Event Notification Report for May 22, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/21/2001 - 05/22/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37947 38017 38018 38019 38020
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37947 |
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| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/26/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:26[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/26/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDREW OHRABLO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/21/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BILL JONES R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS) INOPERABLE |
| |
| The licensee entered a 7 day LCO when high vibrations were noticed on the |
| booster fan. The fan was declared inoperable and led to CREFS being |
| declared inoperable since it is a single train system. Licensee intends to |
| repair the system prior to expiration of the LCO. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 05/21/01 AT 1140 ET BY D. VANDERKAMP TAKEN BY MACKINNON |
| * * * |
| |
| A subsequent engineering evaluation of the fan motor bearings concluded that |
| the motor, even though noisy with elevated vibration levels, was capable of |
| performing it's support role in the Control Room Emergency Filtration System |
| safety related function as required per Technical Specifications. |
| Therefore, this event is being retracted. |
| R4DO (Mark Shaffer) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the |
| licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38017 |
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| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:26[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:50[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BAHNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/21/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK SHAFFER R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*COM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FAILURE OF THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SIRENS |
| |
| The operating system for the early warning system sirens failed. This will |
| prevent activation of the early warning sirens. The sirens failed at 0150 |
| on 5/21/01. The failure is currently being investigated. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/21/01 @ 1246 BY BAHNER TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The system was restored at 0940. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| The Reg 4 RDO(Shaffer) was notified |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38018 |
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| REP ORG: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001|
|LICENSEE: STUDSVICK PROCESSING FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:30[EDT]|
| CITY: ERWIN REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 05/18/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: R-86011 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/21/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LEONARD WERT R2 |
| |JOHN HIICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FREEMAN/SHULTS(by fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| This licensee is authorized for the receipt, possession, processing, |
| storage, handling and shipment of radioactive waste resins. During routine |
| operations at the facility, a spill of approximately four cubic feet |
| occurred from one of the process vessels. The vessel was shut down and the |
| facility evacuated. It is estimated that 29 millicuries of activation and |
| mixed fission products were released during the spill. The material was |
| released into a controlled area. There were no environmental releases. |
| Negative pressure was maintained during the event. The HVAC system was shut |
| down after the release as was the thermal system to the process vessel. |
| During the investigation, five individuals were slightly contaminated as |
| confirmed by nasal swipes. Invivo counting of these individuals will be |
| conducted on Wednesday, May 23 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. |
| Temperatures in the area have now decreased enough for personnel to enter |
| and make a physical evaluation. Video cameras recorded the event and it is |
| believed at this time that the vessel was overpressurized. A complete |
| investigation and root cause analysis will be performed by the licensee to |
| determine the cause of the event. |
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|Research Reactor |Event Number: 38019 |
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| FACILITY: UNIV OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001|
| RXTYPE: 10000 KW TANK |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:43[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001|
| |EVENT TIME: 15:05[CDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/21/2001|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: BOONE STATE: MO |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-103 AGREEMENT: N |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 05000186 |JOHN ZWOLINSKI NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+RICHARD WESSMAN IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HOBBS |ROBERTA WARREN IAT |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD |RICHARD ROSANO IAT |
+------------------------------------------------+MARVIN MENDONCA NRR |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| BOMB THREAT. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY |
| |
| CONTACT HOO FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/21/01 @ 2005 BY HOBBS TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The NOUE was terminated at 2000EDT based on a completed search which turned |
| up no abnormalities. |
| |
| |
| Notified Reg 3 RDO(Burgess), NRR EO(Zwolinski) and FEMA(Canupp) |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38020 |
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| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:04[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001|
| COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 07:59[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/21/2001|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |LEONARD WERT R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001151 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEWMYER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FAILURE OF PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER(PLC) CAUSED LOSS OF ACTIVE |
| ENGINEERED CONTROLS ON CONVERSION LINE 4 |
| |
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN |
| |
| At approximately 0759 the decanter tripped off line on conversion line 4. |
| Subsequently line 4 was shutdown at 0805. An error in the display program |
| was initially suspected. |
| |
| With conversion line 4 shut down, instrument technicians were called. The |
| technicians attempted to correct the problem with the display program to no |
| avail. An instrumentation and controls (I/C) engineer was called and |
| tracked the problem to the line 4 PLC. Since it was determined that the PLC |
| processor for line 4 had faulted, the processor was reset and tested. The |
| test was satisfactory. |
| |
| Line 4 was restarted at approximately 1000. At approximately 1030 line 4 |
| was shut down due to a plugged duplex valve at the inlet of the calciner. |
| During this shutdown, a process engineer was informed about the earlier |
| events. The process engineer became concerned about the status of the |
| safety significant controls on line 4 and contacted a nuclear criticality |
| safety (NCS) engineer at approximately 1130. The NCS engineer was present |
| in the control room at approximately 1140. |
| |
| A time-line of events was reconstructed. The NCS engineer reviewed the |
| sequence of events with the I/C engineer. It was determined that an output |
| fault in an I/O card caused the processor to go into fault mode but all |
| outputs did not go to their correct (OFF) state. |
| |
| The NCS engineer determined that in the time period from 0759 until line 4 |
| was secured at approximately 0805, the active engineered safety significant |
| controls (SSCs) on line 4 were unavailable, and less than double contingency |
| protection existed in the vaporization system during that time period. The |
| SSCs are considered to have been in place for the 1000 startup and remained |
| in place until the shutdown at 1030, although the cause of the initial |
| failure had not been determined. Conversion operators on line 4 were |
| instructed by the NCS engineer to not restart line 4 until the cause of the |
| PLC failure was determined and corrected. Line 4 remains shutdown pending |
| further investigation. |
| |
| Justification for Continuing Operations on Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5: |
| |
| Line 4 utilizes a unique Numalogic PLC system while Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5 |
| utilize a different programmable logic system. There is no reason to |
| believe the Numalogic error is possible on the other lines. The |
| manufacturer of the other programmable logic system (utilized on Lines 1,2,3 |
| and 5) was contacted and stated that their cards cannot fail into any state |
| other than all OFF. Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5 remain in operation. |
| |
| Double Contingency Protection |
| |
| Double contingency protection for the vaporizer is based upon control of |
| mass (prevent/detect a UF6 leak) and geometry (prevent/detect accumulation |
| of moderator in a non-favorable configuration in the bottom of the |
| vaporizer). Double contingency protection on the cylinder (in vaporizer) is |
| based upon moderation control (prevent back-flow of moderator from the |
| hydrolysis column into the cylinder). It was determined that less than |
| double contingency protection remain for these systems and greater than a |
| safe mass was involved. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License |
| (SNM-1107), paragraph 37.3 (c.5), this event meets the criteria for a 24 |
| hour notification because it constitutes a "nuclear criticality safety |
| incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented |
| double contingency protection remains . . and: greater than a safe mass is |
| involved, but a sufficient number of the controls that were lost are |
| restored within four (4) hours such that double contingency protection is |
| restored." |
| |
| As Found Condition |
| |
| See "Reason for Notification" above. |
| |
| Summary of Activity |
| |
| An unknown PLC failure led to the shutdown of conversion line 4. It was |
| determined that less than double contingency protection existed on the line |
| 4 from 0759 to 0805. Therefore, the NCS engineer directed that line 4 could |
| not be restarted until the cause of the failure was determined and |
| corrected. |
| |
| Conclusions |
| |
| Loss of double contingency protection occurred. |
| At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or |
| member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. |
| This notification is the result of equipment failure, not a deficient NCS |
| analysis. |
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