Event Notification Report for September 28, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/27/2001 - 09/28/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38259 38316 38321 38322 38323 38324 38325
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38259 |
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| FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/01/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/31/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES ABRAHAM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 1-HOUR SECURITY REPORT INVOLVED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION |
| |
| Safeguards system degradation related to detection of area boundary. |
| Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee will |
| inform the NRC resident inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations |
| Center for additional details. |
| |
| ***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN WARNER TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1419 ON 09/27/01 |
| ***** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is |
| a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This condition was promptly compensated for upon discovery. Harris Nuclear |
| Plant performed a 1-hour notification due to this condition. Site personnel |
| have determined that this issue is not reportable in accordance with NRC |
| Generic Letter 91-03. As specified in Generic Letter 91-03, if these events |
| are properly compensated upon discovery in accordance with Regulatory Guide |
| 5.62 and NUREG-1304, they need only be logged. Therefore, Harris Nuclear |
| Plant is retracting EN #38259 due to promptly compensating the condition in |
| accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62 and NUREG-1304." |
| |
| (Contact the NRC operations officer for additional information.) |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the Region 2 Incident Response Center (Jay Henson) and IAT |
| (Roberta Warren). |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38316 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RITCHIE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a |
| block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA |
| 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of |
| NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE |
| 0705_076.E03." |
| |
| "Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of |
| material, which may affect this report." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is |
| potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing |
| material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown. |
| Measurements to quantify the material are in progress. The apparent block |
| wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the |
| other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of |
| unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the |
| exterior building wall." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing |
| material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has |
| collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry |
| configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium |
| concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then |
| a potentially critical configuration could result. Note that no spills or |
| leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at |
| this time. The material in question has apparently been there for some |
| time." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical |
| integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of |
| material. An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment |
| of the material. Double contingency also relies upon administrative |
| controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume |
| containers that could collect a spill or leak." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): Unknown at this time. Enrichment |
| could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations. The form is |
| most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2. Measurements for determination of mass |
| and assay are currently in progress." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of |
| NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of |
| NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping. This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken |
| to determine amounts of material and assay." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| notified. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16 indicates a total |
| maximum mass of 225+/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of 8.2% is present |
| (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative values), which is less |
| than the safe mass limit for uranium. Investigations to determine the |
| extent of condition have identified three additional areas of potential |
| concern in X-705 Recovery. These areas are: the wall near the A-loop |
| overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the wall near |
| the top of the B-38 storage columns. Each of these areas has received |
| preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for uranium |
| material holdup in the block walls. Preliminary results indicate that the |
| amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow and near |
| the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6. More |
| detailed quantificative NDA scans for these two locations (to differentiate |
| between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background) are currently |
| in progress and will be reported when available. Preliminary results |
| indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38 storage |
| column (near background readings). Additional NDA scans are currently in |
| progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the Recovery |
| Area. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is |
| now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the |
| openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is |
| less than the safe mass limit for uranium." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan). |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38321 |
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| REP ORG: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2001|
|LICENSEE: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:27[EDT]|
| CITY: PHILADELPHIA REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 08/29/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 37-00118-07 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROB FORREST | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| MISSING 21 MICROCURIE COBALT-60 TESTING SOURCE. |
| |
| |
| On 08/29/01 it was discovered at the University of Pennsylvania Physics |
| Department that a 21 microcurie cobalt-60 source was missing. An extensive |
| survey and search of the Physics Department building was performed and the |
| source was not found. All persons who had access to the source were |
| questioned. The Radiation Safety Officer for the University of |
| Pennsylvania notified NRC Region 1 office of this event. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38322 |
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| REP ORG: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2001|
|LICENSEE: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:58[EDT]|
| CITY: MADISON REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 09/09/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: WI |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 48-09843-18 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON BRESELL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| MISSING AM-241 SOURCES |
| |
| During renovation work in a laboratory, a contractor moved a workbench upon |
| which five americium-241 anti-static sources were being stored. The sources |
| were individually contained in tubes, which apparently broke open upon |
| striking the laboratory floor. Two of the five sources were recovered, but |
| since the sources are extremely small (approximately 1 mm x 3 mm) and the |
| contractor and custodial staff were unaware of their presence, the licensee |
| believes that the three other sources were discarded in a sanitary landfill. |
| The licensee estimates the activity of each source to be between 0.4 and 4 |
| microCuries, and does not believe that these sources present a health risk |
| to the general population. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38323 |
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| REP ORG: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2001|
|LICENSEE: LONGVIEW INSPECTION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:58[EDT]|
| CITY: PASCAGOULA REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 09/27/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: MS |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: MS784-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JAY HENSON/REGION 2 IRC |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: B. J. SMITH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING AN OVEREXPOSURE DURING A RADIOGRAPHY EVENT |
| |
| On an unknown date, a Longview Inspection employee received an exposure of |
| 4,500 mrem during a radiography event in Pascagoula, Mississippi. As a |
| result, the individual's annual exposure increased to 5,270 mrem, which |
| exceeded the annual limit of 5,000 mrem. The second radiographer at the |
| scene of the event received approximately 300 mrem. |
| |
| An inspection is planned for next week. |
| |
| The Mississippi State Health Department notified the NRC Region 2 Office |
| (Dick Woodruff). |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38324 |
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| FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:39[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/27/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:34[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCOTT FRUIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO A LEAK IN A COMMON SAFETY |
| INJECTION SUCTION HEADER |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Unit 1 is required to shut down due to entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both |
| trains of SI (safety injection) pumps being inoperable (Tech Spec 3.5.2). |
| The cause of both Unit 1 SI pump inoperability is due to a leak in the |
| common suction header at a vent line on the common header." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38325 |
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| REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2001|
|LICENSEE: GEOTECHNICAL SERVICES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:47[EDT]|
| CITY: LONG BEACH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/27/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 08:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: RAML #6290-30 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG PICK R4 |
| |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT GREGER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING A STOLEN NITON GAUGE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the California |
| Radiologic Health Branch, Department of Health Services: |
| |
| "This is 24-hour report [in accordance with] 10CFR20.2201(a)(1)(i) from |
| State of California Radiologic Health Branch." |
| |
| "This is to report that an x-ray fluorescence device has been stolen. [The] |
| company is Geotechnical Services [in] Tustin, CA." |
| |
| "[The] device is a Niton S/N U2387NR1222. The operator's car was broken |
| into some time between 7PM (9-26) and 8AM (9-27) in Long Beach. [A] police |
| report [is] being filed, and [the] facility will run an add describing the |
| device and offering a reward for its return." |
| |
| "These devices typically contain up to 50 mCi of Cd-109." |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for state and licensee contact |
| information.) |
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