| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/26/2007 - 04/27/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43197 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/28/2007
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2007
Event Time: 22:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABILITY
"On February 27, 2007, at approximately 2200 hours, testing of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was in progress in accordance with 0PT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test following system maintenance. Soon after the HPCI turbine was started a high level alarm condition in the HPCI barometric condenser was experienced. Evidence suggests the most probable cause was due to failure of the 2-E41-F048, Condensate Pump Discharge Check Valve, to open. The adverse consequence of this check valve failing to open is inadequate cooling flow to the HPCI lube oil cooler. The HPCI turbine was removed from service per applicable plant procedures.
"At the time of discovery, the HPCI system was inoperable for scheduled maintenance. However, this equipment failure would have prevented the HPCI system from fulfilling its safety function. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) per Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1. 'ECCS - Operating' Condition D had been previously entered on 2/25/07 at 1500, which required maintaining the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system operable and restoration of HPCI operability in 14 days.
All other ECCS systems are operable including RCIC. The LCO allowed outage time is due to expire on 3/11/07 at approximately 1500 hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
** UPDATE FROM TURKAL TO KNOKE AT 11:33 EDT ON 04/26/07 ***
"On February 28, 2007, at 0540 hours, the Control Room Supervisor made a notification (Event Number 43197) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident). The notification was made as a result of an unexpected high level alarm condition for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system barometric condenser, which was received during the post-maintenance operability testing of the HPCI system. At the time of discovery, the HPCI system was inoperable; having been properly removed from service for planned maintenance. It was believed that check valve 2-E41-F048, which is in the discharge piping of the HPCI barometric condenser condensate pump, downstream of a connection from the HPCI lube oil cooler cooling water discharge line, did not open, as required, during the HPCI post maintenance operability run. With valve 2-E41-F048 closed, there is a potential for inadequate cooling flow for the HPCI lube oil and, as such, a potential that the HPCI system could be inoperable as a result.
"Basis for Retraction
Upon further review, it has been determined that the 2-E41-F048 functioned properly during the post-maintenance HPCI system operability testing. The valve was disassembled and inspected during the recent Unit 2 refueling outage and confirmed to be operating properly. As such, adequate HPCI lube oil cooling existed and HPCI could have fulfilled its intended safety function.
"Physical inspection of the HPCI lube oil cooler piping, during the Unit 2 refueling outage, revealed that the lube oil cooler outlet orifice was missing. The missing orifice can result in higher than design flows through the lube oil cooler and higher backpressure at the barometric condenser condensate pump discharge. The higher backpressure can affect the ability to pump down the barometric condenser vacuum tank. Additionally, during troubleshooting activities performed prior to the refueling outage, valve 2-E41-F058, which is in the discharge piping of the HPCl barometric condenser condensate pump, upstream of the connection from the HPCI lube oil cooler cooling water discharge line, showed evidence of sticking. Either of these conditions could have caused the barometric condenser high level alarm without affecting HPCI lube oil cooling. If the barometric condenser becomes completely full, a relief valve on the tank will lift and relieve water to the HPCI room sump. The room sump pump has adequate capacity to keep up with the maximum expected flow. Operability of the HPCI system will not be affected by this condition.
"The higher than design cooling water flow rate does not adversely affect the capability of the lube oil cooler to remove heat from HPCI system lube oil and, as such, does not affect HPCI operability. Additionally, physical inspection of the cooler during the refueling outage found no damage or erosion of the cooler internals, and the cooler was successfully pressure tested.
"The barometric condenser condensate pump, barometric condenser vacuum pump, and barometric condenser water level instrumentation are not required to support operability of the HPCI system.
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 223820.
"On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC resident was notified of this retraction." Notified R2DO(Payne). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43314 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: WESTFIELD AT GATEWAY MALL
Region: 4
City: LINCOLN State: NE
County:
License #: GL0457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 04/23/2007
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2007
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (e-mailed) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text NEBRASKA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THREE MISSING SELF LUMINOUS SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM
The licensee provided the following information via e-mail
"The licensee received six model 880-12-6-20 self-luminous signs from Safety Light Corporation in May of 1994. The report from Safety Light did not list serial numbers. The licensee's facility was remodeled in 2005. They have done a number of searches for the missing signs and have not been able to locate them. The licensee does not know where they are. They assume that the signs were misplaced during the remodel. This Department does not have the model numbers as they were not a part of the report from Safety Light in 1994. The licensee previously had not done a complete inventory to record the serial numbers."
Event Cause: Inattention to Detail
Corrective Action: No Corrective Action Taken
Each of the three missing Safety Light Corporation signs initially contained 11.5 cuires/425.5 GBq of Tritium
Event Date: 07/01/2005
Reporting Requirement: 20.2201(a)(1)(i) - Report of theft or loss of licensed material > 1000 x App C value
Reference Number: 04-20-07
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43316 | Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ROOFING CONSULTANTS LTD
Region: 3
City: CRETE State: IL
County:
License #: 133-1249-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/24/2007
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
KEITH McCONNELL (FSME)
ILTAB (E-MAIL) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN
The State provided the following information via email:
"On Tuesday, April 24, 2007, the State of Wisconsin, Department of Health and Family Services, Radiation Protection Section was notified that a Campbell Pacific Nuclear Model MCM-2 roofing gauge, containing 50 mCi of Am-241 had been reported stolen near Crete, Illinois. The Department was notified because the gauge is under ownership of a State of Wisconsin company. The gauge appears to have been in the State of Illinois under the control of a company employee that resides in Illinois and is performing work at a client's location in Illinois. The owner did not file for reciprocity with the State of Illinois.
"Upon further investigation by the Department, the Department learned that the owner of the gauge does not have a proper Wisconsin Radioactive Material License. The owner received the gauge in a transfer of ownership when the past owner (a Wisconsin Radioactive Material License, #133-1249-01, Roofing Consultants LTD) sold the company to the current owner. The name of the company did not change when the ownership changed occurred, so the company is still operating under the name of Roofing Consultants LTD. The State of Wisconsin is currently investigating this transfer of ownership.
"The State of Illinois has been contacted concerning this incident and is in contact with the Will County Sheriff Department. The State of Illinois and the State of Wisconsin will continue to investigate this incident."
Wisconsin Event Number: 07-009
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43322 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MIKE MCDONNEL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/26/2007
Notification Time: 23:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2007
Event Time: 19:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text DEGRADED CONDITION DURING WELD DEPOSIT OVERLAY REPAIR
"On April 26, 2007, at approximately 1930 it was reported that the N2K recirculation system inlet nozzle had slight water seepage. The seepage developed during welding operations being performed to install a full structural weld overlay over the nozzle and stopped almost immediately during the welding. The weld overlay was being installed as a conservative measure following UT inspections that had been performed earlier during the outage.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)A. The plant is in stable condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |