| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/10/2003 - 11/12/2003 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40161 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 09/16/2003
Notification Time: 08:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2003
Event Time: 00:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
BOB DENNIG (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE INCREASE CAUSED A VALID SIGNAL
"At 1150 hours on 9/15/03 during Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure increase to approximately 700 psig, the Core Flood (CF) Tank 1 outlet motor-operated valve (CF1B) opened when the breaker for the valve was closed. Because RCS pressure was not high enough to actuate the pressure switch setpoint of 770 psig to open this valve, it was believed this was an invalid signal, and therefore the valve opening was not reportable under the criteria of 10 CFR50.72
"After further review, at 0030 hours on 9/16/03 it was determined the sensed pressure was within the setpoint range of the switch, making this a valid signal to open the valve. The CF Tank pressure at the time (approximately 600 psig) was less than the RCS pressure of approximately 700 psig, therefore no discharge into the RCS occurred, and this event is not reportable per 10 CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv).
"The CF System is a passive system, but is used in conjunction with other Emergency Core Cooling Systems to mitigate significant events. Therefore, this event involving the opening of the CF Tank discharge valve CF1B is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b(3)(2)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of a train of the Emergency Core Cooling System.
"Upon opening of this valve, CF Tank 1 level and pressure were observed lowering with a corresponding rise in the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank, most likely due to leakage past a check valve. CF1B was closed according to procedures and the source breaker for the valve opened."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
*** RETRACTION on 11/11/03 at 1643 EST by R. Walleman to MacKinnon ****
"The actuation of the interlock for the Core Flood Tank 1 Outlet Isolation Valve did not constitute an actuation of the Core Flood System. The valve opened automatically as designed to ensure the Core Flood System was capable of performing its safety prior to being manually opened by the Operators. As part of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems, the primary function of the Core Flood System is to deliver cooling water to the reactor core in the event of a Loss of Cooling Accident per the Updated Safety Analysis Report. However, plant conditions (namely, Reactor Coolant System pressure lowering below Core Flood Tank pressure) did not exist that would have required the Core Flood System to perform its safety function. Therefore, the automatic opening of this valve does not constitute the actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System, so this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Therefore, NRC Event Number 40161 is retracted." R3DO (Anne Marie Stone) & NRR EO (Herb Berkow) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this retraction by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40198 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD STRAYER
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA | Notification Date: 09/26/2003
Notification Time: 01:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2003
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INITIATION OF A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AT PEACH BOTTOM 2
"On 09/25/03 @ 2210, while restoring reactor vessel instrumentation to service on Unit 3, an invalid ECCS actuation, (reactor vessel lo-lo-lo) occurred which caused all four (4) EDG to automatically start. All eight (8) 4 KV buses remained supplied from offsite sources. The Unit 3 ECCS pump auto starts were previously defeated per plant procedure and were not required to be operable per Tech Specs. The invalid ECCS initiation signal caused the offsite power Loss-of-Power instrumentation setpoints to transfer to the degraded voltage LOCA setpoints. With the degraded voltage LOCA setpoints initiated, the 4 KV E-bus fast transfer capability on a degraded voltage-NON-LOCA condition is defeated. With the inability to fast transfer the 4 KV E-buses on a degraded voltage NON-LOCA condition, both offsite sources are inoperable. Prior to restoring the reactor vessel level instrumentation, the E-2 diesel generator was inoperable. With both offsite source.; and one EDG inoperable, LCO 3.8.1 Required Action H.1 requires an entry into LCO 3.0.3 for Unit 2.
With Unit 3 in MODE 5, LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.
"After one (1) hour, actions were taken to initiate a plant shutdown per LCO 3.0.3. No negative reactivity was added as the preparations were administrative in nature. At 09/26/03 @ 0006, the invalid ECCS initiation was removed. And all offsite Loss-of-Power instrumentation has been returned to OPERABLE status.
