| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/02/2005 - 08/03/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41883 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: D & S WIRELINE
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County: RICHLAND PARISH
License #: LA7657L01-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: S. BLACKWELL VIA FAX
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/29/2005
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONED WELL LOGGING SOURCE
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"On July 21, 2005, D & S Wireline lost a 3.0 Ci source of Am-Be 241 with serial number NV5161NE downhole. The source was manufactured by Gamma Industries on November 10, 1981. D & S stopped trying to retrieve the source on July 26, 2005. The well logging tool is at a depth of 3210 feet. A cement plug and whipstock have been put on top of the tool to keep from reentering the well."
Louisiana Report Number LA050006. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41884 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LONGVIEW INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: EVERETT State: WA
County:
License #: IR067-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: A. SCROGGS VIA E-MAIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/29/2005
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE EVENT - HIGH DOSIMETRY BADGE READING
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"On July 28, 2005 the RSO for Longview Inspection, a radiography company located in Everett Washington, notified [the Washington State Radioactive Materials] department of a potential overexposure. In a written report sent that night, events were described as follows: Two Level 2 radiographers were dispatched to Kent Washington to perform radiography work on an above ground pipeline. Each radiographer was properly equipped with survey meters, self-reading pocket dosimeters, rate alarm dosimeters, and OSL [Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimetry]] badges.
"During the course of the on site work, radiographer #1 crawled under the pipe to search for pipe numbers. At that time, it is believed that his OSL badge was knocked off his shirt pocket where he had it clipped. Both radiographers continued to work taking shots in the area unaware of the missing OSL badge. The alarm rate and pocket dosimeters were worn in a pouch on his hip and not in his shirt pocket with the OSL badge.
"At the conclusion of the work, while both radiographers performed their break downs, equipment checks and daily radiation reports to complete the job, radiographer #1 discovered his OSL badge was missing. The immediate area was searched and the OSL badge was discovered under a sheet of plywood pulled into place to crawl upon while under the pipe.
"They returned to their shop in Everett, Washington and notified the RSO of the mishap. The two radiographers reported that their rate alarms had not sounded constantly and periodic checks of the pocket dosimeter did not indicate any abnormal doses. Both men stated that they were working side by side the whole day . Since it was the end of the month wear period, the RSO sent all the radiographers' OSL badges in for processing. He forwarded the dosimetry report to us with his written report of the incident.
"The report on the OSL found under the pipe had millirem readings of 5367 - Deep dose, 5638 Eye dose, and 6237 Shallow dose. The radiographer #2 had readings that were consistent with the doses reported for the wear period with other radiographers in the company.
"The RSO reported that he suspended the radiographer #1 who had lost the OSL badge under the pipe, until the RSO receives approval from the department to resume radiographic operations."
Washington State Report #WA-05-044 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41885 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES E. SCHLEIF
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/02/2005
Notification Time: 01:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2005
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIALLY INOPERABLE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS
"As part of an ongoing calculation review project, design data is being evaluated on safety related motors. On 07/15/2005 at 2245, design data was accepted for 1P-15A Safety Injection motor. This data determined that during a design basis accident with degraded safeguards bus voltage, the 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump could trip and lockout on over current prior to the safeguards bus stripping on under voltage. The Safety Injection Pump lockout would then prevent an auto start of the Safety Injection Pump during Emergency Diesel Generator load sequencing. 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump was declared out of service at that time. No other safety related motors were affected by this data.
"The 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump time over current set point was adjusted, based on the revised motor data, returning 1P-15A to service on July 17 at 2230. 2P-15A Safety Injection Pump time over current set point was also conservatively reset.
"On 08/01/2005 at 2000, additional design motor data was accepted, which impacted the time over current set point for 1P-15B and 2P-15B Safety lnjection motors. Review of this data determined that a similar potential exists that during a design basis accident with degraded safeguards bus voltage, 1P-15B or 2P-15B Safety Injection Pump could trip and lockout on over current prior to the respective safeguards bus stripping on under voltage. The Safety Injection Pump lockout would then prevent an auto start of the Safety Injection Pump during Emergency Diesel Generator load sequencing. 1P-15B and 2P-15B Safety Injection Pumps have been declared out of service as a result of accepting this new data.
"Based on the combined effect of all received design motor data, a condition existed prior to 07/15/2005, which could have impacted the design function of Unit 1 or Unit 2 Safety Injection Pumps during a design basis accident with degraded safeguards bus voltage. Both Unit 1 and both Unit 2 Safety Injection Pumps had the potential for this effect to prevent auto start on the Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Sequence per design. Therefore, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the potential to prevent fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate an accident.
"Previous corrective action has been completed for Unit 1 and Unit 2 P-15A Safety Injection motors therefore, they remain Operable and capable of fulfilling design safety function."
The licensee is currently in a 72 hour Tech. Spec. LCO 3.5.2 (A) action statement for ECCS train B on both Units. Repairs are expected to take six to eight hours. Safety Injection train A equipment is being protected by administrative requirements put in place by the licensee. Operations personnel have been briefed of the potential impacts.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41886 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/02/2005
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 08:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ECCS SYSTEMS INOPERABLE DUE TO EXCESSIVE REACTOR EQUIPMENT COOLING SYSTEM LEAKAGE
"This notification is being made pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(v)[D- Accident Mitigation] as a loss of safety function due to unplanned inoperability of HPCI and both Low Pressure ECCS systems caused by inoperability of both REC subsystems.
"At 08:40 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] declared both REC (Reactor Equipment Cooling) subsystems inoperable due to excessive leakage from REC system. CNS was in the process of tagging out the north east quad fan coil unit (FCU) for planned maintenance to replace an REC drain valve on the FCU. After commencing draining the FCU, the building operator noted excessive leakage at the drain. A check of REC system out-leakage determined that allowable REC leakage limits had been exceeded. Both REC subsystems were subsequently declared inoperable. REC is a support system for HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems; therefore HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems were declared inoperable.
"At 09:08, the REC drain valve was closed terminating the REC system leakage. REC, HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems were subsequently declared operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41888 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/02/2005
Notification Time: 21:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL PART 21 ISSUE WITH STRUTHERS-DUNN RELAYS
"On 8/21/2005 Duke Energy Corporation was informed by the manufacturer of Struthers-Dunn relay, part number 219BBXP, of a manufacturing defect with the subject relay. Duke contacted the manufacturer as follow up to recent relay failures of this type. There has not been a Part 21 notification to date. The defect is in the relay coil. Some coils that were made in China over an approximate 18-month period did not have their coil core annealed. The annealing step in the manufacturing process was apparently skipped. The missed annealing step results in the relay coil potentially drawing almost twice its rated current. As a result, the coil can fail after an extended period of time in the energized state. Potentially affected relays of this type were purchased commercial grade and dedicated by Duke Energy Corporation for use in safety related applications. This relay type is utilized in valves in the Catawba Nuclear Service Water System. An investigation is in progress as to whether the relays in service at Catawba have the date code to indicate they have the manufacturing defect. Duke is also investigating if this relay type is in service at the other Duke nuclear units. This manufacturing defect may be reportable under 10 CFR 21 if other utilities purchased identical relays and dedicated them for use in safety related applications.
"The following is a summary of information obtained from Struthers-Dunn concerning the affected relays:
(1) Relays manufactured between January 2003 and June 2004 (date codes 0301B through 0424B on the cover).
(2) Any 219 series relay with 120 AC and 240 AC coils.
(3) 'Made in China' marked on the cover.
(4) Also 'Made in USA' marked on the cover with a 'B' in the date code could be affected.
" The Catawba NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."
The relays used in the Catawba Nuclear Service Water System are normally energized.
The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina and South Carolina Warning Points and York, Gaston and Mecklenburg County agencies. | |