|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/13/2005 - 09/14/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41976 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ALCOA WORLD ALUMINA ATLANTIC
Region: 4
City: PORT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: L05186
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 09/09/2005
Notification Time: 12:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
TAS (Email) ()
MEXICAN GOVT - FAX () |
Event Text
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST NUCLEAR GAUGES
"Agency received notification of two found devices. The devices were found to belong to Alcoa Alumina Atlantic in Point Comfort. An on-site investigation at the licensee's facility was performed on 09/06-09/07/05, by two TX Radiation Control (RC) inspectors, who subsequently found that there was actually an inventory total of six devices that were missing from the Alcoa facility (all Texas Nuclear, Model 5192 gauges, with 20 milliCuries of Cs-137). The licensee stated that the six device/gauges were removed from the plant equipment [area] over the period of October 2003-October 2004, and placed into storage. They maintain that they do not know how or when two of the devices/gauges were taken from the facility as scrap metal for recycling, and do not know the location of the other four devices/gauge.
"The devices/gauges that have been found are: one (Serial Number B1683) at Nucor Steel Texas Division, Highway 79, Jewett, Texas 75846 (TX RAM L02504), and two (Serial NumberB1686) at GSD Trading USA, Inc. scrap yard, Houston, Texas. Nucor Steel has bee directed by TX Radiation Control to hold on to all scrap metal received from Alcoa. GSD has been surveying all scrap metal received from Alcoa for radiation detection. Impoundment orders were issued from TX Radiation Control on 09/09/05, for TX Radiation Control's RSO, to take possession of all radioactive devices containing Cs-137 at Nucor Steel and all radioactive material, excluding RAM exempt under 25 TAC §289 and naturally occurring material (NORM) possessed under a general license that is found at the GSD facility. All materials taken in possession by RC's RSO will be temporarily stored at RC headquarters in Austin, Texas.
"The four devices/gauges that were determined to be missing are: Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear, Model 5192 with the respective Serial Numbers: B1682, B1684 B1685, & B1687. Efforts are still being made to recover the remaining missing four gauges.
"Texas Incident No. I-8258"
Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.
Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41978 |
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MIKRON INDUSTRIES
Region: 4
City: KENT State: WA
County:
License #: WN-R0483
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 09/09/2005
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 10:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS) |
Event Text
WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
"This is an update and close of an event in Washington State as reported to and investigation by the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection (ORP).
"STATUS: closed
"Licensee: Mikron Industries
"City and State: Kent, Washington
"License Number: WN-R0483
"Type of License: General License Registration
"Date and time of Event: 29 June 2005, 10:10 a.m.
"Location of Event: Kent, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health, office of Radiation Protection (ORP) on-site investigation; media attention):
"ORP was notified, by telephone on 29 June 2005 by a Mikron Industries representative, the company was unable to locate 34 generally licensed Po-210 static eliminators. The devices were received between 15 May 2003 until 21 October 2004. Of the 34 devices, two are NRD Model P-2021 8101 (each originally containing 370 MBq [10 millicuries] Po-210); the remaining thirty-two are NRD Model P-2035 (each originally containing 1480 MBq [40 millicuries] of Po-210). The company seems not to know any more then that the devices are missing. ORP staff will make a site visit 30 June 2005 to help the company with their investigation.
"ORP staff performed site visits on 30 June and 8 July, 2005. Staff determined from November 2003 until about March 2005 the facility had not properly controlled the licensed material. The facility had not satisfactorily tracked receipt and disposal of the devices. During the visits, staff were able to locate 28 of the 34 missing devices. They had been set aside in work and storage areas. Recovered devices will remain secured on-site until analysis of leak tests will allow for return to the device manufacturer. ORP will follow up with Mikron to ensure proper disposition of the recovered devices. Mikron has instituted management control to ensure proper disposition of devices from now on.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240 (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: 34 devices total. 32 devices originally contained 1480 MBq [40 mCi] of Po-210, 2 devices originally contained 370 MBq [10 mCi] of Po-210. Total initial activities were 48.1 GBq [1300 mCi], decayed activity as of 29 June 2005 is 98.8 GBq [267 mCi].