"Following the automatic start of all four (4) EDGs, E-1, E-3, and E-4 were successfully shutdown per plant procedures. E-2 could not be shutdown per plant procedures and was shutdown locally. The cause of the inability to shutdown E-2 per plant procedures is under investigation. E-2 EDG remains inoperable."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVE FOSS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0932 ON 11/10/2003 * * *
"This 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the
Units 2 and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).'
'On 9/25/03 at 2210 while restoring reactor vessel instrumentation to service on Unit 3, an invalid EDG start actuation signal on Reactor Vessel Lo-Lo-Lo level occurred which caused all four Emergency Diesel Generators to automatically start. Investigation into the cause of the event identified that the sequence of operating instrument valves associated with the instrument rack for level transmitters LT 72A and LT 72C resulted in the invalid reactor vessel lo-lo-lo reactor water level signal and subsequent EDG logic actuation. The EDGs initiated as expected for the given conditions. Off-site power was not affected and continued to supply power to the emergency busses. Once the reason for the EDG initiation was determined, the E-1, E-3, and E-4 EDGs were shut down per plant procedures from the Main Control Room by approximately 2255 hours. The E-2 EDG could not be shut down normally from the Main Control Room control switch. It was later shut down at the local control panel in the E-2 EDG bay at about 0030 hours on 9/26/03. Repairs to the E-2 EDG control switch were completed in accordance with the Corrective Action Program (CR 177605).'
'Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made at 0125 on 9/26/03 (EN # 40198). Since the initial report, it was determined that a Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 condition did not exist since the off-site sources were operable. This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action program for resolution (CR 1776 10)."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40300 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON, INC.
Region: 4
City: LITTLETON State: CO
County:
License #: 664-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS | Notification Date: 11/06/2003
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2003
Event Time: 17:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
| Event Text LOST OR STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
At approximately 1700 MST on 11/5/03, a technician using a CPN model MC-3 moisture density gauge was told to relocate her vehicle on the jobsite at 8247 Shaffer Place in Littleton, CO. The gauge contains 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241, with serial number M380804502. The technician placed the gauge inside its orange transport box in the back of her truck, but she left the tailgate open, and did not chain the box to the bed of the truck.
The technician left the jobsite at approximately 1730 MST to return to the main office 25 miles away. Shortly before arriving at the main office, the technician realized that the truck bed was open and the transport box (and gauge) were not in the truck. The technician turned around and re-traced her route back to the jobsite, but was unable locate the gauge. The technician reported the missing gauge to the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at 1830 MST. The RSO, along with other supervisors, retraced the route to the jobsite and searched for the gauge, which was not found.
The licensee notified the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) at 0530 MST on 11/6/03. The CDPHE informed the licensee that a written report is required within 30 days. The licensee notified local law enforcement officials regarding the lost gauge, and issued a press release offering a reward for information leading to its recovery. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40304 | Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: CHEMSYN SCIENCE LABS
Region: 4
City: LENEXA State: KS
County:
License #: 25-B561-01
Agreement: Y
Docket: KS030013
NRC Notified By: TOM CONLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 11/07/2003
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2003
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE
"Licensee reported via phone call of potential overexposure of two employees to carbon-14. The licensee indicated initial calculations showed approximately 2.5 Rem exposure.
"Licensee followed up the phone call on November 7, 2003, after receiving urinalysis results. The initial calculations indicated internal whole body exposure to carbon-14 of 7976 milli Rem and 8976 milli Rem for two employees.
"The 252 milliCuries carbon-14 was in a mixture of 221 micro liter benzene in a flame sealed glass ampoule which was being readied for shipment to a customer. The ampoule was wiped for contamination and placed on a counter outside of the fume hood for approximately 2 hours. Initially the ampoule was thought to be in the fume hood.
"The ampoule was found to be leaking and 59 milliCuries of carbon-14 remained in the ampoule. The resultant loss into the lab was 193 milliCuries of carbon-14."
This is a preliminary report to be updated as information is received.
Person 1 received 7.976 Rem internal (CEDE) occupational.
