| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/06/2008 - 03/07/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43885 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRANK CLIFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/08/2008
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2008
Event Time: 10:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RCIC INOPERABLE DUE TO MIN FLOW VALVE INABILITY TO REPOSITION
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (v) due to the Reactor Core Injection Cooling (RCIC) system being determined to be inoperable on 01/08/08 at 1040 EST. During a planned RCIC system outage, an instrument calibration surveillance identified a flow switch failure that would have prevented automatic closure of the pump minimum flow valve. Insufficient data is immediately available to assess the ability to achieve design basis flow rates with the minimum flow valve open. This event is an eight-hour notification. The RCIC instrument is currently under repair and will be completed prior to return to service.
"Plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing.
"The resident NRC inspector has been notified of this event."
This event places them in a 14-day LCO per ACT-1-08-002. HPCI verified operable.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD PROBASCO TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 03/06/08 @ 1656 EST * * *
BASIS FOR RETRACTION:
"Event Notification 43885 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were satisfied pending the evaluation of RCIC System operability.
"On 1/8/08, during performance of Attachment 5 to 8.E.13, 'RCIC System Instruments Calibration', RCIC flow switch FS-1360-7, contact number 2 failed to close as expected on increasing test pressure. This switch is expected to close while increasing test pressure between 13.7 to 14.3 inWC [inches of Water Column]. Contact number 2 closes when RCIC flow exceeds 100 gpm signaling [minimum] flow valve MO-1301-60 to close. Failure of the switch to close prevents automatic closure of the [minimum] flow valve on a system flow of 100 gpm increasing. Failure of the [minimum] flow valve to close during RCIC system operation would allow about 70 gpm to 170 gpm of RCIC pump discharge flow to go directly to the torus bypassing the reactor vessel.
"The switch was replaced and the flow switch was returned to service. The defective switch was evaluated and the cause of the failure was determined to be carbon buildup on the switch contacts.
"A functional failure review was performed to assess the impact of the flow switch failure on the RCIC System design basis functions. The RCIC System is required to automatically provide makeup water to the reactor vessel following vessel isolation. This review identifies that 400 gpm is adequate to meet reactor vessel makeup requirements. With the flow controller in 'AUTO' and the minimum flow valve open, the flow controller would increase turbine speed until the flow rate setpoint of 400 gpm is achieved. Based on evaluation of the RCIC System flow controller configuration, turbine speed limits, and hydraulic modeling, it was determined that the required 400 gpm flow rate could have been delivered under worst case conditions with a failed open minimum flow valve.
"These evaluations concluded that the RCIC System was capable of performing its intended safety functions during the time when FS-1360-7 failure prevented automatic closure of the pump minimum flow valve. The RCIC System would have started and supplied design basis flow to reactor vessel under design basis conditions. Thus there would have [been] no impact on nuclear safety. Therefore, this event was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"Event Number 43885, made on 01/08/2008, is being retracted."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Hospital | Event Number: 43961 | Rep Org: BOSTON VA HOSPITAL
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County: NORFOLK
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID DRUM
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 02/05/2008
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2008
Event Time: 17:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
| Event Text POTENTIAL OVER-EXPOSURE OF WORKER WHO OPERATES A FLUOROSCOPY MACHINE
Radiation Safety Officer of Boston VA Hospital made a 24-hour report that that a worker who operates a fluoroscopy machine, which produces x-rays from an accelerator and is used in cardiology, may have received exposure greater than allowed limits. The worker's radiation badge is normally read monthly, with a typical exposure of 80-200 mrem. However, his badge from July 2007 was not read until December 2007. Landauer read the badge on December 23, 2007, and reported a reading of 5,700 mrem, which they reported by letter dated January 23, 2008, to the Radiation Safety Officer, who received the information February 5, 2008. An investigation has commenced to determine whether some of the badge reading may have been when the worker was not wearing the badge, or due to other sources.
* * * RETRACTION FROM T. HUSTON TO P. SNYDER ON 3/6/08 AT 1510 * * *
This report is retracted based on the fact that "the reported exposure was to a dosimeter and not to an individual. In addition, the exposure did not involve byproduct materials."
Notified R3DO (P. Pelke), R1DO (J. Caruso), and FSME (S. Wastler). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44029 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: IRON & METAL
Region: 1
City: GOLDSBORO State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDY CROWE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/04/2008
Notification Time: 17:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2008
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING CS-137 INADVERTENTLY THROWN AWAY AS SCRAP WAS LATER RECOVERED
"Brief Description of Incident
"Railroad [RR] car arrived at Nucor Steel [in South Carolina] at 10AM on February 18, 2008. The RR car set off the exploranium detection equipment, so to ensure accuracy the RR car was passed through 4 times. Radiation measurement of RR car #JOSX 1771 was 25 microR/hr [which is] five times background (5 microR/hr). Notified SC-DHEC -Radiation Waste [DELETED] who further contacted NC DENR. [DELETED] from SC Nucor Steel was given CRCPD approval (see SC-NC 08-01) for return trip of rail car to point of origin, Iron & Metal Goldsboro, N.C.
"The Rail Car numbered JOSX 1771 returned from Nucor Steel Darlington, SC on February 28, 2008. [NC-DENR] arrived at their location in Goldsboro on February 29, 2008 in the AM, as requested and took reading from the rail car and found only one hot spot (35 microR/hr - Ludlum 19) that was located on the left side of the railcar toward the upper middle portion of container. The item in question was located.
"I annotated what was legible and it is the following: Model number 7062 BP; Serial Number 18317; Manufacturing Date 1984; Type and Amount of Isotope Cs-137, 100 mCi. Highest Readings 10.5 mR/hr on contact with Ludlum 19 and Identifinder.
"Gauge SN 18317 was retrieved from Iron & Metal Goldsboro with chain of custody letter signed by all parties, then taken to storage room at the GAF Materials Corp. where three other gauges are now kept.
GAF Materials has custody of the damaged gauge and will package it and ship it to a suitable vendor for repair.
N.C. Incident Number 08-09.
The State of North Carolina informed Region 1(Jim Cotton). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44038 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWEN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/06/2008
Notification Time: 05:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2008
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text PIN HOLE LEAK DISCOVERED IN 1 INCH INSTRUMENT LINE DURING RPV PRESSURE TEST
"With Unit 1 in Mode 4 for a planned refueling outage, a pin hole leak was discovered on a 1 inch line between the 'A' Main Steam Line (MSL) and MSL flow instrument condensing chamber (1B21-D006B) in a weld at a 45 degree elbow. Leakage was identified as approximately 2 gallons per hour (GPH). This leakage was identified during RPV pressure test while test pressure was 1050 psig.
"This elbow is near the 1B21-D006B condensing chamber and is located in the Unit 1 drywell (primary containment).
"This item constitutes a primary coolant boundary leak discovered while shutdown."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |