his home, after work on Friday, January 12, 2007, to have dinner, before returning the gauge to the authorized storage location. The gauge was chained in an open-bed pick-up truck. When the user returned to the truck, between 7:00 - 7:30 pm that evening, the chains had been cut, and the gauge was gone. The user did not report this to the licensee's home office until approximately 9:30 am, Monday, January 15, 2007, at which time, the licensee phoned the police, and notified [CA] DHS. RHB will follow-up with the licensee on this issue."
State report number: 011507
* * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO JOHN KNOKE VIA EMAIL ON 5/20/09 @ 1848 EDT * * *
"Recovered gauge was previously reported stolen on January 15, 2007 from Krazan & Associates (NMED #070031 RH5010 #011507)
"At 0830 on Wednesday, May 20, 2009, the Department received a call from the local metal recycler stating the radiation alarm was set off when an individual brought a truck load of metal to recycle. The item that set off the alarm was a nuclear soil density gauge. The individual stated he had found the gauge in the street at the corner of Highland Avenue and Valencia Avenue in San Bernardino, CA. Information was taken from the driver and the gauge was surveyed and secured in SA Recycling's hazardous waste trailer until the Department could arrive.
"At 0945, the Department arrived on site to survey the gauge and take identifying information from the gauge. The outer plastic housing of the gauge had been broken off, but the metal casing and handle appeared intact. The source rod was retracted and the Cesium 137 source was in the safe shielded position and the Americium 241:Be source metal housing and shielding was also intact. The surface of the gauge was wiped and there was no external contamination found.
"Using a Victoreen, CHP 450 #414, the highest reading found was at the surface of the Americium 241:Be source housing - 18 milliRoentgen per hour (mR/hr) at the surface; 0.68 mR/hr at 1 foot; 0.1 mR/hr at 3 feet; with a background of 0.02 mR/hr. This gauge was a Troxler, model 3430, #35954 with a 40 milliCurie (mCi) Americium 241:Be source #78931 assayed on 8-16-04 and a 8 mCi Cesium 137 source #77-3063 assayed on 10-15-04. We then contacted the manufacturer who identified the gauge as belonging to Krazan & Associates, Ontario, CA. This gauge had been reported stolen on January 15, 2007 (RH5010 #011507, NMED# 070031). The gauge was returned to the Krazan& Associates in Ontario who will send the gauge to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair or disposal as necessary. The Anaheim Police were also notified of the recovery of the gauge."
Notified R4DO (Jones), FSME EO (Chang), ILTAB (via email) and Mexico (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45079 | Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DAKOTA GASIFICATION PLANT
Region: 4
City: BEULAH State: ND
County:
License #: 42-32219-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LOUISE ROEHRICH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/19/2009
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2009
Event Time: 08:45 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Event Text RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK IN THE UNSHIELDED POSITION
The state reported that two radiographers from Team Industrial Incorporated, were performing radiography on some bend joints at the Dakota Gasification Plant (DGP). Following a number of radiography shots, the radiographers attempted to fully retract the source and were unsuccessful. The radiographers expected to retract the source in approximately 4 cranks. However, they were only able to retract approximately 3.5 cranks. The corporate RSO at the site was notified. Barriers were erected and lead shielding has been deployed around the source. Each worker received approximately 30mR. The licensee contacted QSA Global, who has arrived on site and is going to retrieve the source. The device is identified as a SPEC150, S/N 0129 with a 90 curie Ir-192 source.
* * * UPDATE FROM LOUIS ROEHRICH TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0020 ON 5/20/09 * * *
The State of North Dakota reported that the licensee and technicians from QSA were not able to retrieve the source. Currently, the source is shielded and boundaries have been established. Personnel have been assigned to monitor the boundaries throughout the night. The QSA representatives are expecting delivery of a drum tool and source change tool in the morning to retract/retrieve the source.
Notified R4DO (Jones) and FSME EO (Chang).
* * * UPDATE FROM LOUISE ROEHRICH TO DAN LIVERMORE @ 0903 ON 05/20/09 * * *
The State of North Dakota reported that the drum tool and source change tool will arrive via FedEx on 05/21/09. The area remains controlled with barriers erected.
Notified R4DO (Jones) and FSME EO (McIntosh).
* * * UPDATE FROM LOUISE ROEHRICH TO DONALD NORWOOD @ 1953 ON 05/21/09 * * *
The State of North Dakota reported by telephone that the source had been fully retracted back into the camera. The camera will be taken to Minnesota tomorrow by Team Industrial personnel. After arrival in Minnesota the camera will be shipped to QSA for evaluation and repair.
This incident did not result in any injuries or any excess exposures.
Notified R4DO (Jones) and FSME EO (Chang) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45085 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NORM THOMAS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/21/2009
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2009
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OPTIONAL 60-DAY TELEPHONE REPORT OF AN INVALID START OF ALL FOUR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
"This report is being made under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"At the time of the event, Unit 1 was Defueled/No Mode and Unit 2 was 100% Power/Mode 1.
"On 04/9/09 @ 0115 an invalid start of the four emergency diesel generators occurred. The actuation was caused by inadvertent actuation of the K609 relay. The K609 relay causes an emergency start of the diesel generators on a SI [Safety Injection] signal. The actuation of the K609 relay was caused by technicians inadvertently depressing the K609 relay latch pushbutton while working on a nearby K604 relay. The K609 relay is located just below the K604 relay in the same SSPS [Solid State Protection System] panel.
"The train actuated was both Train A and Train B for both Units 1 and 2. The system actuated was the emergency diesel generators. Complete train actuation occurred. The emergency diesel generators started successfully."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45087 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 05/21/2009
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2009
Event Time: 16:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text RPS ACTUATION (SCRAM) DUE TO A MAIN POWER TRANSFORMER FAULT
"At 1635 CDT on May 21, 2009, LaSalle Unit 1 automatically scrammed due to a main power transformer fault. The transformer fault appears to have been caused by a failed bushing or lightning arrestor. The main power transformers deluged and other than the initial flash, there was no fire. Two safety relief valves actuated in the relief mode on the turbine trip. There were spurious non-valid isolation signals due to electrical power perturbations that were received on the reactor building ventilation system and reactor water cleanup. The plant is stable with reactor pressure control to the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The plant [will] remain in hot shutdown pending transformer inspection and repair."
All control rods fully inserted following the scram signal. Water level is being controlled via the motor driven reactor feedwater pump. Current reactor pressure is 927 psig and current reactor temperature is 532 degrees F. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. No diesel generators started as a result of this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45088 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN NEWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 05/21/2009
Notification Time: 23:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2009
Event Time: 20:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | A/R | Y | 42 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text RPS ACTUATION (REACTOR TRIP) DUE TO GENERATOR PHASE DIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUT
"Event: Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation due to Anticipatory Trip.
"At 2015 hrs on 5-21-2009, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 experienced a RPS actuation due to an anticipatory trip caused by a generator phase differential lockout. At the time of the RPS actuation, Unit 3 was exiting a planned refueling outage and power was at 42%. Immediately after the trip, Operators entered the appropriate emergency operating procedure and post-trip response was determined to be normal. Operators transitioned to the normal shutdown procedure at 2056 hours. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable.
"This event is being reported as a 4-Hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Initial Safety Significance: No Emergency Action Limits (EALs) were met and there was no safety significance as a result of the Unit 3 trip. Units 1 and 2 remain at 100% power (Mode 1) and were unaffected by the Unit 3 trip.
"Corrective Actions(s): Planned corrective actions are to maintain Unit 3 in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) until completion of the post-trip evaluation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
All control rods fully inserted. The reactor is currently subcritical and shutdown margin within Technical Specification limits. RCS Inventory Control is via normal makeup. PORV and Pressurizer Code Safeties are closed. SG inventory control is being maintained via Main Feedwater. Heat is being removed from the Steam Generators to the Main Condenser via Turbine Bypass Valves. | |