| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/23/2008 - 10/24/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 44529 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: HWA GEOSCIENCES
Region: 4
City: LYNNWOOD State: WA
County:
License #: I0176
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/30/2008
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2008
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
| Event Text WASHINGTON AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State of Washington provided the following information via e-mail:
"The licensee reported to the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) that a Troxler 3440 nuclear density gauge, serial number 28433, with 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be, was struck by a truck at a landfill site at about 12:45 p.m. on 9/29/08. The gauge was struck while the operator was taking measurements with the source rod extended into the soil. It was reported that a truck tried to skim by the operator and gauge, narrowly missing the operator and hitting the gauge. The truck caught the gauge handle breaking it and the guide rod from the gauge. The source rod and the rest of the gauge remained intact and in place. The licensee field engineer and lead gauge operator went to the scene to assist with the incident. Since the handle was broken from the gauge, the source rod was placed back into the gauge by turning the gauge on its side and striking the bottom of source rod with a mallet. This action caused the source rod to move completely out of the top of the gauge. The lead individual put the source rod into a bucket and found a max reading of 20 mR/hr. The lead [operator] returned the source rod back into the shielded position in the gauge and secured [it] in place with duct tape. Additional wraps of duct tape were made around the top and bottom of the gauge to keep the source rod from coming out again. A reading of 2.4 mR/hr was found on contact with the gauge with the licensees' TroxAlert. Additional readings were taken on the bucket and the testing site indicating background readings. The gauge was placed back into the transport case and taken to the licensed storage location prior to determining its final disposition. DOH staff will visit the licensee to make confirmatory measurements and start an investigation."
Washington Report Number: WA080072
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1717 EDT ON 10/23/08 FROM STATE (CLARK) TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Washington via email:
"Two DOH staff visited the licensed storage location and investigated the incident on 09/30/08. After interviewing the operator, the field engineer and the RSO, the staff inspected the damaged gauge. The gauge was removed from its transport box and placed on a table for inspection. The gauge had been duct taped with the source rod in position to keep the shutter closed. The majority of the gauge was intact; a small piece of the T handle had been broken off and was separate from the gauge. DOH staff surveyed the gauge with several instruments. An Eberline RO-2 (serial number 2587, cal date 05-07-08) reported a surface contact reading of 6 mR/hr. A Ludlum 2363 neutron/gamma instrument reported a surface contact rate of 5 mRem/hr. The gauge was then turned over and the orifice was surveyed. The Eberline reported 20-22 mR/hr, which is higher than normal, and the Ludlum reported 13 mRem/hr. The shutter appeared to be only 3/4 closed. The T handle was manipulated to return the shutter to a completely closed position and duct taped into place. The orifice of the gauge than read 4 mR/hr with the Eberline. DOH staff than took two swabs, one of the sources (with rod extended) and one in the transport case. Both swabs were taken out of the area and surveyed with RADALERT Inspector SN 21089. The swabs did not indicate any contamination so it appears the cesium source was not leaking. The gauge was then carefully placed back into its transit box and the box was surveyed at a distance of one meter to determine the transport index (TI). A TI of 0.6 was marked on the label. The gauge was shipped back to Troxler for repair and leak testing."
Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME (Mauer) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44583 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 4
City: TEXARKANA State: AR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/21/2008
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text ARKANSAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email:
"Wal-Mart stores notified the state of Arkansas of one missing tritium exit sign discovered during a world wide inventory of their stores. The exit sign was last seen during a Spring 2008 inventory. The following device was reported missing:
1. Exit sign from a store (#468) located at 133 Arkansas Blvd., Texarkana, AR 71854, Serial number - 248464, manufacturer - SRB, activity - 20 Ci of tritium at time of manufacture.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 44584 | Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/21/2008
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2008
Event Time: 13:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2)
EUGENE PETERS (NMSS)
FUELS OUO GRP-email ()
| Event Text IROFS FAILURE IN AREA 600
"Area 600 uses a flammable gas as part of its operation. IROFS FIRE6-6 is a control that prevents the flammable gas from exiting the main process equipment and being released into an attached glovebox. FIRE6-6 makes use of a dual door system, only one door is allowed to be open at a time and the chamber between the doors is purged. The accident scenario of concern is release of the flammable gas into the glovebox and an explosion in the building. IROFS FIRE6-8, 6-1 and 6-9 ensure an inert gas purge occurs prior to opening the main process equipment to the glovebox and are also credited as IROFS.
"The equipment associated with FIRE6-6 is designated as Safety Related Equipment (SRE) and is functionally tested annually. The test was performed on October 21, 2008. The test failed because when one door was open, the 2nd door opened slightly (approx 1 inch). Though there are mitigating factors such as potential dilution of the flammable gas through the glovebox ventilation system, it was determined that IROFS FIRE6-6 was degraded and that the performance criteria of 10CFR70.61 were not met.
"The event occurred due to a degraded IROFS that was discovered during a periodic functional test. Initial investigation indicates that a failed position switch is the cause. [The potential health and safety consequences are] a potential explosion in a glovebox and release of radiological material and exposure to the worker. No actual explosion or radiological exposure occurred.
"Discussed situation with Safety management and with NRC Resident Inspector. Operations has locked out the flammable gas supply on Area 600 until the equipment associated with FIRE6-6 is fixed and the SRE test passes." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44595 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 07:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 10 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM WITH MANUAL RCIC INITIATION
"'A' Reactor Feed Pump speed decreased to zero with no trip signal evident in the Control Room for the 'A' Reactor Feed Pump. The reactor scrammed due to loss of feedwater flow on a Level 3 (11.4") RPS scram signal as designed. Operators implemented appropriate off normal event procedures to mitigate the transient with all systems responding as designed. Lowest reactor water level observed was -35" wide range. All withdrawn control rods fully inserted to position '00'. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was manually initiated and was used to restore water level to within the normal band. No ECCS initiations were received and all systems responded as designed. Additionally, no SRVs lifted as a result of this event.
"Level 3 is also a setpoint for Group 2 (RHR to Radwaste) and Group 3 (Shutdown Cooling Isolation) automatic isolation. No valves isolated in these systems due to them being in their normally CLOSED position prior to the event. Currently, reactor water level is being maintained by the condensate system in normal level band and reactor pressure is being controlled to limit cool down."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44596 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC HORVATH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SUMP DISCHARGE LINE LEAKAGE
"This is a report of a situation, related to the protection of the environment, for which a notification to other government agencies is being made, as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"On October 22, 2008, excavation within the Protected Area was ongoing to identify a leak in the Fire Protection System. At approximately 1600 hours, the Turbine and Water Treatment Building sump discharge line was identified as leaking. This three-inch carbon steel pipe routes the sump discharge to the settling basins, where it is eventually discharged via a monitored outfall to the environment.
"The cause of the leakage is unknown, but due to the condition of the piping, it is believed to have existed prior to the excavation activities. The amount of leakage is therefore conservatively assumed to be more than 100 gallons, but this cannot be quantified at this time. Analysis of a water sample from the sump discharge line leak determined that the water leaking from the pipe contains approximately 37,500 picocuries per liter (pCi/l) tritium. These tritium levels are consistent with tritium levels in the Condensate/Feedwater Systems in the Turbine Building.
"Actions are underway to remove the piping from service and re-route the sump pump discharge. Analysis of routine groundwater well samples taken earlier this month is being expedited, and additional well samples are being planned.
"The State of Ohio, Lucas County and Ottawa County government agencies were contacted regarding the above information at 0900 on October 23, 2008. The Resident Inspector has also been briefed on the issue." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44597 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 10/23/2008
Notification Time: 18:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text INFORMATION ONLY NOTIFICATION REGARDING PLANT SHUTDOWN
"This is an information only notification that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a plant shutdown as of 1800 on 10/23/08, a proactive measure, to complete repairs on the Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump 2SIS-P21A. On 10/19/08 at 2326, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A was entered during this maintenance activity with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). On 10/20/08, during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was then disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete repairs on the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period will expire on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08. While pump reassembly and testing to restore operability may still be completed by the end of the enforcement discretion period, FENOC management determined that it was more prudent to shutdown the unit at this time so that the Operations crews are not placed under undue time pressure to reach Mode 3 conditions.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44598 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUENTIN HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 10/24/2008
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2008
Event Time: 21:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
. ()
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRESSURE REGULATOR
"Control Room Operators observed slight [reactor] pressure rise during panel walk down. Investigation of pressure indication led Control room staff to determined that [the] EPR (Electronic Pressure Regulator) was not functioning properly (noise in the output signal). Control Room Staff entered Special Operating Procedure for failed pressure regulator. EPR could not be moved and this was confirmed by operators in the field. Control Room Staff [then] inserted a manual scram.
"Immediately after the scram reactor water level reached a low of 36", Emergency Operating Procedures for Level (EOP-2) were entered. HPCI initiated on the turbine trip to control water level. After the turbine tripped, oil turbine bypass valves failed open; MSIVs (main steam isolation valve) were manually shut to control pressure. [The] EPR eventually disengaged from control, allowing the operator control of the turbine bypass valves. MSIVs were then reopened. [The] Scram has been reset. [The] turbine driven shaft pump did not initially disengage, pump [was] manually tripped after turbine speed reduced to 1500 rpm. All other systems responded correctly.
"[The] plant is not currently in any SOPs or EOPs and is preceding to cold shutdown using normal operating procedures."
All control rods fully inserted as expected. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. At the time of the event, containment spray loop 1-12 was out of service for routine surveillance. The plant is currently cooling down and is at 365 psi.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |