Event Notification Report for January 16, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           01/12/2001 - 01/16/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37554  37626  37660  37661  37662  37663  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37554       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:50[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        11/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:13[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB COOLIDGE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANIELLO DELLA GRECA  R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO            |
| INSTRUMENTATION FAILURE                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The HPCI System was taken out of service for surveillance testing earlier   |
| in the day.  The surveillance's were completed and HPCI was placed back in   |
| service in standby lineup.  At this time, the high flow isolation            |
| instrumentation was found to be reading well beyond the limits of the normal |
| in service band (+10 to -10).  At that time, HPCI was removed from service   |
| (availability) and isolated.  The proper LCO was entered and troubleshooting |
| is underway."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1415EST ON 1/12/01 FROM OLSON TO MacKINNON * * *                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:               |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a retraction of event no. 37554 made on November 28, 2000 at 1651   |
| in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "An Engineer had noted a flow switch that provides a high steam flow to the  |
| HPCI system reading -17 inches of water while the other indicated -2 inches  |
| of water.  The Primary Containment Isolation capability of the HPCI          |
| isolation valves was declared inoperable and the valves de-energized in the  |
| isolated condition.  HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14 day cold shutdown |
| LCO entered.  Subsequent testing of the differential pressure switches found |
| the trip setpoints to be correct.  The face plate had not been 'zeroed'      |
| during previous calibration.  This had no effect on switch operation,        |
| therefore could not have prevented fulfillment of safety function."          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.  Notified R1DO(Lew).       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37626       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/20/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:25[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        12/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:14[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT McCOY                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS  R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM SHIFT FROM NORMAL TO EMERGENCY     |
| RECIRCULATION MODE WHILE A PLANNED GAS DECAY TANK RELEASE WAS IN PROGRESS    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2014, with a gas decay tank release in progress (total activity 0.215    |
| Ci, (Kr-85 = 0.214 Ci, Xe-133 = 0.001 Ci)), control room ventilation gas     |
| monitor R-36 went into alarm causing ventilation to shift to mode F.  During |
| the [2-second] spike, R-36 counts went from 30 cpm to 856 cpm and back to 30 |
| cpm.  Local air samples taken by the RP Tech both in the control room and in |
| the area of the control room ventilation intake revealed no activity."       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the gas decay tank release was planned and that the |
| counts going through the plant stack were considered normal.  (These counts  |
| peaked at 120 cpm.)  The licensee stated that the planned gas decay tank     |
| release was within both the expected and required release limits.  The wind  |
| was blowing in a favorable direction, and the stability class for            |
| meteorological conditions was stable.  Although counts have returned to      |
| normal, the licensee plans to leave control room ventilation in the          |
| emergency recirculation mode until tomorrow morning.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/12/01 @ 1113 BY GOMEZ TO GOULD * * *  RETRACTION           |
|                                                                              |
| Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) is retracting this notification. This      |
| event was originally thought to be in response to a valid radiological       |
| condition because a waste gas decay tank release was in progress at the same |
| time as this event.  RG&E has confirmed that the alarm on Control Room Noble |
| Gas radiation monitor                                                        |
| R-36 that occurred at 20:14 EST on December 20, 2000, causing the shift in   |
| Control Room ventilation to "Mode F" (emergency recirculation mode), was the |
| result of a spurious spike on R-36.  The alarm was not in response to any    |
| radiation condition,                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Local samples taken by radiation protection technicians on December 20, both |
| in the Control Room and in the area of the Control Room ventilation intake,  |
| revealed no activity.  The Plant Process Computer (PPCS) plots show that     |
| R-36 counts were steady just before and immediately after the spike.         |
| Further engineering evaluation of this event has determined that the alarm   |
| on R-36 was caused by a sudden spike and was not in response to any          |
| radiation condition. Therefore, this event is not reportable and is          |
| retracted.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Other occurrences of spiking on R-36 took place during December 2000 and     |
| January 2001.  Some of these spikes resulted in alarms on R-36 and           |
| subsequent shift in Control Room ventilation to "Mode F".  These alarms were |
| recognized at the time of alarm as invalid actuations of the HVAC System for |
| the Control Room, and did not result in NRC notification.  Trouble-shooting  |
| and corrective maintenance is on-going on the R-36 monitor.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The Region 1 RDO (Lew) was notified.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37660       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WATTS BAR                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/12/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:36[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY KNUETTEL               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES R. OGLE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AN ACTING SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR AN ILLEGAL DRUG DURING A RANDOM     |
| TEST                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| A non-licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of          |
| marijuana during a random test.  The employee's access to the plant has been |
| terminated.  Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional      |
| details.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37661       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/12/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:40[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        01/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:28[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  R BARTON                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/12/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INVALID ACTUATION OF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM                     |
|                                                                              |
| During performance of "A" Train Trip Actuations Device Operational Test a    |
| reactor protection signal was generated when a procedure step was            |
| inadvertently skipped.  At the time this occurred the "A" reactor trip       |
| bypass breaker was closed when the trip signal was generated.  This caused   |
| the "A" reactor trip breaker to open.  The reactor did not trip because the  |
| "A" bypass breaker was closed.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| This event resulted in an invalid actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature  |
| system.  It was concluded that this event was reportable per                 |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)  since:                                                 |
| (1) This actuation was not anticipated to occur as part of this pre-planned  |
| evolution since the trip signal was expected to be inhibited by the omitted  |
| procedure step and                                                           |
| (2) The omitted step resulted in the system not being properly removed from  |
| service as required by the surveillance procedure (source range trip signal  |
| not being bypassed or inhibited).                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37662       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/12/2001|
|LICENSEE:  AEROJET ORDNANCE TENNESSEE, INC.     |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:33[EST]|
|    CITY:  JONESBOROUGH             REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        01/11/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TN |EVENT TIME:        11:30[EST]|
|LICENSE#:  S-90009               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/12/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CHARLES R. OGLE      R2      |
|                                                |JOSEPH HOLONICH      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DEBRA SHULTZ (via fax)       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE IN AN INCINERATOR AIR EFFLUENT         |
| CLEANING SYSTEM                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Event description: The licensee called to report a fire in their            |
| incinerator's air effluent cleaning system. The fire in the baghouse lasted  |
| approximately two hours. The building was evacuated, and onsite personnel    |
| extinguished the fire. The baghouse filter has not yet been opened to assess |
| the damage. The area is secured and no routine operations are ongoing at     |
| this time. Smears taken in the area were maximum of 100-dpm/100 sq. cm.      |
| Clean up of the area has not begun. The total release from this event is     |
| estimated to be 0.013 microcuries of depleted uranium. Sample results will   |
| be available soon.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "These events do not pose a threat to public health and safety but may be    |
| reportable under 1200-2-5-.141(2)c.(4).                                      |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Media attention: None"                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37663       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION               |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/15/2001|
|LICENSEE:  ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION               |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:33[EST]|
|    CITY:  Florence                 REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        01/15/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  SC |EVENT TIME:        15:20[EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/15/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CHARLES R. OGLE      R2      |
|                                                |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DARALL  HARRIS               |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL DEFECT PER 10 CFR PART 21 CONTROL DEVICE FOR HK AND K-LINE CIRCUIT |
| BREAKERS                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| In December 1998, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (Chattanooga, TN) experienced a     |
| failure to close of a 7.5HK500/1200 Medium Voltage circuit breaker (Serial   |
| Number 48672-A101-1-3B) manufactured 3/30/1973. The cause of the breaker     |
| failure as determined by TVA was a failure of the Control Device (Part       |
| Number 191921T06). Specifically, a movable contact within the Control Device |
| was found to have a broken spring retainer, which is a protuberance holding  |
| the return spring in place on the contact. This broken spring retainer       |
| allowed the spring to move out of its intended position, causing failure of  |
| the control contacts to make and break properly. This occurrence was         |
| documented and evaluated by the Tennessee Valley Authority Central           |
| Laboratories & Field Testing Service in their Technical Report #99-0550 on   |
| 11 February 1999.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| On February 29, 2000, Catawba Nuclear Station (York, SC) experienced a       |
| failure to close of a 5HK250/1200 Medium Voltage circuit breaker (Serial     |
| Number 50465F-1 -10186) manufactured 3/28/1979. The cause of the breaker     |
| failure as determined by Duke Power and ABB Florence was similar to the      |
| failure reported by TVA in 1998. Material analysis of the failed movable     |
| contact concluded that the material for the contact was correct to that      |
| specified. A dissected profile analysis of the failed contact revealed that  |
| the material at the base of the spring retainer on the movable contact was   |
| thin and failed due to fatigue. This failure was documented and evaluated by |
| Duke Engineering Testing and Laboratory Services in their Metallurgical      |
| Analysis Report #2624 on 29 March 2000.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| On October 30, 2000, during a routine inspection of a Control Device on a    |
| 7.5HK500/1200 Medium Voltage circuit breaker (Serial Number 50464L-2-07210)  |
| manufactured 2/29/1979, Catawba Nuclear Station found a movable contact that |
| had failed in a similar manner as the other two previously reported. This    |
| failure was documented and evaluated by Duke Engineering Testing and         |
| Laboratory Services in their Metallurgical Analysis Report #2726 on 01       |
| November 2000.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of these three failures was fatigue of the metal at the base of    |
| the spring retainer on the movable contacts, due to insufficient metal mass  |
| at the base of the retainer. The spring retainer on the contact is formed    |
| with a die by punching the movable contact from the opposite side of the     |
| electrical contact mounting location during fabrication. The height of the   |
| spring retainer, therefore, determines the amount of material left at the    |
| base.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective action for this incident has been taken. After further            |
| investigation, ABB Florence has determined that the height of the spring     |
| retainer was changed in September 1979 to a lower specification, leaving     |
| more material at the base of the spring retainer. The movable contact formed |
| with the greater spring retainer height specification prior to 1979 has a    |
| small possibility of failure as discussed above. There have been no other    |
| reports of movable contact failures.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| There have been only these three reports of this movable contact failure     |
| since the control device was introduced to the market in 1960. Since its     |
| introduction, more than 22,000 control devices have been produced for both   |
| HK and K-line type circuit breakers, each with 5 movable contacts. ABB       |
| therefore believes this problem is not significant enough to require         |
| immediate action from users. However, we recommend that control devices      |
| older than 1981 be replaced with new control devices on both HK and K-line   |
| breakers at the next scheduled maintenance of the breaker.                   |
|                                                                              |
| ABB will notify all customers who purchased this product.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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