Person 2 received 8.976 Rem internal (CEDE) occupational. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40305 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/10/2003
Notification Time: 00:39 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2003
Event Time: 23:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION DURING OUTAGE
"On 11/9/03 at 2315 [EST], with Unit 2 in Mode 3 in preparation for a Refueling Outage, an unanticipated ESF actuation occurred. With one Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) reset and one MFP tripped per the General Operating Procedures, Main Condenser Vacuum was being broken. Low Condenser vacuum caused the trip of the reset MFP. The signal for trip of two MFPs caused an Aux Feedwater (AFW) start. AFW was in service in manual control per procedure when the start signal was received; however, the start signal caused the Level Control Valves (LCVs) to reposition to their accident position."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40306 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: KEVIN CHESTER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/10/2003
Notification Time: 06:41 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text SAFEGUARD VULNERABILITY - PHYSICAL SECURITY
Discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow access to a controlled access area for which compensatory measures were not employed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
TAS notified Region IAT member who will followup for NRC.
Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40308 | Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 11/10/2003
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 09:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
TERRY REIS (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRO)
DAN SULLIVAN (FEMA)
JIM CLARDY (DHS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARATION DUE TO RELEASE OF FLAMMABLE GAS THAT MAY IMPACT NORMAL STATION OPERATIONS
A 1/8 inch sealant injection plug for the Main Generator was discovered out of it's location. This allowed the leakage of hydrogen gas into the Turbine Building. Fire Brigade leader responded and observed a flammable concentration of hydrogen. All available ventilation was initiated, and non-essential personnel were evacuated from the 75 foot level of the Turbine Building. Maintenance personnel responded and were able to reinstall the plug. Hydrogen levels were reduced to less than flammable. No radiological release occurred or is expected.
An Unusual Event was declared at 0908 on 11/10/2003 and terminated at 0908. Unusual Event was declared based on EAL 18a.3 - Release of toxic or flammable gas from anywhere near site or on site that may adversely impact normal station operations.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and New Hampshire. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40309 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: FOREST LERO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 11/10/2003
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 10:36 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FALSE RCP BREAKER OPEN SIGNAL
"Reactor Protection System actuation in response to an indicated (not an actual) 2A RCP [Reactor Coolant Pump] breaker open position signal. All reactor protection and support systems operated as expected. The Aux Feedwater System started as required in response to the tripping of both Steam Generator Feed Pumps. All 3 RCPs are running; none have tripped.
"Not understood is the indication of the 2A RCP breaker open when the breaker has remained closed."
The licensee reported that all control rods fully inserted; decay heat is being rejected to the condenser via the steam dumps; a steam generator atmospheric relief may have momentarily lifted during the transient; and that the electrical grid is stable. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40310 | Rep Org: EASTERN ISOTOPES INC
Licensee: EASTERN ISOTOPES INC
Region: 1
City: STERLING State: VA
County:
License #: 45-25221-01DM
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE HARLESS RSO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 11/10/2003
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
DOUG BROADDUS (NMSS)
M. BROWN (DOT)
L. MARZULL (EPA)
SUSAN FRANT (IRO)
| Event Text TRANSPORTATION EVENT - SYRINGES LOST FROM COURIER VEHICLE
The licensee reported that at 0700 ET on 11/10/03, a courier was transporting syringes containing Technetium-99M and Flourine-18 when, while driving over the Key Bridge in Georgetown, District of Columbia, the trunk of the vehicle popped open and 2 boxes were released just past the bridge in Georgetown. Everything was recovered except for 1 syringe containing 15 millicuries of Flourine-18 calibrated at 1145 ET with a 2-hr half life and 1 pig containing a syringe with 2 millicuries Technetium-99M calibrated at 1300 ET with a 6-hr half life. Pieces of the syringe containing the Flourine-18 were recovered and it was believed that the syringe had been run over by a truck. A radiation survey was performed and only very low readings were found where the syringe had been broken. The pig containing the syringe with Technetium-99M was not recovered and it is believed to have rolled into a storm drain near the intersection of Reservoir Road and M Street in Georgetown. The licensee and the local Hazmat Team determined that there was no need to attempt a recovery of the material from the storm drain.
The licensee had initially notified the VA Dept. of Health, DC Department of Health, and US DOT (NRC) of the released Flourine-18 prior to realizing that the syringe containing Technetium-99M was also missing. The licensee will be updating these agencies. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40311 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: R. BUCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 11/10/2003
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 07:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 5 | Startup | Event Text BYPASSING THE PRESSURE SUPPRESSION FUNCTION OF THE TORUS
"On 11/10/2003 at 07:20 CST it was discovered, during a control room panel walk-down, that Dresden U2 had primary containment valves 2-1601-56 Torus Purge valve and 2-1601-21 DW (drywell) Purge valve open simultaneously. This valve alignment created a flow path from the Drywell to the Torus, effectively bypassing the pressure suppression function of the torus water volume during a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) condition. This condition placed U2 containment in an unanalyzed condition, not capable of performing the intended design function, which is to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA. The proper valve alignment was restored at 07:26 CST which restored U2 primary containment to operable status per TS (Tech. Spec) 3.6.1.1.
"A review of plant data identified that this valve arrangement, which bypassed primary containment, had been in effect when U2 entered Mode 2 (Startup) from Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) at 12:01 on Nov 9, 2003. In addition, this valve line-up existed for a duration greater than that allowed by TS 3.6.1.1 A.1 and B.1 (1 hour)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 40313 | Rep Org: LAKELAND MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: LAKELAND MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: ST. JOSEPH State: MI
County:
License #: 21-04177-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TODD TSCHETTER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 11/11/2003
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 12:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
| Event Text LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE TO PATIENT
The licensee received from the pharmacy a dose of Samarium-153 isotope (93.5 millicuries) scheduled to be administered to a patient for bone pain treatment. The dose calibrator at the hospital indicated that the assayed activity of the Samarium-153 was 9.39 millicuries. The licensee called the pharmacy and questioned about the discrepancy that the assayed activity needed to be multiplied by a factor of 10 which made the calculated value equal to 93.9 millicuries. The dose was then administered to the patient.
About one hour later the pharmacy called and stated that the dose the patient received was in fact 9.39 millicuries of Samarium-153, realizing that the mistake was made due to the assumption that Samarium-153 is not just a pure beta emitter but actually gives off gamma radiation. The dose calibrator was accurate and the procedure was improperly followed by multiplying the assayed dose by a factor of 10.
The physician, the Radiation Safety Officer and the patient were notified of the mistake. The physician will administer the rest of the dose to the patient. The licensee will make policy and procedural changes to reflect the fact that Quadramet Samarium-153 emits gamma radiation and can be properly measured by the hospital's calibrator. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40314 | Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF PEASE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 11/11/2003
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2003
Event Time: 17:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2003 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JOHN PELCHAT (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM CONDITION
"On November 10, 2003, at 1740 hours it was determined that a Fitness-For-Duty program condition existed which required a 24-hour report to the NRC.
"Personnel with unescorted access are placed into different groups within the Fitness-For-Duty program. One of these groups, the Immune group, is for personnel not eligible for random test selection at our site, such as the NRC. The remaining groups become part of the random eligible population.
"During a review of the Fitness-For-Duty program it was discovered that the total number of personnel in the Immune population group was higher than normally expected (133 vs. 24). Some personnel required to be in the random eligible population were discovered to be in the Immune group, which rendered them ineligible for selection. (This primarily affected personnel transferring from an approved program within 30 days.). This resulted in non-compliance with 10 CFR 26.24.
"Security personnel are manually correcting the group listings, identifying the affected individuals, scheduling individuals still on site for testing, and notifying the plants where individuals potentially affected may have gone.
"A root cause investigation is presently being conducted to identify the extent, time frame, and cause of this event. If relevant information is uncovered as a part of the root cause investigation that affects the reportability determination, the NRC will be notified.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR26.73."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector | |