Event Notification Report for July 22, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/21/2008 - 07/22/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44236 44348 44349 44350 44357 44358

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44236
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUCHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 05/23/2008
Notification Time: 08:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2008
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CHARGING PUMP DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO RELIEF VALVE LIFTING BELOW SETPOINT

"During normal operation with 23 Charging Pump in service, 21 Charging Pump was placed in service for quarterly testing. Shortly after starting 21 Charging Pump, 23 Charging Pump relief valve lifted below its set point value. CVCS system pressure was approximately 2520 psig. This is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown. 23 Charging Pump was declared inoperable. Recent NRC guidance indicates that a loss of a single train system not credited in accident analysis is reportable when identified in LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1446 EDT ON 7/21/08 FROM ROKES TO HUFFMAN * * *

"Indian Point Unit 2 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on May 23, 2008, at 08:11 hours (EN #44236). The notification reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of the relief valve for the 23 charging pump lifting below its setpoint value. The condition was discovered during Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS) operation with the 23 charging pump in operation. Shortly after the 21 charging pump was placed in service for quarterly testing, the 23 charging pump relief valve lifted. The operating speed of the charging pumps was reduced and the 23 charging pump relief valve re-seated. The 23 charging pump is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown from the control room. The relief valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide overpressure protection for the 23 charging pump and associated piping. The relief valve has an active safety function in the closed position to prevent charging pump discharge flow from continuously re-circulating to the pump suction. At the time of the event Operations believed the 23 charging pump relief valve lifted prematurely and declared the 23 charging pump inoperable and made the 8-hour non-emergency notification for loss of remote shutdown capability for a component specified in Technical Specification 3.3.4, 'Remote Shutdown.' The relief valve was subsequently changes out with a spare.

"Subsequent investigations determined that the CVCS pressure was set high in the operating band for two pump operation. Engineering determined that when the 21 charging pump was started the pulsation at the discharge of the positive displacement charging pump exceeded the limit of the relief valve pressure setting. Initial header pressure with the 23 charging pump in operation was approximately 2420 psig with typical charging header pressure at approximately 2300 psig. When the 21 charging pump was placed in service, the resultant pressure with consideration for pulsation immediately at the discharge of the charging pump would have been approximately 2701 psig. The charging pump relief valve lift pressure setting is 2735 +/- 3% (2653 psig to 2817 psig). Therefore, the resultant pressure from two pump operation was within the relief valve lifting pressure. An inspection of the removed relief valve showed only minor anticipated seat degradation of the disc ring insert. Further assessment indicated that the 23 charging pump relief valve did lift and also reseated when aligned for parallel pump operation when the CVCS pressure was adjusted. Engineering and Operations concluded that the 23 charging pump and associated relief valve were operable and capable of performing this safety function. The initial condition was determined to have been attributed to elevated initial CVCS pressure that resulted in challenging the relief valve during two pump operation."

The licensee will notify the State and the Resident Inspector.

R1D0 (Dentel) notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44348
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: W.G. YATES & SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Region: 4
City:  State: MS
County: RANKIN
License #: MS-656-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/16/2008
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2008
Event Time: 02:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CRUSHED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"Approximately 02:35 a.m. on 7-14-08, an employee who coordinates nuclear gauge use with W. G. Yates & Sons Construction Company notified MEMA that a Troxler 4640-B thin lift density gauge had been crushed by an 18-wheeler truck when the truck drove through the cone barrier. The Gauge contents were scattered over a 10 ft X 10 ft area in the middle of highway 49 South, Richland, Mississippi. MEMA then notified [redacted] Director of Radiological Health at approximately 3:03 a.m.

"[The director] picked up the gauge parts off Highway 49 South and packed them in the original shipping container with dirt. Surveys were conducted of the accident scene revealing only background readings after the gauge parts were put back into the gauge box. At 4:10 a.m., [the director] reported to MEMA the contents of the crushed gauge and that one lane of traffic was open on Highway 49 South in Richland, Mississippi. Confiscation of the gauge by the Division of Radiological Health was reported to MEMA at 4:38 a.m., when [the director] was leaving the accident site.

"[The director] returned with the gauge to Radiological Health at approximately 8:30 a.m., on 7-14-08. Pictures of the crushed gauge were taken by [a Senior Health Physicist of the] Division of Radiological Health. Then the gauge was surveyed and placed in a lead storage cask. Surveys revealed 600 Mr/hr at 6 in from the gauge source rod.

