| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/24/2006 - 11/27/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43003 | Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY
Region: 3
City: BLOOMINGTON State: MN
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG VERKE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 11/21/2006
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 11/06/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOST/UNACCOUNTED FOR STATIC ELIMINATORS
The State of Minnesota received the following notification from Seagate Technology via letter dated November 6, 2006:
"Subject: Loss of Anti-static Nuclear Ionizing Devices [General License Material]
"The following anti-static nuclear ionizing devices described below were due for return to the vendor, but could not be found after an extensive search including a written communication requesting assistance from associated work areas across our site.
"The devices are:
"NRD brand Model P-2063-1200, Nuclear Ionizer Fan Element, 31.5 millicuries of Polonium-210 per device
"Serial Numbers A2ER777 thru A2ER785 [nine total], manufactured 9/22/2005."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43006 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TSA SYSTEMS, LTD
Region: 4
City: LONGMONT State: CA
County:
License #: CO - 285-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/22/2006
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2006
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - COLORADO - LOST CHECK SOURCE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"A licensee, TSA Systems, Ltd., Colorado License #285-01, notified the Department on this date that a 2.1 microcurie Cf-252 source was missing. The source, manufactured by Isotope Products Laboratories, is a Model A3014 with Serial #B2-833. The licensee's representative stated that they continue to search their facility for the source which is used for instrument response checks and calibrations.
"No other details are available at this time. The Department has initiated an investigation."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43010 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GENE DAMMANN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 11/25/2006
Notification Time: 04:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/2006
Event Time: 19:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION
"With Prairie Island Unit 2 core offloaded for the 2R24 refueling outage, it was discovered that a potential common cause failure of the 21 and 22 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps may exist. A non-safety related 120 VAC motor heater circuit from Panel 2RPA3 Circuit 28 supplies power to 21 and 22 RHR Pumps. Investigation continues. The RHR system is not required by the current operating mode.
"The RHR Pumps on the operating unit (Unit 1) are supplied from separate 120 VAC panels so the concern does not exist for the 11 and 12 RHR pumps."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43011 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 11/25/2006
Notification Time: 22:48 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2006
Event Time: 20:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM FROM FULL POWER DUE TO GENERATOR LOAD REJECT
"At 2042 on 11/25/06, Susquehanna Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to an apparent generator load reject. All rods fully inserted, and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to approximately +13" inches causing level 3 (+13") isolations, and was restored to normal level (+35") by the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. Five steam safety relief valves opened then reclosed. Pressure was subsequently controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected.
"The 'A' reactor recirculation pump was restarted to re-establish forced core recirculation. Reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system has been restarted and placed in service. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is underway.
"Unit Two continued power operation.
"The NRC resident inspector was notified. A press release will occur."
Decay heat is being removed by normal feedwater to the reactor vessel and steaming through the steam bypass valves to the condenser.
The licensee intends to notify the State of Pennsylvania EOC. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43012 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 11/27/2006
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2006
Event Time: 13:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID SPECIFIC SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On September 29, 2006, at 1:33 pm CDT, a safety-related 120VAC distribution panel was inadvertently de-energized during a planned shift of its power supply. The plant was operating at 100 percent power at the time. The loss of power resulted in the automatic closure of primary containment isolation valves in the reactor water cleanup and the suppression pool cooling/cleanup systems. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) as an invalid actuation of the containment isolation valves affecting more than one system.
"This event occurred during a planned shift of the inverters that supply the distribution panel. This shift was being performed to support post-maintenance testing of one of the inverters. The operators performing the shift were utilizing the appropriate procedure. At a certain point in the procedure, the off-going inverter was deenergized, and the operators discussed the expected equipment response. Following that discussion, a step was erroneously performed out of sequence, resulting in the loss of power to the 120VAC distribution panel. The primary containment isolation signal was actuated as designed, and the appropriate valves responded correctly.
"Reactor power was not affected by the containment isolation signal. The pertinent response procedures were implemented, and actions were taken to restore the distribution panel to service. This was completed at 5:31 pm CDT that day."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |