| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/18/2008 - 12/19/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 44720 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0633
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY K. HILL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 12/15/2008
Notification Time: 11:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2008
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
"Wal-Mart employed the Shaw Group Inc. as a contractor to replace the H3 exit signs in their stores nation-wide. Shaw Group conducted an inventory of the store on March 11, 2008. They returned to the store on May 26, 2008 to replace the H3 sign with a non-tritium exit sign but found it missing. They had no information on the sign being transferred. The Shaw Group conducted interviews with store personnel and reviewed shipment and inventory records, but were not able to locate any additional information about the location or condition of the lost sign.
"1. Site: Wal-Mart #5361; Source Material: Sealed source luminous; Manufacturer: SRB Technologies Inc.; Model Number: BX-20-GY; Serial Number: 310248; Activity 17.51 Ci.
NE report number - NE080010.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44722 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BRUKER AXS HANDHELD, INC.
Region: 4
City: KENNEWICK State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0282-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 12/15/2008
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2008
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
MARK THAGGARD (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - SAFETY EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
"A General Licensee, a customer of Bruker AXS Handheld (Bruker) that is a device manufacturer located in Richland, Washington, returned one of Bruker's Map 4 XRF analyzers. The device had not been operating properly. When Bruker received the shipment they noticed that the package exhibited radiation levels on contact with the package of 4.9 mR/hr as measured with a GM survey instrument. This reading was unusual because it was significantly above the 0.5 mR/hr limit allowed for excepted radioactive instruments and articles transportation packaging. These packages are identified as NOS UN 2910 on the bill of lading. Bruker's receiving staff took the device to a shielded work area and when disassembled they discovered that the device's trigger mechanism was not operating properly. The mechanism did not allow the source to be fully shielded after it was released. A Bruker instrument technician discovered that one of the screws was partially backed out preventing the source block from fully closing. This screw had initially been installed per manufacturing procedure using lock-tite. This part has had no history of coming loose. The screw was replaced per the manufacturing procedure again using lock-tite on the threads as required. Bruker reported that this was the only problem like this they had experienced. The generally licensed device contained a Co-57 source, model F3-038, with a current activity of 318 megabecquerel (8.6 mCi).
"The source was removed and checked for contamination. None was found. The device was repaired, calibrated and sent back to the customer. Bruker has established new guidelines for their technicians when they receive a call about a device problem / malfunction. The Bruker RSO will be notified and will work directly with the customer to assess the problem prior to the device being shipped to Bruker for repair."
Washington Report # - WA-08-093 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44728 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/18/2008
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2008
Event Time: 08:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TONE ALERT RADIO INPUT OUT OF SERVICE
"Loss of Ames Hill NOAA transmitter. Loss of the Ames Hill input from Albany, NY. Unable to establish backup input to Ames Hill transmitter from WTSA radio station, Brattleboro, VT. This results in a loss of output signal to area tone alert radios. Coordinating trouble shooting and repair with vendor. This action was successful in restoring service at 11:00, 12/18/08."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44729 | Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JERRY ASHLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/18/2008
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2008
Event Time: 18:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text 60 DAY REPORT - INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.
"With Unit 1 at Intermediate Shutdown (226?F and 300 psig), an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 'B' train of the Safety Injection (SI) system occurred at 1804 [EDT] during repair of a broken light socket located on the SI relay cabinet door. Plant systems and components responding to the 'B' train SI signal started and functioned successfully as designed (with the exception of those procedurally rendered inoperable due to the RCS being below 350?F and 450 psig). SI train 'B' was reset and the affected systems were restored to their pre-event configuration.
"Specific trains and systems that actuated for train 'B' of SI are described below:
"- With the unit at intermediate shutdown, one high head pump was currently running (the two redundant pump controls were in the Pull to Lock position in compliance with Technical Specifications). The 'B' train High Head Safety Injection motor operated valves re-aligned such that the running high head pump provided flow to the RCS Cold Legs from the RWST. During this time a bubble was present in the Pressurizer and the level remained on scale (increased 8%).
"- One train of the Control Room Bottled Air System actuated on the Control Room Isolation. The ventilation alignment was restored to normal thereby isolating the Bottled Air System. The system was re-pressurized and restored to an operable condition.
"- Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump motor operated valves opened but no flow was delivered to the Steam Generators since the AFW pumps were in Pull to Lock.
"- The 'B' train containment isolation valves closed, isolating the 'B' RHR heat exchanger. However, shutdown cooling was previously being provided by the 'A' RHR train and was therefore uninterrupted. Containment isolation valves were later restored to a normal alignment.
"- One train of Auxiliary Ventilation actuated and was restored to normal after the Safety Injection signal was reset.
"- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 3 started but did not load since its associated Emergency Bus remained energized by offsite power. The EDG was stopped and returned to automatic.
"- Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) were stopped due to the closure of the seal water return containment isolation valve.
"A root cause evaluation is determining the cause."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44732 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM EFFINGER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/18/2008
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2008
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
WILLIAM RULAND (NRR)
PART 21 GROUP ()
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEFECTIVE OPTICAL ISOLATORS
"Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) herein makes the following notification under 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(i) of defective digital optical isolators. The isolators are Commercial Grade Items dedicated by Duke. Failure analysis conducted by the manufacturer determined that a manufacturing defect with the isolator capacitor will cause the output voltage to drop when the isolator is not energized and there is a very light load on the output. The subject digital optical isolators are Model 175C180, manufactured by E-max Instruments (also known as Electro-Max) 13 Inverness Way, South Englewood, CO 80112. These digital optical isolators could be utilized in a variety of applications at Duke's McGuire and Catawba nuclear stations. There are no known applications for these digital optical isolators at Oconee.
"Initial Safety Significance: None. Defective digital optical isolators were never installed. Duke protocols require the conduct of a pre-installation bench test and a post installation test to assure these isolators perform satisfactorily in service. E-max Instruments has issued a Model 175C180 recall for all uninstalled isolators. Duke has returned all uninstalled digital optical isolators to the supplier. Duke is the only known nuclear utility purchasing E-max Instruments Model 175C180 digital optical isolators.
"The McGuire and Catawba Senior NRC Resident Inspectors were notified of this Part 21 notification on Dec 18, 2008." | |