"The RSO for W. G. Yates & Sons Construction Company was contacted by [the director] and asked to give a report on how the accident happened. The report issued to the Mississippi State Department of Health / Division of Radiological Health was received 7-15-08. In summary, the RSO said work was being performed on two of the three South bound lanes of Highway 49 South. The center and right hand lanes of Highway 49 South were blocked off with cones. The RSO said one employee on site walked away from his profiler machine which was in the center lane of Highway 49 South to ask another employee about the measurements from the thin lift density gauge, also located in the center lane of Highway 49 South. Standing approximately 5 feet from the gauge, they witnessed an 18 wheeler veer from the left hand lane and travel to the center lane crossing the cone barrier. The driver of the 18-wheeler veered further to the right of the profile machine which was in the center lane of the highway. One employee's truck was parked in the right hand lane while he was taking readings from the profile machine. Upon approaching the employees truck, the 18-wheeler veered back into the center lane from the right hand lane and crushed the thin lift density gauge. Both employees were uninjured.

"Upon further review of the accident, the authorized user for the thin lift density gauge was trained and certificates are on file with the Division of Radiological Health. The gauge was also last leak tested on 11/1/07. The RSO said three employees with W. G. Yates & Sons Construction company who were involved in the accident have had there badges sent in for processing.

"Accident site surveys revealed the source was still in the gauge. Additional site surveys revealed only background readings. The gauge was confiscated by DRH.

"Isotope(s): Cesium-137;
"Activity: 8 mCi."

This is Mississippi Event Number MS08008.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44349
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: RAYONIER PERFORMANCE FIBERS
Region: 1
City: JESUP State: GA
County:
License #: GA-381-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH FIEVET
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/16/2008
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2008
Event Time: 18:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIATION EXPOSURE TO NON-OCCUPATIONAL WORKER

Rayonier Performance Fibers is a pulp mill that utilizes a Berthold Model 2653.100-001 density gauge with a 24 millicuries Cesium-137 for measures paper density and thickness on its process line. The company employed a contract welder to perform some structural welding in the vicinity of the gauge. Another company employee noted that the welder was in a radiation restricted area and had him leave the area immediately. The RSO was notified who then informed the State of Georgia. Based on preliminary information, it appears that even though the process had been shutdown, the gauge shutter was still open for reasons unknown. The licensee's initial estimate of the welder's exposure based on his time and location is 36 millirem whole body. The State of Georgia's investigation is in progress.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44350
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: CTI CONSTRUCTION TESTING & INSPECTION, INC
Region: 1
City: HIALEAH State: FL
County:
License #: 3298-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/16/2008
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
ANDREA KOCK (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The following report was submitted by the State via e-mail:

"Licensee's truck was parked at a fast food restaurant, which happens to be part of the work site, while the employee was inside getting a late lunch. The [Troxler 3440A, S/N 26057] gauge was in its transport box and secured to the bed of the pick up with two cables and two locks. At approximately 3 p.m. thieves using a bolt cutter tried to cut the cables. When they couldn't, they cut the locks and took the gauge. The keys were not with the gauge. Hialeah PD is investigating. A witness provided the make of the car and a partial plate number. Licensee will submit a written report and after 48 hours consider offering a reward for the return of the gauge. Florida is investigating."

This gauge contains an 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am-141/Be source.

Florida report number FL-08-104

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44357
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN STERMER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/21/2008
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 09:08 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2008
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD DEESE (R4)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
JIM WIGGINS (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
AKERS (DHS)
DENNIS VIA (FEMA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED - UNABLE TO VALIDATE A FIRE ALARM WITHIN 15 MINUTES

The licensee received a fire alarm (smoke alarm) for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Room at 0853 PDT. An operator was dispatched to visually inspect the area of the fire alarm. The area was not able to be accessed due to a high delta pressure across the door. Operators were not able to access the area within 15 minutes of receiving the alarm and declared EAL HU 2.1 at 0908 PDT. A maintenance worker in the area of the alarm opened the door from the other side and an operator was able to visually inspect the area. The area was free of smoke and fire and the Unusual Event was exited at 0915 PDT. The licensee performed required notifications to the State of California and the local government.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * UPDATE AT 1602 EDT ON 7/21/08 FROM NIMIK TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee plans to issue a press release concerning the Unusual Event. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

R4DO (Deese) informed.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44358
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/22/2008
Notification Time: 04:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 20:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITIES DUE TO TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS OUT OF SERVICE

"On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1B Emergency Diesel generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement. The 1B Emergency Diesel remains out of service and is anticipated to be returned to service on 7/26/08.

"On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A Emergency Diesel generator was declared inoperable due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system.

"The combination of these two diesels being out of service results in two emergency diesels, one in each train, being inoperable for Farley Unit One. This represents a Unit One loss of safety function for mitigating the consequences of an accident in the event of a loss of off-site power.

"Farley Unit Two is affected only by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel and is maintaining a B-Train Emergency Diesel operable.

"The 1-2A Emergency Diesel is suspected of having a lube oil heat exchanger tube leak. Confirmation of the tube leak and repairs are anticipated to take three to four days."

The loss of two EDGs places Unit One in an 8-hr plant shutdown action statement which will require the unit to initiate shutdown by 0458 CDT on July 22, 2008 and be in hot standby by 1058 CDT. Unit Two is in a 10-day non-shutdown action statement as a result of the loss of the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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