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown but likely not.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number):
"34 missing NRD Models (2) P-2021 8101 & (32) P-2035 Static Eliminator Devices.
"Model Serial Number / status
"P-2021 8101 A2EA576 Found
"P-2021 8101 A2EA577 Found
"P-2035 A2EA554 Found
"P-2035 A2EA556 Found
"P-2035 A2EA557 Found
"P-2035 A2EA558 Found
"P-2035 A2EA559 Found
"P-2035 A2EA560 Found
"P-2035 A2EA561 Found
"P-2035 A2EA562 Found
"P-2035 A2EA563 Found
"P-2035 A2EA564 Found
"P-2035 A2EA565 Found
"P-2035 A2EA566 Found
"P-2035 A2EA567 Found
"P-2035 A2EA568 Found
"P-2035 A2EA569 Found
"P-2035 A2EA570 Found
"P-2035 A2EA571 Found
"P-2035 A2EA574 Found
"P-2035 A2EA575 Found
"P-2035 A2DU458 Found
"P-2035 A2DU459 Found
"P-2035 A2DU462 Found
"P-2035 A2DH035 Found
"P-2035 A2DH037 Missing
"P-2035 A2DH039 Found
"P-2035 A2DH040 Found
"P-2035 A2DH041 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA168 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA169 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA170 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA171 Missing
"Disposition/recovery:
"Disposition of the missing devices is unknown.
"Leak test?
"Initial, manufacturers leak tests are likely to have been performed. Succeeding, periodic leak tests are unknown. The 30 June 2005 site visit May determine leak test status. Leak tests taken during site visits have been sent for analysis.
Event Report "WA-05-039
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number)
N/A
"Release of activity?
Unknown
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: see above
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: unknown
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided to patient? N/A
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? No"
Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.
Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41979 |
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: EARTHTECH
Region: 1
City: Orlando State: FL
County:
License #: FL 3198-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 09/11/2005
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2005
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
FRANK COSTELLO (R1)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS) |
Event Text
FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGE
A CPN gauge was stowed and locked inside a trailer inside a locked shed in Orlando, Florida. An employee visited the work site and noticed the locks on the storage shed and trailer were broken. EarthTech reported the gauge stolen and reported the theft to the Florida Bureau of Radiation and the local police. The local police are currently at the scene.
These gauges typically contain 10 milliCuries Cs-137 and 50 milliCuries of Am-241:Be.
Less than the quantity of a IAEA Category 3 source. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
* * * UPDATE FROM J. WILLIAMSON TO M. RIPLEY 2030 EDT 09/11/05 * * *
The gauge is a CPN model MC-3, serial number M330206877. The State also provided the licensee's license number and Radiation Safety Officer contact information.
Notified R1 DO (F. Costello), NMSS EO (L. Kokajko) and TAS (B. Sandler) |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41987 |
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 09/14/2005
Notification Time: 04:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 02:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL |
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"An automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. The HPCI system started on low reactor level but did not inject, reactor level had risen above the initiation set-point. The RCIC did not receive an initiation signal. Overall plant response was as expected."
Prior to the transient the licensee was in the process of transferring UPS electrical loads to the alternate power supply. The momentary loss of UPS power locked-out the RFP controls during a downtrend in the reactor water level from the normal 201-203 inch operating band. Before Operators could establish manual control, reactor water level reached the 177 inch scram setpoint. Following the scram, reactor water level continued to decrease to the HPCI and RCIC initiation setpoint of 126 inches before recovering. HPCI received a start signal but RCIC did not for reasons under investigation. The unit will remain in mode 3 pending the results of the post-scram investigation and restart.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and is planning on issuing a press release. |
|