Event Notification Report for August 14, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/13/2001 - 08/14/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38130  38203  38204  38205  38206  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38130       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:50[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID BARNETT                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)  DEGRADED CONDITION     |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)   POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE - TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee found a shipping restraint installed on a drywell-to-torus vent |
| pipe bellows, apparently in place since construction (about 30 years).  This |
| device was discovered due to another licensee with similar containment       |
| configuration notifying Monticello of their discovery.  This device would    |
| partially impede axial motion.  The primary containment was declared         |
| inoperable at 1650 CDT on 07/11/01, and removal was initiated.  This is an   |
| 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(a) as a degraded condition and      |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c and d), control of radiation release and accident      |
| mitigation.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee initiated a required shutdown at 2050 CDT on 07/11/01 per       |
| Technical Specification 3.7.A.2.a, as a result of declaring primary          |
| containment inoperable because the drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows        |
| shipping installation attachments were still installed.  This is a 4-hour    |
| report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), technical specification required           |
| shutdown.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and intends to notify state |
| and local agencies.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM DAVE BARNETT RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE AT 0039 EDT ON      |
| 07/12/01 *****                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The four shipping fasteners have been removed from each of the eight         |
| drywell-to-torus vent pipe bellows, and primary containment was declared     |
| operable at 2304 CDT on 07/11/01.  The technical specification required      |
| shutdown was terminated while the reactor was at 90% power.  The licensee    |
| currently plans to restore reactor power to 100%.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector as well as the       |
| applicable state and county agencies.  The NRC operations officer notified   |
| the R3DO (Hills).                                                            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| **** RETRACTION ON 08/13/01 AT 1253ET BY D. BARNETT TAKEN BY MACKINNON ****  |
|                                                                              |
| Subsequent evaluation has shown the bellows as well as the drywell and torus |
| attachments capable of performing their design safety functions.  Therefore, |
| Primary Containment was considered operable at all times and this event is   |
| not considered reportable.  The licensee will notify state and local         |
| officials of this retraction. R3DO (T. Kozak) notified.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38203       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:04[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        08/13/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BREEN                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION   |
|                                                                              |
| An immature green sea turtle was rescued from the plant's intake canal.  The |
| turtle is alive but in need of rehabilitation.  As required by the plant's   |
| sea turtle permit, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection        |
| (Florida Fish and Wildlife) was notified of this event.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38204       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  SCIENTECH, INC.                      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2001|
|LICENSEE:  NUS INSTRUMENTS, INC.                |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:14[EDT]|
|    CITY:  GAITHERSBURG             REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        08/07/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MD |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |RONALD BELLAMY       R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE, FAX      NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARTIN BOOSKA                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL DEFECT                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| SCIENTECH, Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) has determined     |
| that a Basic Component, supplied to Rochester Gas and Electric Ginna Station |
| Nuclear Plant under RG&E purchase order 5000002014, contains a potential     |
| defect that is reportable under 10CFR21.  NUSI determined that the potential |
| defect was reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 on August 07, 2001.    |
| SCIENTECH, Inc. President was informed August 13, 2001.  RG&E is aware of    |
| this problem and the affected component is being modified to restore this    |
| item to an acceptable status by August 17.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| A formal written report will be provided within 30 days of this              |
| notification.  The component, delta T Time Domain Module, M/N:               |
| TMD500-08/08/08/08-08-08-1/2, P/N: MBA-E063PA-1, Rev. 0 (1ea.), S/N:9800771, |
| was originally manufactured as P/N: MBA-E062PA-1 (voltage output) by NUSI.   |
| NUSI performed a conversion of this item to P/N: MBA-E063PA-1 (current       |
| output) resulting in a defect.  A total of six items were converted under    |
| this purchase order for use in Safety Related Systems.  NUSI has opened a    |
| 10CFR21 file concerning this component and has numbered it as 21-01-01.      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38205       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:40[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/13/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:15[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |THOMAS KOZAK         R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM McCLEERY                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF ONE CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE                      |
|                                                                              |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1415 8/13/01 loose plastic wrap was discovered on a storage shelf in an   |
| inadvertent container area and was not configured or secured such that it    |
| cannot be deformed into an inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation |
| potential.  This is a violation of control # 5 of NCSA705_076.A03, "Use Of   |
| Inadvertent Containers".  A pump located on a lower shelf apparently had a   |
| pump flange cover dislodged, uncovering a potential inadvertent container.   |
| This is a violation of control # 3 of the same NCSA.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The PSS entered an anomalous condition.  The plastic wrap and pump were      |
| removed from the inadvertent Container area.  The PSS exited the anomalous   |
| condition.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS: LOW                                       |
|                                                                              |
| There was no leak of uranium bearing material in the vicinity of the plastic |
| or the uncovered pump.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO OF HOW CRITICALITY   |
| COULD OCCUR):                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required:  The     |
| microfiltration system would have to be processing uranium bearing liquid    |
| with an unknown or high concentration of uranium.  Then a leak in this       |
| system must occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid sprays from the       |
| system onto the plastic wrap or uncovered pump.  The plastic would then have |
| to deform or the pump would have to fill such that 2.5 liters collects to a  |
| depth of greater than 1.5 inches.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
| volume, geometry                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Inadvertent containers are controlled based upon volume (2.5 liter) or       |
| geometry (1.5" or 4" diameter). Flexible material is specifically controlled |
| such that solution cannot pool to a depth greater than 1.5 inches.           |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| No uranium material was involved in this event.                              |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Loose plastic wrap was not configured or secured to prevent deformation into |
| an inadvertent container.  The pump flange cover was dislodged.  The pump    |
| was located on a lower shelf in the same area.  This is a violation as       |
| control # 5 and # 3 respectively of NCSA-705_076.A.03.                       |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| The plastic wrap and pump were removed from the inadvertent container area.  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event report by the          |
| certificate holder.                                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38206       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:31[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        08/13/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:53[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  V. FALLACARA                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |RONALD BELLAMY       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNEXPECTED REACTOR SCRAM DURING LOGIC SYSTEM TESTING OF EMERGENCY BUS A5.    |
|                                                                              |
| Pilgrim Unit 1 scrammed from 100% during performance of Logic System Testing |
| of Emergency Bus A5.  This is the first time that  the Logic System Testing  |
| of Emergency Bus A5 had been performed at power. The test is performed once  |
| every 24 months and had just been rewritten to be performed at power.  The   |
| cause of the scram is under investigation at this time but the initiating    |
| transient was the loss of Emergency Bus A5.  All rods fully inserted into    |
| the core.   The plant is at 700 lbs. and a controlled depressurization is in |
| progress.  Plans are to cooldown to less than or equal to 150 lbs. and       |
| repair the outboard RCIC steam isoaltion valve.                              |
|                                                                              |
| Due to deenergization of Emergency Bus A5 Recirculation Pump A tripped and   |
| there was a fast transfer of the swing bus (this was expected).  The         |
| licensee is looking into the transfer of the swing bus causing the trip of   |
| Recirculation Pump B.  Loss of both operating Recirculation Pumps at power   |
| will cause a reactor scram.    All systems operated properly.  The           |
| electrical grid is stable and all Emergency Core Cooling systems are fully   |
| operable if needed.  The Recirculation pumps will be restarted when the      |
| differential temperature between the top and bottom head are within          |
| specification.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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