| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/23/2007 - 08/24/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43190 | Rep Org: CARRIER CORPORATION
Licensee: CARRIER CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SYRACUSE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROMAN IWACHIW
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/27/2007
Notification Time: 09:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
DALE POWERS (R4)
TABATABAI (email) (NRR)
| Event Text CHILLER COPPER SLEEVE CRACKS LEADING TO SLOW REFRIGERENT DISCHARGE
Manufacturer provided the following information via facsimile:
Carrier Corporation provided the following information of a potentially reportable condition regarding a Compressor and Bearing Discharge Temperature Sensor, Carrier Part #17FA999-1200-381 supplied by Carrier Corporation's Replacement Components Division to PSE&G Nuclear, LLC for use at Hope Creek Nuclear Station.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"The operative portion of the Sensor is encased in a copper sleeve 1 1/2 inch in length and 1/4 inch in diameter which is soldered to a brass fitting, which fitting couples the Sensor to the chiller to be monitored. PSE&G notified Carrier of four (4) separate instances where a crack occurred in the Sensor's copper sleeve. This crack did not affect the Sensor's ability to function and the Sensors did not cease to function. However, the crack in the Sensor's copper sleeve did result in a leak of refrigerant from the compressor of the chiller to which the Sensor was coupled. Three (3) of these four (4) instances were noted on chillers with safety-related applications, while the fourth was noted on a chiller dedicated to a non-safety application.
"PSE&G noticed the fast refrigerant leak during a routine, visual equipment inspection. As a result of this discovery, the Sensor was replaced, but a similar refrigerant leak was noticed approximately three (3) months thereafter. At approximately the same time, during pressure testing of another safety-related chiller, PSE&G noticed a similar refrigerant leak.
"Safety Hazard which could be created by such a defect: While the refrigerant leak appeared to have been a slow process occurring over some period of time, had that refrigerant leak continued uncorrected, the result would have been a loss of enough refrigerant such that the chiller would be automatically shut down by a separate safety feature.
Since mid- 2001 Carrier has sold the sensor to the following facilities:
NRC Region 1: Limerick Generating Station, PSE&G (Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem Generating Station)
NRC Region 2: Catawba Nuclear Station, McGuire Nuclear Station
NRC Region 3: Braidwood Station, Perry Nuclear Power Plant
NRC Region 4: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station
* * * UPDATE ON 8/23/07 AT 1424 FROM IWACHIW TO SNYDER * * *
Manufacturer provided the following information via facsimile:
"In response to the notice of a potential defect or failure to comply received from PSE&G, along with a report of various analysis conducted by PSE&G, Carrier convened its 'Nuclear Defect Review Board' (NDRB) to review and respond to PSE&G's notice and report.
"As part of its review, Carrier's NDRB requested various additional information from PSE&G regarding the Sensor's alleged defect or failure to comply experienced by PSE&G, as well as its use and operation of the Sensor and the chillers utilizing the Sensor. The chiller use and operation data provided by FSE&O showed that the chiller was run under such an extremely light cooling capacity that Carrier has no reference test data or experience available. As a result, Carrier cannot accurately predict the effects of this low cooling capacity on the operation of the Sensor.
"Carrier's NDRB also reviewed Carrier's current process of brazing the Sensor's copper sleeve, as compared to the brazing process utilized when the Sensor was first offered for sale approximately 30 years ago. Carrier's NDRB commissioned testing by a third party firm to determine if changes in the brazing process had any impact on the hardness or grain size of the Sensor's copper sleeve. This testing determined that there was no significant difference in the hardness of the Sensor's copper sleeve between a sample using the original brazing method, another sample using the current brazing method and a third sample using an alternate brazing method not previously or currently in use in connection with the Sensor. In addition, the firm indicated that it is typical that a lack of significant difference in hardness will also be an indicator of a lack of significant difference in grain size.
"Carrier's third party test results showing no change in hardness or grain size, PSE&G's operation of the associated chiller at an extremely light cooling capacity and the fact that the PSE&G failures were very isolated occurrences have convinced Carrier's NDRB that the cause of the potential defect or failure to comply was other than a defect inherent in the Sensor. Rather, Carrier's NDRB believes that the potential defect or failure to comply resulted from a cause or causes external to the Sensor.
"Carrier plans to work with PSE&G over the next sixty (60) days to explore these possible external causes and to take corrective actions, as may be necessary, to limit the effects of these external causes on the Sensor and/or to modify the Sensor to better operate in the presence of these external causes.
"In addition to the above actions, on June 8, 2007, Carrier personnel made a visit to PSE&G to collect vibration data at the point of failure. The data collected and analyzed showed no abnormalities that would cause cracking of the sensor at the copper sleeve braze joint location.
"Conclusion:
"Carrier is unable, at this time, to determine the root cause of the defect.
"Post Evaluation Actions
"Upon completion of Carrier's evaluation, analysis and conclusions, Carrier's Nuclear Defect Review Board (NDRB) was reconvened. The NDRB determined that the supplier of the sensor would be asked to provide a modified design of the sensor to eliminate any future potential failures/defects that could result in sensor cracking and subsequent refrigerant leakage. The supplier has complied and provided a modified design of the sensor which has been approved by the NDRB.
"At the present time, the modified sensor is in production. Essentially, the modification involved complete elimination of the sensor's brazed joint. This improved design consists of a probe body manufactured from a single, solid piece of brass, thus eliminating the copper sleeve portion of the probe and the braze joint, from which there could be a possible leak path thru the sensor body. Additionally, the wall thickness of the body has been increased by approximately four times its original thickness. These changes will not impact the fit or function of the sensor. In addition, prior to production for sale, the modified sensor was tested, to determine if the heavier wall would have an impact on the sensors response time. There was little if any change in the sensor's response time. The modified sensor's body is made from the same brass material as the threaded portion of the previous two piece design. The form changes slightly due to the increased wall thickness.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility activity, or basic component that has been, is being or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"Effective July 30, 2007, any purchase orders (PO's) or requests for quotation (RFQ's) received by Carrier for the 17FAS99-1200-381 sensors will be of the modified design described above. Carrier will notify all utilities that may have inventory of the previous design that these sensors may still be used, but only in the Bearing Temperature application, not in the Compressor Discharge Temperature application. Carriers notice will also request the utilities to segregate all previous sensor designs and clearly label them 'For Bearing Temperature Sensor Use Only. Do Not Use As Replacement for Compressor Discharge Temperature Sensor'."
Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Payne), R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Clark) and NRR (Hodge and Thorp). |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 43586 | Rep Org: TESTAMERICA ST. LOUIS
Licensee: TESTAMERICA ST. LOUIS
Region: 3
City: EARTH CITY State: MO
County:
License #: 24-24817-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DON DIHEL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/23/2007
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF LICENSE INVOLVING AN INADVERTENT DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
On Monday 8/20/07, a package containing a small quantity of natural uranium, was inadvertently discarded and taken to the Bridgeton Landfill. The material was shipped as an Excepted Package - Limited Quantity from General Engineering Laboratory which is located in South Carolina to TestAmerica. The package was received, opened and set aside. On Monday, workers inadvertently disposed of the package as trash. The total activity of the material was .265 microcuries (natural uranium with a specific activity of 34 picocuries/gm). The licensee does not believe that a search of the landfill would locate the material due to the shredding and mulching process and the extremely small quantity involved. An accident investigation is in progress which will identify appropriate corrective actions.
The licensee will notify the State of Missouri Department of Natural Resources.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43587 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ERNEST MATHES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/23/2007
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2007
Event Time: 13:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 12 | Power Operation | 12 | Power Operation | Event Text RECEIPT INSPECTION SURVEYS INDICATE RAD LEVELS GREATER THAN EXPECTED
"A package removed from the transport flatbed had a gamma dose rate of 224 [millirem per hour] on contact which exceeded the 10 CFR 71.47 limit, and is therefore reportable per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(2).
"No issue with personnel exposure or a dose to public since the highest dose rate was found on the bottom of the package which was secured to the flatbed. No other limits were exceeded."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43588 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG LOOSE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/23/2007
Notification Time: 15:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2007
Event Time: 18:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR
A contract employee supervisor was determined unfit for duty based on site policy regarding alcohol use during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been placed on administrative hold. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43589 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDY ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/23/2007
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION INVOLVING A 70 GALLON DIESEL SPILL WITHIN 1 MILE OF THE SITE BOUNDARY
"On August 23, 2007, at 1300 EDT, the Susquehanna Control Room was notified of a diesel fuel oil spill from a ruptured saddle tank on a tanker truck. The truck was located within 1 mile of the site boundary, on company property, NOT within the plant protected area. Approximately 70 gallons of diesel fuel oil was spilled in the immediate vicinity of the parked truck and did not get into any waterway. The remainder of the fuel oil was pumped from the ruptured tank into a 55 gallon drum. The event did not meet thresholds for reporting to the state of Pennsylvania. However, the contractor (Rizzo Associates) performing the work made a courtesy call to the Department of Environmental Protection with subsequent notifications made to the Susquehanna control room. This 4 hour notification is made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The clean-up plan was discussed with the DEP and is currently in progress. This incident had no impact to SSHS or its operating units."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43590 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RALPH RICHARD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/23/2007
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2007
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP BECAUSE OF LOWERING CONDENSER VACUUM
"At 1530 hours on 8/23/07, Braidwood Station Unit 2 was manually tripped due to lowering condenser vacuum. The lowering condenser vacuum resulted from the trip of two circulating water pumps. The cause of the two circulating water pump tripping is under investigation. All control rods inserted and there were no complications during the trip and all systems functions as required. Following the unit trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as expected to maintain steam generator level. At the time of the unit trip, the Braidwood Station area was experiencing severe thunderstorms.
"Additionally, at 1604 hours, 19 of 70 emergency sirens for the Braidwood Station were declared inoperable due to a loss of power from storms in the area. As of 1704 hours, 19 sirens (greater than 25%) remain inoperable. This event is considered a major loss of offsite response capability and applies to both Braidwood Station Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"These events are is being reported under:
(1) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event that results in the actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical,
(2) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the PWR auxiliary feedwater system.
(3) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of offsite response capability."
All safety buses remained powered by offsite power throughout this event. Emergency diesel generators are available if needed. No steam generator PORV's lifted as a result of the trip. Decay heat is being discharged to the condenser via the steam dumps.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 43591 | Facility: GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
RX Type: SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY
Comments: NO SHIPMENTS OF SPENT
FUEL EXPECTED
Region: 3
City: MORRIS State: IL
County: GRUNDY
License #: SNM-2500
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-1
NRC Notified By: STANLEY BOND
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/23/2007
Notification Time: 22:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2007
Event Time: 18:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2007 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
TOM BLOUNT (IRD)
EDWIN HACKETT (FSME)
| Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER IN THE AREA
Per the site emergency plan, MOI's 202 and 233, at 1850 local time, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to severe weather including tornado warnings. The licensee sheltered personnel onsite. No damage was sustained at the site. There was no radiological release. No offsite assistance was requested. At 1930 local time the licensee terminated the Unusual Event due to expiration of the tornado warnings.
The licensee notified state authorities. | |