| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/16/2005 - 03/17/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41485 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CONAM MMP INSPECTION INC
Region: 4
City: LONG BEACH State: CA
County:
License #: 4832-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C J SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/12/2005
Notification Time: 01:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE DURING RADIOGRAPHY
Initial report made by licensee to the State of California at 1330 PST on 03/11/05 via voicemail:
While performing radiography at the BP Refinery located in Carson, CA, a radiography camera source was not fully retracted while disconnecting the guide tube. The camera was an INC Model IR100 Serial #4043, which contains a 90 Curie Iridium-192 source. After performing several operations of the radiography camera (approximately 10 shots) the radiographer approached the camera without his survey instruments. After disconnecting the guide tube, it became apparent to the radiographer and his assistant that there was a problem since their survey instruments were off scale, and when the radiography crew checked their pocket reading dosimeters, they were off scale also. The radiographer used pliers to force the source into the shielded position and secure the camera. The licensee estimates that the radiographer received 1800 millirem whole body, 212 Rem to the hands, and the assistant received 2766 millirem whole body. There are no reported physical manifestations from the exposure at this time. The corporate RSO is flying to the scene of the incident to reenact the events for their investigation. The personal dosimetry for both operators has been sent for processing. The camera will be sent to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair. The State of California will be conducting their own investigation into the event.
* * * UPDATE FROM CALIFORNIA (SALGADO) TO M. RIPLEY AT 1510 EST ON 03/14/05 * * *
The following information was obtained from the State via facsimile (State text in quotes):
"3/14/05, 1030 [PST]: Update, licensee is reporting that dosimetry for involved individuals has been processed with results as follow: radiographer shows 1.6 rem, whole body. Assistant shows 2.7 rem, whole body. No physical manifestations displayed at this time. Preliminary written report from licensee pending."
No further information available at this time on refinements to the extremity dose estimates. Notified R4 DO (T. Farnholtz) and NMSS EO (T. Essig). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41490 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY, LLC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GLENN CORBIN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/14/2005
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2004
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNEXPLAINED EXPOSURE DOSE
The following is a summary of a report submitted by the State of Texas to the NRC via email:
A radiographer employed by Texas Gamma Ray, LLC received an unexplained dose of 6730 mrem during the month of October 2004. Additional dose reported for the month of November 2004 increased the annual accrued dose for the year 2004 to 7780 mrem which exceeds the yearly occupational dose limit [5 Rem].
The licensee [Texas Gamma Ray, LLC] immediately informed the State of the overexposure via telephone and initiated an investigation. The investigation determined through interviews with the radiographer and a review of his October work assignments that he had dropped his film badge near a radioactive source (approximately 1 meter distance from a camera containing 30-40 Curies Ir-192) for about thirty minutes to an hour. The radiographer did not report the incident at that time or in his written statement describing his work activities. The licensee noted during their review of the monthly dosimetry monitoring reports provided by Atomic Energy Industrial Laboratory that two of the three individuals assigned to work with this radiographer wore spare film badges.
The State cited the licensee for eleven violations of their TX license. Texas Incident No. I-8190. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41491 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TESTMASTERS, INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L03651-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN VERSER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/14/2005
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2004
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURES
The following is a summary of a report submitted by the State of Texas to the NRC via email:
On January 11, 2005 the licensee [Testmasters, Inc.] was notified by their Atomic Energy Industrial Laboratory that two Testmaster employees had received high doses on their 11/20/04 through 12/19/04 film badges, i.e., 7,035 mRem and 950 mRem. The licensee initiated an investigation and determined that both individuals had performed an adjustment of the collimator on the 117.8 curie AEA Model 424-9 Ir-192 camera, S/N B1831, after cranking in the source following a shot. Neither individual had a survey meter when they approached the camera for the collimator adjustment. A subsequent review of their pocket dosimeters showed a "high off-scale" reading which was not reported to the company RSO.
The State cited the licensee for six violations of their TX license. Texas Incident No. I-8198 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41498 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/16/2005
Notification Time: 10:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2005
Event Time: 05:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
BOB DENNIG (EO)
PAT HILAND (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION UNUSUAL EVENT
The licensee provided the following information about the event via facsimile (licensee test in quotes):
"On 3/16/2005 at approximately 0540 preparations were being made to drain down the RCS. A tagout needed to be released to support aligning the RCS for drain down. The tagout was not completely released prior to opening the intermediate leg loop drain valves. When the intermediate leg loop drain valves were opened, a flow path was created which resulted in draining the RCS. The Control Room noted approximately 70 gpm mismatch between letdown flow and charging. Personnel in containment manipulating the valves discovered that water was flowing unexpectedly to a trough in containment when they went to position the last set of intermediate leg loop drain valves and they quickly isolated the flow path. The time frame that the flow path existed was approximately 10 minutes. When the Shift Manager evaluated the event for Emergency classification the flow path had been isolated. The Shift Manager was not clear on if this event met the guidance for an NOUE declaration and asked for assistance from the Outage Control Center. Corporate licensing and Emergency preparedness were contacted for additional assistance.
"At 0930 it was decided to report the event per 50.72 (a) General Requirements even though it is not clear that the threshold for an EAL was met. Per NUREG-1022 the NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the Emergency Class to be necessary when the event has rapidly terminated and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists."
The licensee stated that the threshold for an Unusual Event declaration per the Vogtle EALs is 25 gpm identified RCS leakage.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified as well as courtesy notifications to state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE TO NRC (HUFFMAN) FROM LICENSEE (DORMAN) AT 10:58 ON 3/16/05 * * *
After further consideration, the licensee decided that this event should have been classified as an Unusual Event at the time of the occurrence. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this classification. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41499 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DARIN MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/16/2005
Notification Time: 19:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2005
Event Time: 09:43 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO DEGRADED PUMP MOTOR AIR DEFLECTOR
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"At 0943 with Columbia Generating Station operating at 100% power the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was taken out of service for maintenance. During the maintenance activity, severe cracking and degradation was discovered on the upper air deflector of the HPCS pump motor. This component functions to direct air into the motor housing to provide cooling while the system is operating. A preliminary evaluation determined this represents a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of the HPCS system to mitigate the consequence of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Upon discovery of this condition plant operators fulfilled the action required by Technical Specifications LCO 3.5.1 condition B to verify by administrative means that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is operable and took action to restore the HPCS system to operable status within 14 days. No other systems were required to function in response to this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |