Event Notification Report for February 6, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/05/2002 - 02/06/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38316 38576 38670 38671 38672
Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 38316
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FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT NOTIFICATION DATE:
09/25/2001
RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]
COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002
CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3
COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH PERSON ORGANIZATION
LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N MONTE PHILLIPS R3
DOCKET: 0707002 SUSAN FRANT NMSS
NRC NOTIFIED BY: RITCHIE
HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD
EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR SECTION:
NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN
EVENT TEXT
4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth
personnel:
"At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a
block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior
spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA
0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential
collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency
as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time)
amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the
facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of
NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system
piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE
0705_076.E03."
"Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of
material, which may affect this report."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is
potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing
material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown.
Measurements to quantify the material are in progress. The apparent block
wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the
other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of
unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the
exterior building wall."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW
CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing
material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has
collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry
configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium
concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then
a potentially critical configuration could result. Note that no spills or
leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at
this time. The material in question has apparently been there for some
time."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):
Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical
integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of
material. An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment
of the material. Double contingency also relies upon administrative
controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume
containers that could collect a spill or leak."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS
LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): Unknown at this time. Enrichment
could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations. The form is
most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2. Measurements for determination of mass
and assay are currently in progress."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION
OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The openings leading to the interior
spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of
NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential
collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency
as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time)
amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the
facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of
NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system
piping. This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency
as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:
Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken
to determine amounts of material and assay."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be
notified.
***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth
personnel:
"Update #1 - Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16
indicates a total maximum mass of 225/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of
8.2% is present (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative
values), which is less than the safe mass limit for uranium. Investigations
to determine the extent of condition have identified three additional areas
of potential concern in X-705 Recovery. These areas are: the wall near the
A-loop overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the
wall near the top of the B-38 storage columns. Each of these areas has
received preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for
uranium material holdup in the block walls. Preliminary results indicate
that the amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow
and near the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6.
More detailed [quantitative] NDA scans for these two locations (to
differentiate between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background)
are currently in progress and will be reported when available. Preliminary
results indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38
storage column (near background readings). Additional NDA scans are
currently in progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the
Recovery Area.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is
now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the
openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is
less than the safe mass limit for uranium."
Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC
operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan).
***** UPDATE FROM MIKE RITCHIE TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1626 ON 10/01/01 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth
personnel:
"Update #2 - More detailed quantitative NDA scans for the wall near the
A-loop overflow column indicate a total maximum mass of 92/-46 grams 235U
with an enrichment of 86% is present (less than a safe mass). Quantitative
NDA scans for the wall adjacent to the Calciner system indicate a total
maximum mass of 201/-101 grams 235U with an enrichment of 5.3% (also less
than a safe mass). It should be noted that these results incorporate
conservative assumptions about the distribution of uranium bearing material
in the wall matrix, and total amount of uranium present may be found to be
much less upon final disposition."
"Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspected in the wall near
the B-38 storage column (near background readings): therefore,
quantification was not performed in this area."
"[...]"
Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC
operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Brown).
(Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
***** UPDATE FROM CURT SISLER TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 0408 ON 02/05/02 *****
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth
personnel:
"Update #3 - To reestablish compliance, an approximately 24" X 80" section
of block wall was removed in accordance with NCSA-0705_135. Following
removal of the primary area, five locations around the perimeter were then
subjected to additional NDA analysis. Conservative NDA analysis indicated
less than 306 grams U235 total spread over the five additional locations.
In a second removal operation, additional blocks were removed at four
locations adjacent to the primary area where greater than 15 grams U235 was
indicated. When combining all NDA estimates which make conservative
assumptions about the distribution of uranium-bearing material in the wall
matrix, up to 705 [grams] U235 may have been distributed in this area. If
the mass were concentrated in one location, it would still be less than the
maximum subcritical mass [...] given in ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983."
Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC
operations officer notified the R3DO (Tom Kozak) and NMSS EO (John Hickey).
(Call the NRC operations officer for additional details.)
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 38576
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FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/16/2001
UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: PA NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:39[EST]
RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 EVENT DATE: 12/16/2001
NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN McCLINTOCK LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002
EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1
10 CFR SECTION:
AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
EVENT TEXT
BOTH HIGH FLOW INSTRUMENTATION FOR REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (RWCU)
FOUND
INOPERABLE.
During performance of routine surveillance testing on the PBAPS Unit 3 RWCU
system high flow isolation instrumentation, it was discovered that both
channels of isolation instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable. Both
affected instruments were returned to operable status by 1828 hours on
12/16/01.
The RWCU system is designed to automatically isolate upon detection of a
high flow condition. This isolation detection system utilizes two channels
of differential pressure instrumentation for high flow detection. An
isolation of the RWCU system can be accomplished by actuation of either
channel of the logic. A single channel trip would result in either an
inboard or outboard isolation. A failure of both channels would result in a
failure of the system to isolate as required.
On 12/16/01 at 1111 hours, surveillance testing of the "A" channel high flow
instrument (DPIS 3-12-124A) determined that this instrument failed to trip
due to entrapped air in the sensing line. DPIS 3-12-124A was vented,
retested, and returned to operable status at 1536 on 12/16/01.
At 1645 hours, surveillance testing of the "B" channel RWCU high flow
instrument (DPIS 3-12-124B) determined that this instrument failed to trip
due to entrapped air in the sensing line. DPIS 3-12-124B was vented,
retested, and returned to operable status at 1828 on 12/16/01.
At 1645 on 12/16/01, it was determined that both channels of Unit 3 RWCU
system high flow isolation instrumentation were simultaneously inoperable
since the system had been placed in service during refueling outage 3R13.
Unit 3 entered Mode 2 on 10/08/01 at 2221 hours, requiring the Primary
Containment Isolation (PCIS) function to be operable.
Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10 CFR
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).
The systems affected were the RWCU system isolation logic instruments, DPIS
3-12-124A and DPIS 3-12-124B. These instruments actuate on high system flow
of 125%. No plant effects or transient occurred as a result of this event.
The RWCU system isolation capability, on high system flow, was inoperable.
This isolation capability is required whenever the RWCU system is in service
with the reactor in Modes 1, 2, or 3.
DPISs 3-12-124A and 3-12-124B were filled, vented, tested satisfactorily,
and returned to operable status.
A station investigation to determine the cause of the air entrapment is in
progress.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1413 2/5/2002 FROM KOVALCHICK TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This notification is a retraction of Event Number (EN) 38576 which reported
a loss of safety function of thc RWCU primary containment isolation valves
due to entrapped air in the instrument sensing lines for the high flow
isolation for both isolation valves.
"On December 16, 2001, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system high flow
isolation instrumentation routine surveillance was performed. During the
routine surveillance, it was discovered that both high flow isolation
instruments tripped outside their Technical Specification Allowable Value
due to entrapped air in the system. resulting in both instruments being
declared inoperable.
"An engineering evaluation determined that the test failure was caused by
the testing methodology and concluded that both instruments were operable
and the safety function was not impacted. Specifically, the evaluation
determined that the entrapped air existed in the test lines only, which are
isolated during normal plant operations.
"Therefore, because the safety function of the RWCU automatic isolation on
high flow was maintained, this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).
"The NRC resident has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Doerflein).
Power Reactor Event Number: 38670
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FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002
UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:20[EST]
RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP EVENT DATE: 02/05/2002
NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUG GOMEZ LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002
EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1
10 CFR SECTION:
ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA
UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
EVENT TEXT
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF A MAIN CIRCULATING WATER PUMP
The licensee initiated a manual reactor trip per procedure due to the loss
of a main circulating water pump for an unknown reason. All plant systems
functioned properly and all rods fully inserted. The plant is stable in Hot
Standby with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and the
atmospheric reliefs removing excess heat. The licensee is investigating the
cause of the main circulating water pump trip.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local
authorities and the Public Service Commission.
General Information or Other Event Number: 38671
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REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2002
LICENSEE: RADIATION TECHNOLOGY INC. NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:45[EST]
CITY: ODESSA REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 01/14/2002
COUNTY: STATE: TX EVENT TIME: [CST]
LICENSE#: LO4633-000 AGREEMENT: Y LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002
DOCKET:
PERSON ORGANIZATION
JOHN PELLET R4
NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS (via fax)
HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY
EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR SECTION:
NAGR AGREEMENT STATE
EVENT TEXT
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE
The following is text of a TX licensee report regarding the event:
"In reviewing our quarterly dosimetry reports for the first three quarters
of 2001, we find that the employee identified on the attachment has exceeded
the annual TEDE for occupational]y exposed workers. The fourth quarter
report will not be available from our TLD supplier until sometime in
February.
"However, in compliance with TRCR 289.202(yy)(1)(B)(i) we are reporting this
overexposure as soon as known.
"In discussing this overexposure with the individual, he indicated it was
due to the quantity of work performed. No procedures or license conditions
were violated. Upon receipt of our fourth quarter report, we will advise you
of any addition exposure to this individual."
The Quarterly doses were
First Quarter - 574 mrem
Second Quarter - 1868 mrem
Third Quarter - 4847 mrem
The State of Texas is investigating the event.
General Information or Other Event Number: 38672
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REP ORG: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION NOTIFICATION DATE:
02/05/2002
LICENSEE: WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:26[EST]
CITY: PULLMAN REGION: 4 EVENT DATE: 01/31/2002
COUNTY: STATE: WA EVENT TIME: [PST]
LICENSE#: WN-C003-1 AGREEMENT: Y LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/05/2002
DOCKET:
PERSON ORGANIZATION
JOHN PELLET R4
NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY FRAZEE (email)
HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY
EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR SECTION:
NAGR AGREEMENT STATE
EVENT TEXT
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective
actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention) A sealed
source was discovered to be leaking and contamination was found on one
researcher and at several locations within the researcher's lab. The
contamination from a custom-made sodium-22 source was discovered during a
routine survey of the lab. The WSU Radiation Safety Office (RSO) continues
to oversee clean-up of the lab.
The WSU researcher was contaminated on the inside of a knuckle of one hand.
The WSU RSO staff estimated about 2 nCi of Na-22 in a 0.5 centimeter wide
spot on the contaminated finger. This was about 10,000 cpm when first
measured and immediately cleaned to 3000 cpm (0.04 mR/hr) by simple washing.
The researcher was taken to the Pullman Hospital for additional cleaning and
an X-ray of the finger to rule out the possibility of a metal sliver or
other removable contamination. RSO staff were at the hospital to oversee
activities.
Contamination was only found in the lab, including on a jacket and the
floor. No contamination was found outside the lab. Staff and others who
had access to the lab are being checked to see if any contamination was
carried out of the lab on shoes or clothing.
What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-221-265
(Special Reports...Leaking Sources)
Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 18 millicuries Na-22
Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body
part receiving dose; consequence) One individual was known to have some
contamination on a finger but the dose is unknown at this time.
Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number) The Na-22 source was
made by Brookhaven National Labs in December 2000. Model and serial number
unknown at present.
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