Event Notification Report for October 24, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/23/2001 - 10/24/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38414 38417 38418 38419 38420 38421
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38414 |
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| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/2001|
|LICENSEE: QTE GROUP, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
| CITY: GARLAND REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/29/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: 08:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: L05222 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS (via fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE |
| |
| The following is a portion of a fax received from the Texas Department of |
| Health: |
| |
| "On the morning of September 29, 2001, [a] QTE technician picked up Troxler |
| Gauge [Model 3440] SN:30229 from office to perform test on a project in |
| Garland at 8:30 a.m. On his way to project he realized that he forgot his |
| wallet and returned home to pick it up. After returning to his pickup (1998 |
| Chevy S-10 - Silver), he noticed that the lock was cut and the gauge had |
| been stolen (approximately 8:00 a.m.). Source numbers are (CS-137: |
| 750-4377) and (AM-241: 47-27208)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the City of Garland Police Department (Report Number |
| R028859) and the Texas Department of Health (Texas Incident Number I-7816). |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38417 |
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| REP ORG: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/2001|
|LICENSEE: CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:59[EDT]|
| CITY: COLORADO SPRINGS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/23/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: CO |EVENT TIME: [MDT]|
|LICENSE#: 48-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JACOBI by FAX | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| THE CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS REPORTED A MISSING Ni-63 RADIATION SOURCE
|
| |
| The wastewater treatment plant has gas chromatography equipment that uses |
| electron capture detectors containing 8-15 mCi Ni-63. For as long as anyone |
| now present can remember, the instruments in use there have been made by |
| Hewlett Packard. There have been 4 detectors made by Varian in a box in |
| storage on a shelf in a cabinet in the lab. Those detector cells did not |
| fit on the HP GCs. The lab manager discovered another laboratory that |
| wanted the detectors that were in storage. They solicited and received a |
| copy of that laboratories license to possess radioactive material (as well |
| as the license for CJ Bruyn, a detector maintenance facility). The 4 |
| detectors were sent to C.J. Bruyn of Bellingham Washington, who upon |
| receiving the detectors and opening the cases for cleaning reported that one |
| of them did not contain the radioactive source. |
| |
| An exhaustive search of the lab, concentrating on the cabinet area where the |
| sources were stored revealed no hint of the source. The emissions or Ni-63 |
| are of such energy that external readings with a survey instrument would |
| never indicate the presence of such a source. Areas of the laboratory have |
| been wipe tested for contamination from the time that sources have been in |
| use there, and no lost source has been so revealed. |
| |
| The source housings for the Varian sources have not been opened at the |
| Laboratory, to the best of anyone's knowledge. In the past, the HP sources |
| were opened for cleaning and maintenance, but never the Varian sources. No |
| one now at the lab can remember using Varian GCs and so cannot remember that |
| one of those detectors did not work (possibly indicating a missing source). |
| |
| The only scenarios that make any sense is that either |
| 1. The detector cell was received without the radioactive source from the |
| original vendor or a facility that cleaned it. |
| 2. The source inadvertently fell out of the detector cell when it was opened |
| at CJ Bruyn and was not detected. The individual involved at CJ Bruyn denies |
| this possibility. |
| |
| Ni-63 is a beta emitter with 67 keV electron energy and approximately 100y |
| half-life. The range of the emissions in air is ~10 inches, if the source |
| was in contact with an individuals skin the electrons would penetrate |
| ~0.35mm. A significant radiological hazard is hard to imagine unless the |
| source was ingested, inhaled, or held against the skin for a protracted |
| period. It has been discussed with the department that ingesting Ni-63 is |
| not even a hazard of significance. Nickel is not absorbed by the body and |
| the beta particles are absorbed by the fecal matter. |
| |
| Modifying the procedures to avoid a future occurrence of a similar instance |
| is not indicated due to the extremely unlikely probability. We no longer |
| have EC detectors that are in long-term storage and use the ones that we |
| have on a regular rotation, so we will know if the source is not present. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38418 |
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| FACILITY: FARLEY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:54[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/23/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HAWKINS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| THE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION NETWORK WAS INOPERABLE |
| |
| The licensee reported that their Emergency Notification Network(ENN) was |
| declared inoperable due to an on site switching problem. Three channel |
| banks went down and did not automatically transfer to backup source. The |
| problem has been identified and was restored(test satisfactory) at 1324 CDT. |
| The problem with the automatic transfer is still being investigated. The |
| licensee uses the Southern Line System as a backup for the ENN. |
| |
| The NRC Resident inspector was notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38419 |
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| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/2001|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:57[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/23/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:02[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CAMPBELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |GENE IMBRO NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|RICHARD WESSMAN IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
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EVENT TEXT
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| REACTOR SCRAMMED FROM 100% POWER DUE TO TURBINE VALVE FAST CLOSURE
SIGNAL |
| |
| Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a Main Generator Lockout resulted in |
| a Reactor SCRAM from a Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Signal. Reactor |
| Pressure peaked at 1125 psig causing 5 Safety Relief Valves to open, and an |
| automatic ARI (Alternate Rod Insertion) initiation on high reactor pressure. |
| The SCRAM transient also caused an expected reactor low level condition of |
| minus seven inches (-7 inches) resulting in PCIS (Primary Containment |
| Isolation System) Group II and III Isolations and SBGTS (Standby Gas |
| Treatment System) initiation. All plant systems operated as expected with |
| all rods being fully inserted and all relief valves fully reseating. |
| |
| The Unit 2 Reactor is shutdown, and cause of the Generator Lockout is being |
| investigated. Reactor level is 23 inches, and a controlled reactor cool |
| down is in progress. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38420 |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 10/23/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:12[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STOCKHAM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
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| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 98 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
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EVENT TEXT
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| THE PLANT HAD A REACTOR SCRAM FROM 98% POWER DUE TO A GROUP 1
ISOLATION |
| |
| The group 1 MSIV isolation instrumentation was bumped in the plant causing |
| an inadvertent group 1 isolation which resulted in a reactor scram. Group 2 |
| and 3 isolations also occurred on low reactor level (+9") during the reactor |
| scram. The low-low set controlled reactor pressure while the MSIV's were |
| closed. The "H" SRV cycled approximately 6 times and fully reseated. All |
| rods fully inserted and no ECCS actuation occurred. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector, the state, and local agencies were notified. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38421 |
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| REP ORG: DRESSER-RAND |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2001|
|LICENSEE: GIMPEL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:05[EDT]|
| CITY: WELLSVILLE REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: NY |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
| |EDWARD MCALPINE R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GEORGE HERMANN |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING TERRY TURBINE TRIP & THROTTLE VALVE
SCREW |
| SPINDLE |
| |
| The following is from a facsimile report: |
| |
| DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT: |
| |
| Material substitution of grade 1212 Steel in place of grade 1018 carbon |
| steel specified by design. |
| |
| ENGINEERING EVALUATION & RECOMMENDATIONS: |
| |
| Following the failure of an installed Trip/Throttle valve screw spindle on |
| the Catawba unit #2 AFW Pump Turbine (Terry Turbine S/N 40096A or B) on May |
| 25, 2000, the material of the failed screw was analyzed and found to be |
| Grade 1212 steel. Gimpel gave verbal confirmation that the screw material |
| was incorrect (Grade 1213 and 1215 steel) at the Terry Turbine Users Group |
| meeting on July 18, 2001 Gimpel has traced the supplied material to a single |
| lot of approximately 50 original screw spindles manufactured in 1974, and |
| has identified the originally affected Trip & Throttle valve serial numbers |
| as 74-12201-01 to 74-12244-02, 78-13136-01, 78-13215-01, and 78-13091-01. |
| Written confirmation of this defect and a listing of affected valves was |
| received by Dresser-Rand 10/11/01. |
| |
| Following this incident, additional information was received indicating that |
| a screw spindle installed in Palo Verde Unit 1 was found cracked In 1992, |
| and was determined to be grade 1213 steel. |
| |
| Dresser-Rand tested the material of a functional screw spindle removed from |
| an in-house test valve (Gimpel serial number 74-12243) and determined the |
| material was grade 1212. |
| |
| It is unknown whether the material substitution was a contributing factor in |
| the failures of the screw spindles at these sites. The trip valves in |
| question have been in operation for many years, and although the material |
| used is less desirable in this application than the design specified |
| material, the limited number of failures indicates that the immediate risk |
| of continued operation is minimal. It is acknowledged however, that a |
| substantial safety hazard may exist due to this defect in that failure of |
| this component can result in steam isolation preventing the emergency |
| feedwater turbine from performing its safety-related function. |
| |
| Recommendations: |
| 1) Units using Gimpel T&T valves in the serial number series listed above |
| which may have the original Screw spindle installed should replace their |
| screw spindles at the next maintenance opportunity. The original spindles |
| should be destroyed. |
| 2) It is additionally recommended that any Gimpel screw spindles in-stock or |
| in-service which may have been manufactured in the 1974-75 timeframe be |
| treated as suspect and be tested to confirm that the material is correct |
| (Grade 1018 carbon steel). |
| |
| A written Final Report will be submitted no later than 11/21/01. |
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