Event Notification Report for May 15, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/14/2001 - 05/15/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37748 37839 37937 37971 37987 37988
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37748 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/14/2001|
|LICENSEE: DRASH CONSULTING ENGINEERS, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:33[EST]|
| CITY: HARLINGEN REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 01/01/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: TX L04724 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG PICK R4 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF STOLEN HUMBOLDT GAUGE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas |
| Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control: |
| |
| "On Monday January 1, 2001, a moisture/density gauge was stolen from the |
| back of a pickup truck that was parked at an apartment complex in Harlingen, |
| Texas. The technician who had used the gauge went to his apartment from |
| 10:00 am to 1:00 p.m. after completing work at one job site. When the |
| technician was getting into his truck, he noticed the lid on the gauge |
| transport case was cracked open and the gauge was missing. |
| |
| "The stolen gauge is a Humboldt Model 5001-C, serial number 1467. The gauge |
| contained two sources: |
| 10 millicuries of Cs-137, source serial No. 692GH, and 40 millicuries of |
| Am-241:Be, source serial No. |
| NJO1429. |
| |
| "The Licensee notified the Harlingen Police Department, this Agency, and the |
| manufacturer. The Licensee placed an ad in a local newspaper offering a $500 |
| reward for the return of the gauge." |
| |
| Call the NRC operations officer for contact information. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1606 EDT ON 05/14/01 FROM HELEN WATKINS TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas |
| Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control: |
| |
| "This is a followup report. The gauge was found and returned to the |
| licensee." |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a letter provided to the Texas Department |
| of Health by the licensee on 03/12/01: |
| |
| "[...] This gauge has been recovered. [...] The gauge was in good working |
| order, and had not visibly been abused. The lock that keeps the source rod |
| from being exposed was intact, and no visible signs of removal were visible. |
| Upon transporting [the] gauge back to the laboratory[, ... ] a leak test |
| [was performed,] and [the gauge was] sent [...] to SUNTRAC Services for |
| [analysis. ... Less] than 0.0001 �Ci were found on Alpha, Beta, and Gamma |
| rays. [...]" |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R4 DO (Spitzberg) and NMSS EO |
| (Reamer). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37839 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/14/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:02[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT R. BOESCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*INV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED AN UNEXPECTED LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING DUE TO TRIPPING OF |
| VARIOUS POWER SUPPLY BREAKERS |
| |
| "Unit 2 was in Mode 5 on the fifth day of its 10th Refuel and Inspection |
| Outage. At 1508 hours, the unit experienced an unexpected loss of Division 1 |
| RPS Power supply. The loss of power was a result of the Electrical |
| Protection Assembly (EPA) A & C breakers and motor generator output breaker |
| tripping. The cause is under investigation. |
| |
| "The loss of power caused the RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valve HV251F009 |
| to close. This is a common suction valve to both divisions of RHR and |
| resulted in the complete loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. The reactor currently |
| has its head removed with the reactor cavity flooded up with the gates to |
| the spent fuel pool removed. A Supplemental Decay Heat Removal system was in |
| service at the time, but was not considered fully capable of decay heat |
| removal. Reactor coolant temperature increased less than 2 degrees during |
| the 37 minutes SDC was out of service. The RPS power supply was switched to |
| its alternate supply and SDC was restored at 1545 hours. In accordance with |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) this represents a loss of a safety system which removes |
| residual heat and requires an 8 hour ENS call. In addition to the isolation |
| of RHR SDC, RWCU isolated due to containment valve HV244F001 closing, and |
| Unit 2 HVAC Zone 3 (refuel floor) isolated. These isolations constitute an |
| actuation of a Containment Isolation signal that affected multiple systems, |
| and is reportable per |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)." |
| |
| Peak temperature after losing SDC was 105 degrees. The licensee informed the |
| NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1542 ON 05/15/01 FROM GORGON E. ROBINSON TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE ***** |
| |
| The licensee is updating this event notification to change the event |
| reporting requirements from an 8-hour event notification to a 60-day |
| notification of invalid system actuations. The following text is a portion |
| of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "ENS Notification # 37839 documented that the loss of the Unit 2 Division 1 |
| RPS power supply on 3/14/01 required an 8-hour ENS notification for |
| actuation of a containment isolation signal that affected multiple systems |
| and a loss of a safety function required to remove residual heat |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), respectively). After |
| subsequent evaluation of the event, the reportability determination is being |
| changed to retract the 8-hour notification and provide the required a 60-day |
| ENS notification for an invalid actuation that affected multiple systems. |
| See the discussion below." |
| |
| "The initial condition was reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), loss of |
| safety function that is needed to remove residual heat. A subsequent review |
| of the event and reporting requirements by PPL has concluded that the event |
| is not reportable per this section of the rule. In this case, the 37-minute |
| interruption did not and would not have prevented the fulfillment of the RHR |
| shutdown cooling function." |
| |
| "The original notification stated that an actuation of a containment |
| isolation signal that affected multiple systems was reportable as an 8-hour |
| ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). For this event, a half-scram |
| while the unit was shutdown, was the result of an invalid signal since it |
| was due to loss of RPS power. Except for critical scrams, invalid |
| actuations are not reportable by telephone under 10CFR50.72. Therefore, |
| this 60-day optional report, as allowed by 10CFR50.73(a)(1), is being made |
| under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an |
| invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting |
| isolation valves in more than one system." |
| |
| "At 15:08 on March 14, 2001, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, the primary |
| power supply to the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) power distribution |
| panel was lost when the Motor-Generator (MG) Set generator in that division |
| failed. This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System actuations |
| including isolation of [a] Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling suction |
| valve and other automatic system initiations. RPS as well as other plant |
| systems functioned as designed in response to the event. The 'A' RPS |
| distribution panel was swapped to alternate power, and all isolations were |
| reset by 16:10. The loss of power was due to a failure of the 'A' RPS M-G |
| set generator. The generator failed due to a manufacturing defect of an |
| internal conductor connection. The failed generator was replaced, and other |
| like-in-kind generators will be inspected. There were no safety |
| consequences or compromises to the health or safety of the public. This |
| event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action program for |
| resolution. Internal and industry events were reviewed to assess if a |
| generic problem exits with this type of generator. No evidence of similar |
| failures was found, which indicates that a generic problem does not exist." |
| |
| "The NRC site Resident Inspector has been notified." The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Rogge) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37937 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/21/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 04/21/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN LECHMAIER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD GARDNER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED TURBINE EXHAUST LINE VACUUM BREAKER |
| CHECK VALVES |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "At 0320 [CDT] on April 21, 2001, Unit [2] HPCI was declared inoperable when |
| two check valves failed to meet acceptance criteria during the performance |
| of [procedure] QCOS 2300-18, HPCI STEAM EXHAUST VACUUM BREAKER LINE CHECK |
| VALVES IST FUNCTIONAL TEST. Two of the four HPCI turbine exhaust line |
| vacuum breaker check valves were found to have failed to close. The exhaust |
| line containing the failed check valves was isolated at the start of the |
| surveillance using motor-operated isolation valves contained in the exhaust |
| line. The failed check valves remain isolated." |
| |
| The licensee stated that Unit 2 is in a 14-day limiting condition for |
| operation as a result of this issue. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| ***** RETRACTION RECEIVED AT 1829 EDT ON 05/14/01 FROM TOM OSELAND TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "We have completed our evaluation and have determined that the HPCI [system] |
| was always capable of performing its intended safety function." |
| |
| "BACKGROUND" |
| |
| "On 4/21/01 at 0116 hours [CDT], plant operators began surveillance QCOS |
| 2300-18, 'HPCI Steam Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Line Check Valves IST Functional |
| Test.' The surveillance test is performed to confirm that valves 2-2399-64 |
| and 2-2399-65 open and close by applying air pressure to the check valves. |
| During the test, these valves were found to meet the acceptance criteria in |
| the open direction. The function of these valves is to open to provide a |
| flow path from the suppression chamber to the HPCI turbine steam exhaust |
| piping to prevent a vacuum. Following HPCI operation, the steam condensing |
| in the suppression pool and exhaust line would cause the suppression pool |
| water to be drawn up the exhaust piping." |
| |
| "At 0320 hours [CDT], the station equipment operator performing the test |
| indicated that the 2-2399-64 and 2-2399-65 valves failed to close. These |
| valves must close during HPCI operation to prevent steam flow from the HPCI |
| turbine steam exhaust piping to the suppression chamber. Station operators |
| declared the HPCI system inoperable when the test revealed that these valves |
| did not close. Subsequently, operators initiated an ENS phone call to the |
| NRC in accordance with the Exelon reportability manual SAF 1.8, 'Event or |
| Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function' |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v))." |
| |
| "Repairs were initiated, and at 1806 hours [CDT] on 4/21/01. Following |
| repairs, the HPCI vacuum breaker valves 2- 2399-64 and 2- 2399-65 passed the |
| IST test criteria and HPCI was declared operable." |
| |
| "At approximately 1200 hours [CDT] on 4/22/01, the operators tested the |
| 2-2399-66 and 2-2399-67 valves. They were found to meet the acceptance |
| criteria in both the open and closed direction. These valves are a |
| redundant set to the 2-2399-64 and 2-2399-65 valves." |
| |
| "ANALYSIS" |
| |
| "The 2-2399-64 valve and 2-2399-66 valve are in series on the same line. |
| This same configuration also exists on a different line for the 2- 2399-65 |
| and 2-2399-67 valves [...]." |
| |
| "During HPCI operation, either the 2-2399-64 valve or the 2-2399-66 valve |
| and either the 2-2399-65 valve or the 2-2399-67 valve must close to prevent |
| HPCI exhaust steam from flowing to the suppression chamber atmosphere which |
| would cause an increase in containment pressure and temperature. The HPCI |
| system is designed to exhaust the steam to the suppression pool. The |
| exhaust is discharged below the water level in the suppression pool to |
| ensure the steam is condensed." |
| |
| "The acceptable test results of the 2399-67 and 2399-66 valves would allow |
| HPCI exhaust steam during operation to be discharged below the water level |
| of the suppression chamber to ensure that steam was condensed and HPCI |
| operation would not be impeded." |
| |
| "Although, the failure of the 2-2399-64 and 2-2399-65 to close was |
| identified the as-found acceptable condition (ability to close) of the |
| 2-2399-67 and 2-2399-66 valves would have ensured the ability of the vacuum |
| breaker line to perform as required and thus allow HPCI to meet its safety |
| function." |
| |
| "Based on the above, it has been concluded that HPCI was always capable of |
| performing its safety function." Therefore, the licensee is retracting this |
| event notification. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Shear). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37971 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:52[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 05/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:09[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: VEITCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 22 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 22% POWER DUE TO FAILURE OF RECIRC PUMP |
| TO RESTART |
| |
| A manual scram was inserted at 0009 on 5/8/01. The scram was conducted in |
| accordance with plant procedures, IOI-8 "Manual Scram," due to a failure of |
| the reactor recirculation pump "A" to restart during a downshift from fast |
| to slow speed operation. Plant response to the manual scram was as |
| anticipated, all rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations occurred and no |
| SRVs opened. Reactor vessel water level reached Level 3 (177.7 inches) and |
| operators entered the Plant Emergency Instructions. At 0016, the Plant |
| Emergency Instructions were exited. The cause of the "A" recirculation pump |
| failure to restart is being investigated. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1132 5/14/2001 FROM RUSSELL TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "A 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv), RPS Actuation, four- (4) hour non-emergency |
| notification was initially made on 5-8-2001, due a Manual Reactor Scram |
| while critical. The Shift Supervisor conservatively defaulted with the |
| reportability determination and made the notification. Subsequently the |
| plants corrective action program required a confirmatory review of the |
| condition and its reportability by the staff. |
