| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/06/2006 - 01/09/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42188 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MATHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 12/05/2005
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR APPROXIMATLEY 2 WEEKS.
"The Plant Process Computer (PPCS) will be taken out of service for an approximately 2 week period to implement a planned modification. The current PPCS is being replaced and the computer outage is required to allow cutover to the new PPCS. During this time period ERDS and SPDS will not be available. ERDS and SPDS parameters will be monitored by control board indications. Compensatory actions have been developed.
"This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action.
"The PPCS outage is expected to commence around 0600 CST on 12/5/05. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspectors of the modification and schedule. The NRC was previously notified of this planned outage via letter dated November 7, 2005."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOHNSON TO ROTTON AT 0324 EST ON 12/16/05 * * *
"The Plant Process Computer System was restored at 2330 CST on 12/15/05. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) has been returned to service. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) portion of the system will be turned over once the testing has been completed."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Burgess).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ELLISON TO ROTTON AT 1716 EST ON 01/06/06 * * *
"This notification is an update to previously made notification, EN# 42188. As of 14:30 CST on 1/6/06 the Unit 1 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) has been accepted for use and is considered fully operational."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Ring) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42237 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 12/31/2005
Notification Time: 19:16 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2005
Event Time: 14:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFW) DUE TO A TRANSIENT ON THE "B" MAIN FEEDWATER (MFW) PUMP
"The EFW actuation occurred when the 'B' MFW pump RPM rose then dropped to ~4000 rpm. The MFW pump then recovered immediately. This transient caused EFIC [Emergency Feedwater Initiation Control] to actuate and both EFW pumps received start signals on invalid low SG level from the EFIC low range level instruments. These instruments measure level based upon a dp [differential pressure] across an orifice and are not considered reliable at 95% power and full MFW flow. All other SG level instruments indicate SG level was above EFIC setpoint during the MFW pump transient. This can be concluded by reviewing the OTSG [Once Through Steam Generator] level prior to and during the transient. Prior to the transient the EFIC low range level instruments indicated a level of ~24 inches. During the transient the EFIC low range level instruments indicated as low as 4 inches. However, the Startup Range level only lowered from ~122 inches prior to the transient to ~120 inches.
"Both EFW pumps were immediately overridden and stopped once it was verified this was not an actual under feed condition to the OTSGs. No EFW injection into the OTSGs occurred due to the EFW actuation."
There was no ongoing maintenance at the time which would have explained the "B" MFW pump transient.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE EVENT FROM FRED VAN BUSKIRK TO JOE O'HARA ON 1/5/06 AT 0942 * * *
"On 12/31/05, an 8-hour notification (EN# 42237) was made by Arkansas Nuclear One reporting an automatic actuation of Emergency Feedwater (EFW). The report was submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) Valid System Actuation. The actuation of EFW occurred as a result of a "B" Main Feedwater (MFW) pump transient which caused an invalid low Steam Generator (SG) level signal from the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) instrumentation. As discussed in the original event report, the low SG level EFIC instruments do not provide valid indication at 95% power and full MFW flow. As a result of the elevated flow rate during this perturbation, an invalid indication below the low SG level setpoint was produced resulting in the system actuation. All other SG level instrumentation indicated that actual SG levels remained within the normal operating band, confirming that no low level condition existed and that this event represented an invalid actuation. Accordingly, this update revises Event Notification 42237 to be submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) and the 60-day Optional 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) requirement - Invalid Actuation of EFW. EFID and EFW systems functioned as designed in response to the invalid low SG level signal.
"The original event report stated that there was no EFW injection into the steam generators as a result of the actuation; however, subsequent reviews of historical Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) data indicated that the electric EFW pump (P-7B) fed the steam generators for approximately 5 seconds during the event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Shannon) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42239 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TWINING LABORATORIES
Region: 4
City: FRESNO State: CA
County:
License #: 1014-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN FUREY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/03/2006
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2005
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
JIM WHITNEY (E-MAIL) (TAS)
MEXICO VIA FAX ()
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A STOLEN TROXER GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The RSO for Twining Laboratories called to inform the State of California Radiologic Health Branch that a Troxler 3430, Serial # 32684, was stolen the evening of New Years Eve (12/31/05). The gauge was located in an employees garage in San Bernadino, CA. The gauge was chained in the bed of a pickup. The tab that locks the lid of the transport box was cut and the gauge, block, and charger were taken. The employee had worked half a day on Saturday and did not want to drive his vehicle all the way back to the company's Bakersfield office."
The police have been notified of the theft.
Although not stated in the report, Troxler gauges typically contain an 8 millicurie Cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie Americium-241/Beryllium source.
State Report: 010306
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42240 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: IRISNDT, INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L04769 Site 3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/04/2006
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/04/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - TEXAS LICENSEE EMPLOYEE OCCUPATIONAL OVEREXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via email:
"The [Texas] Department of State Health Services (DSHS), Radiation Control received written notification from [Name Deleted], Texas Regional RSO for IRISNDT, Inc. that one of its previous employee's received exposure in excess of 5 Rem annual dose. The RSO reports that while doing an update of radiation dose reports for all licensees' Texas employees, the Texas Regional RSO noted that a past employer exposure history was not recorded for a former employee (the radiographer) of the licensee. The RSO reviewed the personnel files for the individual and could not find a past exposure history from the record from the radiographer's previous employer. The Texas RSO contacted the Corporate RSO to see if he had a record for the individual. The Corporate RSO found an exposure history record and faxed it to the Texas RSO. The previous employer's record, H&G Inspection, [address deleted] reflected a dose of 3.918 Rem in the first 6.5 months of employment. The doses were compiled with IRISNDT's records and it was immediately noted that the radiographer had an accumulated dose in excess of 5 Rem. The Texas RSO called the former employee to notify him of the overexposure that same day of record discovery. The former employee stated that he thought the dose he had been assigned was not correct and that's why he did not inform the Texas RSO. It was determined through discussions with the radiographer that the radiographer has not worked since November 2005 and was informed that he cannot work in the industry until he talks to the DSHS. IRISNDT, Inc. stated they failed to check previous records and the radiographer failed to report [previous dose] to [IRISNDT]. In the future IRISNDT, Inc. will provide a form for potential employees to complete pre-hire for dose records to be reviewed and the safety program administrator has been assigned the responsibility to call 2 times per week to follow-up on previous employer dose histories for new hires."
Texas Incident No: I-8287 | |