Event Notification Report for May 23, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/22/2001 - 05/23/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38011 38021 38022 38023
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38011 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/07/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:37[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/22/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE |
| |
| At 1640 CDT on 05/17/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that the independent verification required by procedure CP2-CU-CH2137 was |
| not performed. The maintenance segment was not independently verified to be |
| isolated. The same person signed for performance as well as the |
| verification of the segment isolation. NCSA 400.009 requires that fissile |
| operations that credit AQ-NCS function that is disabled due to maintenance |
| must be identified independently and disabled using a tagout prior to |
| disabling the feature and commencing maintenance. This is done to prevent |
| operation of a system while an AQ-NCS component function is disabled. Since |
| the independent verification was not performed, the process condition was |
| not maintained. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| While the NCS control was violated, the fissile operation containing the |
| component(s) undergoing maintenance was tagged out using LOTO both as a |
| standard maintenance practice in C-400 and due to other NCS requirements. |
| In addition, the equipment items removed had no AQ-NCS function which was |
| affected by the maintenance actions. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| In order for criticality to be possible, the components undergoing |
| maintenance must have an AQ-NCS function that is disabled, and the affected |
| operations must be subsequently performed with fissile solution. |
| Additionally, the maintenance activity must be one of the relatively few |
| maintenance activities that do not require tagout for another NCS reason, |
| such as to prevent fissile solution from leaking from the system. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing |
| independently verifying the prevention of the affected fissile operation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Maximum assay of 2.75 wt. % U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing operation of the |
| Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the AQ-NCS component. |
| The components were properly identified as non-AQ-NCS; therefore, this |
| control was not violated. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independently preventing |
| operation of the Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the |
| AQ-NCS component. The requirement to independently verify the AQ-NCS |
| function of all components affected by maintenance was not performed. The |
| control was violated, and the process condition was not maintained. |
| |
| Since the independent verification was not performed, the process condition |
| was not maintained. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| This condition was identified while reviewing completed maintenance work |
| packages. There is no action that can be performed to resolve this |
| condition and bring the process back into compliance since the maintenance |
| activity has been completed. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified, and the DOE Representative will be |
| informed. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/22/01 @ 1235 BY HUDSON TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| As a result of this NCS violation, a review of work packages was initiated |
| to determine if other instances exist where the required second signature |
| was not obtained. On 05/21/01 at 1520 CDT, the PSS was notified that |
| another incident involving the violation of this requirement was discovered |
| pertaining to maintenance on the RF (radio frequency) furnace. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. The Reg 3 RDO (Burgess) and the NMSS EO (Cool) were informed by |
| the NRC Operations Officer. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38021 |
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| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/22/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:42[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/22/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: E BOGGS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/22/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |FRANK COSTELLO R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP. ALL SYSTEMS OPERATED AS EXPECTED. |
| |
| This notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 1 has experienced |
| an automatic reactor trip. All rods fully inserted into the core. The |
| reactor trip was caused by a main turbine trip. The cause of the main |
| turbine trip is under investigation. Post trip, main feedwater to steam |
| generators was isolated due to the feedwater air lock, which is expected on |
| a reactor trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started on low |
| steam generator water levels, and this was also expected on a reactor trip. |
| Auxiliary feedwater pumps "21," "22," and "23" all automatically started and |
| fed the steam generators. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, "23," |
| has been shut down by procedure since the "21" and "22" motor-driven |
| auxiliary feedwater pumps were maintaining adequate feedwater flow. Main |
| feedwater restoration is in progress. |
| |
| Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Reactor coolant |
| temperature is currently 547 degrees F, and plant pressure is 2235 psi. All |
| emergency core cooling systems and all engineered safety feature systems are |
| available. There are no shutdown technical specification limiting |
| conditions for operation (LCO) in effect. There is one non-shutdown |
| technical specification LCO in effect due to the power distribution |
| monitoring system being inoperable. The system is functional, but post |
| isolation testing will not be completed for some time. The only major |
| secondary equipment unavailable is number one station air compressor, which |
| is out of service for oil filter replacement. It is expected to be restored |
| to service today. The emergency diesel generators are fully operable if |
| needed, and the electrical grid is stable. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township of this |
| event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the |
| licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38022 |
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| FACILITY: PALISADES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/22/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:24[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/22/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MALONE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/22/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN DAVIDSON IAT |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |ROBERT SKELTON IAT |
| |JOSEPH HOLONICH IRO |
| |BRUCE BOGER NRR |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| SUSPECTED ARSON |
| |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
| |
| (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.) |
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|Research Reactor |Event Number: 38023 |
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| FACILITY: OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/22/2001|
| RXTYPE: 1000 KW TRIGA MARK II |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:17[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 05/22/2001|
| |EVENT TIME: 16:35[PDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/22/2001|
| CITY: CORVALLIS REGION: 4 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: BENTON STATE: OR |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-106 AGREEMENT: Y |MARK SHAFFER R4 |
| DOCKET: 05000243 |AL ADAMS NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BINNEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOST/UNACCOUNTED FOR KEYS |
| |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE PUT INTO PLACE BUT WERE INADVERTENTLY REMOVED FOR |
| A |
| 1-HOUR PERIOD. |
| |
| (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.) |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021