| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/09/2006 - 01/10/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42240 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: IRISNDT, INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L04769 Site 3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/04/2006
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/04/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - TEXAS LICENSEE EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL OVEREXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via email:
"The [Texas] Department of State Health Services (DSHS), Radiation Control received written notification from [Name Deleted], Texas Regional RSO for IRISNDT, Inc. that one of its previous employee's received exposure in excess of 5 Rem annual dose. The RSO reports that while doing an update of radiation dose reports for all licensees' Texas employees, the Texas Regional RSO noted that a past employer exposure history was not recorded for a former employee (the radiographer) of the licensee. The RSO reviewed the personnel files for the individual and could not find a past exposure history from the record from the radiographer's previous employer. The Texas RSO contacted the Corporate RSO to see if he had a record for the individual. The Corporate RSO found an exposure history record and faxed it to the Texas RSO. The previous employer's record, H&G Inspection, [address deleted] reflected a dose of 3.918 Rem in the first 6.5 months of employment. The doses were compiled with IRISNDT's records and it was immediately noted that the radiographer had an accumulated dose in excess of 5 Rem. The Texas RSO called the former employee to notify him of the overexposure that same day of record discovery. The former employee stated that he thought the dose he had been assigned was not correct and that's why he did not inform the Texas RSO. It was determined through discussions with the radiographer that the radiographer has not worked since November 2005 and was informed that he cannot work in the industry until he talks to the DSHS. IRISNDT, Inc. stated they failed to check previous records and the radiographer failed to report [previous dose] to [IRISNDT]. In the future IRISNDT, Inc. will provide a form for potential employees to complete pre-hire for dose records to be reviewed and the safety program administrator has been assigned the responsibility to call 2 times per week to follow-up on previous employer dose histories for new hires."
Texas Incident No: I-8287 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42245 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MALONEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/09/2006
Notification Time: 17:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2006
Event Time: 04:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF CHARGING SYSTEM IMPACT ON SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY
At 0455 EST, the control room received a Plant Process computer alarm for the 'C' Charging pump and entered TS 3.0.3. TS 3.0.3 was entered due to both ECCS trains becoming inoperable due to the loss of the charging subsystem safety function. The 'A' charging pump (backup) was started at 0458 and had sufficient flow for only several minutes. The control room then attempted to start the 'B' charging pump (standby) at 0459 with no success. At 0500 Charging and Letdown was secured and at 0501, operators identified a potential 'B' charging pump pulse dampener bladder failure and entered AOP 2568 for RCS leakage. The 'B' Charging pump suction and discharge were isolated at 0510 and at 0544 the 'C' charging pump was vented and restored to service. The licensee exited TS 3.0.3 at 0554 and entered TS 3.5.2 A since 'B' train of ECCS was restored to operability. The licensee suspects that the nitrogen from the bladder on the discharge of the pump leaked through the 'B' charging pump to the common charging pump suction header and caused gas intrusion to the running 'C" charging pump and to the common suction header for the standby charging pumps. TS 3.5.2 Bases does not credit the charging system for Design Basis Accident (DBA) mitigation, however the charging system is credited for two beyond DBA events - ATWS and Complete Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
At 1343 EST, the control room received a Charging low flow alarm with the 'C' charging pump in service. Charging and Letdown were secured and the licensee entered TS 3.0.3 at 1344. At 1459 the licensee completed the fill and vent of the 'C' charging pump and started the pump at 1514 and placed Charging and Letdown into service. The licensee is performing an engineering evaluation to keep the 'C' charging pump running and an Operability Determination must be completed prior to declaring the 'C' charging pump operable. The licensee continues to troubleshoot the 'A' charging pump to restore to operability. Once the 'C' charging pump is declared operable, the licensee will exit TS 3.0.3
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and both state and local emergency response organizations. | |