Event Notification Report for August 8, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/07/2001 - 08/08/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38161 38188 38189
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38161 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/23/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:27[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/23/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:55[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/07/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 1255, on 7-23-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| checks required to meet the requirements of NCSA CAS-011 were not performed |
| during replacement of the C-337 Unit 5 Cell 10 RCW [recirculating cooling |
| water] spool piece. NCSA CAS-011 requires a line clarity check on the peak |
| reading pressure gauges prior to connecting the spool piece. This check was |
| not performed. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure the RCW pressure |
| in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 PSIA. |
| |
| "The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| "While a control was violated, insufficient time existed for moisture from |
| the RCW system to enter the process gas system. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the following conditions must |
| exist. With the condenser RCW supply and return valves closed, the supply or |
| return valve must be leaking to allow the condenser pressure to exceed the |
| minimum coolant pressure of 35.5 PSIA. The process gas equipment must |
| contain a UO2F2 deposit greater than a critical mass. The condenser must |
| have a leak of sufficient rate and duration to allow enough water to |
| overcome the down corner allowing liquid water to enter the cooler. The |
| cooler must also have a simultaneous leak which would allow wet coolant to |
| leak into the process gas side of the equipment at a location which would |
| allow a moderation of the deposit. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| "Two controls on moderation. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| "No known deposits of concern at this time.. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on moderation. |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing moderation of a |
| deposit by maintaining the RCW pressure in a condenser below 35.5 PSIA. |
| Pressure gauges are installed and checked for clarity whenever the RCW |
| return valve is closed on a cell without a fluorinating environment. Since |
| clarity of the pressure reading instrument was not verified, the |
| functionality of the pressure reading instrument cannot be assured, |
| violating the control. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based upon independent verification |
| that the RCW pressure gauges are reading correctly. Since clarity of the |
| pressure reading instrument was not independently verified, this control was |
| violated. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED: |
| "Upon discovery of the failure to perform the requirement, the coolant |
| system was sampled for moisture and verified to be dry." |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1623EDT ON 8/7/01 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| This report is retracted based on the following: |
| |
| "UPDATE 8-7-01: THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Additional information was |
| discovered which changes the initial evaluation of the violation. In |
| preparation for maintenance, the peak reading pressure gauges were |
| adequately installed on the condenser head and clarity verified prior to |
| isolating the condenser. Since the maintenance involved the RCW control |
| valve, it was not necessary to remove the pressure gauges. The normal course |
| of events would be to remove the pressure gauges after the condenser is |
| drained. However, in this case, the maintenance evolution was limited and |
| Cascade Operations decided to leave the pressure gauges installed on the |
| condenser head. If the pressure gauges had been removed while the RCW system |
| was drained the gauges would have been required to be reinstalled and |
| clarity verified prior to reestablishing system integrity. Once system |
| integrity is reestablished, the pressure gauges are used to ensure the RCW |
| pressure in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 psia. The clarity check |
| supports the double contingency principle by ensuring the common instrument |
| line to the gauges is not blocked. However, in this case, the gauges were |
| not removed and the instrument isolation valves were not manipulated. |
| Therefore, clarity was maintained. |
| |
| "After the maintenance had been performed, Operations realized the second |
| clarity check had not been performed. At this point, NCS was contacted and |
| direction was given to perform the remedial actions as if the pressure limit |
| were exceeded according to NCSA CAS-011. These actions included opening the |
| RCW return valve and sampling the coolant system for moisture, which was |
| found to be below the moisture limits, These actions were performed within |
| the NCSA CAS-011 required inspection frequency of 12 hours. |
| |
| "After the incident report was competed, it was discovered that the pressure |
| gauges had not been removed from the condenser head. Therefore, the |
| requirement for the reinstallation and clarity check of the pressure gauges |
| had already been performed. Since the requirement of NCSA CAS-011 to perform |
| a clarity check was met and the system conditions were clearly bounded by |
| the analysis of NCSA CAS-011, no violation occurred. |
| |
| "The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event." |
| |
| Notified R3DO(Stone) and NMSS(Brown). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38188 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/07/2001|
|LICENSEE: GME ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:53[EDT]|
| CITY: GREENVILLE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/03/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: SC |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 522 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/07/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KING | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA WAS NOTIFIED BY ONE OF THEIR LICENSEES OF A HIGH |
| FILM BADGE READING |
| |
| GME Engineering, which uses moisture density gauges, received a second |
| quarter film badge reading for one of its employees that measured 33.5 Rem. |
| The employee had been terminated in mid May for vandalizing company |
| property. It is believed that the employee intentionally exposed his badge |
| so that he would not have to work with a moisture density gauge any more. |
| The licensee has not been able to locate the individual. The State was |
| notified on 8/7/01. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38189 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/07/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:11[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 08/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN BLANCHE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/07/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CHARLES MARSCHALL R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOR REASONS UNKNOWN |
| |
| "At 2015, Grand Gulf Unit 1 had an automatic RPS actuation. This is a |
| 4-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). All systems performed |
| as expected, except that Feedwater/Condensate were not available due to |
| hotwell level problems. RCIC was manually started for level control. At |
| the time of the scram, a local generating station was experiencing |
| switchyard problems (Baxter Wilson Electric Station). Also at the time, |
| significant lightning strikes were noticed in the area. Scram initiation |
| event analysis is in progress." |
| |
| All rods fully inserted. The licensee is in the process of restoring the |
| condensate system. Offsite power is stable and available. All safety |
| equipment is available. The main condenser is available for decay heat |
| removal. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021