| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/11/2008 - 04/14/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43990 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SKINNER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 02/16/2008
Notification Time: 02:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/15/2008
Event Time: 19:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL INOPERABILITY OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS DUE TO AN UNALALYZED CONDITION
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) which states in part Any event or condition that results in (A) the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or (B) the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) which states in part Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. This notification describes a licensee identification of a condition where the low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) may not have been able to perform their safety functions of removing residual heat and significantly degrades plant safety. The condition has been corrected.
"At 2152 on 15 February 2008, while operating at 100% power, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 completed evaluating a 10 CFR 21 communication from General Electric on ECCS suction strainers, and concluded that the calculation on debris head loss was non conservative. The original design basis net positive suction head calculations assumed a suppression pool water level of 199.5 feet. Based upon the General Electric notification, at this suppression pool water level, the low pressure core spray and all three residual heat removal systems might not have been able to perform their safety functions. Further engineering evaluation determined that if the suppression pool level was [greater than or equal to] 200.3 feet then the suction strainers debris head loss could be met and the low pressure ECCS would be able to perform their safety functions.
"At 1902 the control room operators took action to raise suppression pool water level while engineering completed their evaluation based on the expectation that suppression pool water would have to be raised. At 1910 on 15 February 2008, suppression pool water level was raised to 200.3 feet, which resulted in the low pressure core spray and residual heat removal systems being able to perform their safety function."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 4/12/08 AT 1001 EDT FROM PETRELLI TO HUFFMAN * * *
"After further review, this event notification report is being retracted based on the following:
"The notification was initiated due to a 10 CFR 21 communication from General Electric on ECCS suction strainers, indicating that the calculation of suction strainer head loss was non-conservative. As a result, at the assumed suppression pool water level of 199.5 feet, adequate net positive suction head may not be available for the low-pressure ECCS pumps. Suppression pool water level was raised 9.8 inches, to 200.3 feet, which provided assurance that the low pressure ECCS pumps were capable of performing their specified safety functions.
"Further evaluation by plant staff has determined that there are margins available in the suction strainer head loss calculations and in the design basis ECCS pump net positive suction head calculations that, when combined, exceed the increase in suction strainer debris head loss identified in the General Electric communication. Based on these available margins, there was adequate net positive suction head for the low pressure ECCS pumps at the originally assumed suppression pool water level of 199.5 feet. In addition, the as-found quantity of corrosion products and debris removed from the suppression pool during the current refueling outage was significantly less than the quantity assumed in the design basis suction strainer head loss calculations, indicating that additional analytical margin existed. Thus, the low pressure ECCS pumps were operable and capable of performing their specified safety functions without reliance on the 9.8 inches of water level added to the Suppression pool. Raising the suppression pool water level was a conservative action but was not necessary to maintain operability of the low pressure ECCS pumps. Therefore, this event is not reportable under either 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Conte) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44052 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: NEBRASKA CITY State: NE
County:
License #: IL-011396-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HOWARD SHUMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/11/2008
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
MARK RING (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text NEBRASKA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The State of Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services, Radiation Control Program, Radioactive Materials Branch reported that a radiographer employed by Team Industrial Services, Inc. was potentially overexposed while performing radiography at a Nebraska City, NE facility. Team Industrial Services, Inc. is performing work in Nebraska under reciprocity of their Illinois license.
On March 7, 2008, while at the job site, the radiographer noticed that his direct-reading pocket dosimeter was off-scale. He reported this to the regional Team Industrial Services RSO and stated that he believed he just bumped the dosimeter to cause the off-scale condition. The RSO directed him to send his TLD to Landauer Laboratories for processing.
On March 10, 2008, Landauer informed the RSO that the TLD indicated that the radiographer received 7.753 REM Deep Dose Equivalent.
The Team Industrial RSO notified his corporate RSO, who then notified the State of Nebraska. The radiographer has been restricted from radiation areas while Team Industrial and the State of Nebraska investigates this incident.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA E-MAIL FROM HOWARD SHUMAN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1530 ON 4/11//08 * * *
"On March 11, 2008, the Corporate RSO for Team Industrial Services, Inc. called to report that one of their industrial radiographers had received an exposure of 7.753 rems to their dosimetry badge while conducting radiographic operations, under reciprocity, at a construction site in Nebraska City, NE.
"The dates that the radiographer had performed radiography were the evening of March 4, 2008 and the early morning of March 5, 2008. At the time the radiographer noted that his pencil dosimeter had gone off-scale. He did not notify the FRSO in the licensee's Illinois office until March 7, 2008 at which time his dosimetry badge was sent off to Landauer for emergency processing. Landauer verbally reported the findings to Team Industrial on March 10, 2008.
"During the subsequent investigation of the incident, the radiographer admitted that he had performed radiography alone at the temporary jobsite alone. Four possible scenarios were developed during the investigation. First, he had received the exposure because the confined space in which the exposures were made caused the radiographer and assistant to be in a 200-300 Mr/hr field. This was discounted because the assistant only had 30 mrem on her pencil dosimeter and badge readings were 137 mrem for February and 4 mrem for March (both sent in for emergency processing).
"The second scenario involved the statement by the radiographer that he had dropped his dosimetry badge near the camera and guide tube and that he may have "bumped" his pencil dosimeter. Calculations could not substantiate the exposure to the badge. In addition, it was too coincidental that both the dropped badge and "bumped" pencil dosimeter happened at the same time.
"The third scenario was that this was an intentional exposure of the badge. Intensive questioning by the State of Nebraska inspectors and Team management could not substantiate this scenario.
"The last and most probable scenario was that the radiographer did not fully retract the source following a radiography shot and failed to properly conduct a complete survey around the camera and guide tube before repositioning the guide tube for the next radiography shot.
"There is no evidence to discount any of the above scenarios so the investigation is considered to be inconclusive.
"A complete investigation report is in process. Violations have been identified and will be included in the final report with the response from the licensee."
Notified R4DO(Deese) and FSME(Kock) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44068 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GRANT MELIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/16/2008
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2008
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM ERDADS
"The Plant Process Computer System (Emergency Response and Data Acquisition System, 'ERDADS') OPCONs for Unit 4 failed causing the NRC Emergency Response Data System Link to be non-functional.
"This is an eight hour NRC Notification for an ERDADS failure which is not corrected in 30 minutes and a loss of ability to supply ERDS data for greater than 30 minutes per 1OCFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 4/12/2008 AT 1512 FROM JIM RUSSELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The Unit 4 Plant process Computer System (Emergency Response and Data Acquisition System, 'ERDADS') is out of service for an approximate 4 week period to implement a planned modification which replaces the current ERDADS system. During this time period the Unit 4 ERDS and SPDS functions will not be available. Also, Unit 4 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 2D Containment Temperature and power system indicators for motor control centers, batteries and inverters is unavailable in the Control Room, although other instrumentation is available to monitor these parameters."
The reactor is currently defueled.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 44134 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: B. W. WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/11/2008
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2008
Event Time: 19:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
LARRY CAMPBELL (NMSS)
| Event Text FAILED DETECTOR HEADS
"At 1903 CST, on 04-10-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that an alarm was received in the C-335 Area Control Room for the C-335 Unit 2 Cell 7 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System. Operators responded to the local panel and found all detector heads in alarm. Operators attempted to reset the system and the system would not reset, all heads remained in alarm. Operators then responded to the Unit 2 Cell 7 cell floor with the proper PPE and confirmed there was not a UF6 release. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover the C-335 Unit 2 Cell 7 cell housing roof and cell exhaust duct and sections 3 & 4 of the cell bypass housing. At the time of this alarm, C-335 Unit 2 Cell 7 and sections 3 & 4 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell housing roof, cell exhaust duct, and cell bypass housing are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With all the Unit 2 Cell 7 PGLD system heads locked in alarm, none of the required 3 heads in the cell housing roof and cell exhaust duct were operable and less of the required 3 heads in the cell bypass housing sections were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCOs 2.4.4.1.A.1 and 2.4.4.1.C.1 were entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. An investigation is ongoing to attempt to determine the cause of the failure. This event is being reported as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-08-1089; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-10; Worksheet No. 44134 Responsible Division: Operations" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44135 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/12/2008
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2008
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MODIFICATION TO PROCESS COMPUTER THAT WILL IMPACT ERDS
"The Unit 3 Plant Process Computer System. (Emergency Response and Data Acquisition System, ERDADS) ERDS link will be out of service to install phone cables for the unit 4 ERDS link and cyber security equipment cabling. Additionally we are performing several software upgrades on the unit 3 ERDADS system. These upgrades will require several computer backup operations and several interruptions to the unit 3 ERDS link capability.
"These activities will render the Unit 3 ERDS link out of service for several hours per day over the course of 3 to 5 days. In case of a plant emergency that would necessitate the activation of the unit 3 ERDS link, it can be placed in service within one (1) hour. The unit 3 SPDS functions are unaffected by this work.
"This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action.
"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector." | |