| |
| "The reportability review by the plant staff determined that the condition |
| was not event driven since viable options were available. The options |
| included: continue operation in single loop until the Recirculation Pump 'A' |
| breaker was repaired and the pump restarted, shutdown by manually inserting |
| control rods or enter Shutdown by Manual Scram, utilizing plant procedures |
| IOI-4 and IOI-8 respectively. The operators followed IOI-8 which purpose is |
| to provide general directions and guidelines for initiating a planned |
| shutdown by a manual reactor scram. It is intended to be entered during a |
| non-emergency condition with plant conditions stable. Use of this procedure |
| requires prior approval of the Operation's Manager and was obtained. |
| |
| "After Operations reviewed the available options, it was concluded at |
| management's discretion, that the plant would be shutdown to repair the |
| Recirculation Pump 'A' breaker and the Recirculation Pump 'B' seal, via |
| IOI-8. |
| |
| "The power plant was then configured for a controlled reactor scram in an |
| orderly manner without delay. House electrical loads were shifted to the |
| startup source: HPCS, which had been out of service for scheduled |
| maintenance was made available to support the scram if required; the Motor |
| Feed Pump was started and reactor level and pressure were adjusted to |
| support the scram. Reactor pressure was raised to support performance of |
| control rod scram time surveillance testing during the scram. |
| |
| "The reactor was scrammed on 5/8 at 0009 hrs. All equipment functioned as |
| expected. The plant underwent a controlled cooldown resulting in RHR 'A' |
| being placed in service just prior to 0800 hrs. The shutdown evolution as |
| chronologically described below complied with plant procedures, license |
| conditions, and Technical Specifications. License Commitments were reviewed |
| for compliance, and no issues were identified. |
| |
| "Chronology |
| |
| "May 7, 2001 |
| 16:20 Start 101-3 power reduction for B33 'B' seal temperature. |
| 17:22 Power reduction suspended while seal temperature stable. |
| 19:42 Restarted 101-3 power reduction; B33 'B' seal at 200�F. |
| 20:50 533 pump downshift incomplete. 'B' in slow; 'A' in off. |
| 20:52 Enter ONI-51: B33 Pump 'A' tripped. |
| Reactor Engineer contacted. |
| Power 22%; Loop Flow 'B' 6.25%; B33 in Loop Manual. |
| Technical Specification Power/Flow limits met w/o adjusting power or flow. |
| 21:01 B33-F067A - closed per ONI. |
| 21:10 B33-F067A - reopened per ONI. |
| 22:16 Attempted restart of B33 'A' Pump. |
| 22:46 Raised Reactor Pressure for scram testing. |
| 22:51 House electrical loads transferred to Start-up Transformer. |
| 23:49 Motor Feed Pump started for SCRAM. |
| 23:55 HPCS In secured status with operator ready to place in standby if |
| needed during SCRAM. |
| |
| "May 8, 2001 |
| 00:09 Manual SCRAM inserted per IOI-8, PEI-B13 entered on Level 3 as |
| expected. |
| 00:13 SCRAM Reset. |
| 00:16 PEI-B13 Exited. |
| |
| "Subsequent review has determined that although a plant outage was |
| determined to be the appropriate option, there was no urgency and sufficient |
| planning was involved to ensure a controlled shutdown occurred. The |
| determination concluded that this plant shutdown should be considered a |
| pre-planned sequence and was performed at Management's discretion and |
| oversight. The level 3 scram that occurred as part of he post Scram |
| transient was an expected part of the preplanned sequence. Therefore, this |
| condition is not reportable and ENF 37971 is retracted." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Shear). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37987 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY WHITE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DIESEL FUEL SPILL ONSITE |
| |
| The licensee notified the Maine Department of Environmental Protection |
| regarding the spillage of approximately 25 gallons of diesel fuel. The fuel |
| oil was spilled when the fuel tank of a truck was punctured as it was |
| driving over a temporary ramp. The spill has been contained. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37988 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/2001|
|LICENSEE: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:16[EDT]|
| CITY: ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 05/11/2001|
| COUNTY: HARFORD STATE: MD |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 19-30563-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
| |S. FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOYCE KUYKENDALL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM AT FT. IRWIN, CA. |
| |
| |
| The U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Grounds reported the loss of a chemical agent |
| alarm, model number GID-3. The alarm contains two nickel-63 sources each |
| with an activity of 15mCi. The chemical agent alarm was lost at FT. Irwin, |
| CA during training exercises on May 11, 2001. Search is in progress to |
| locate the alarm. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021