Event Notification Report for June 9, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/08/2000 - 06/09/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37021 37067 37068 37069 37070
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37021 |
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| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/23/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 05:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ART BREADY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 4 Startup |4 Startup |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO STUCK OPEN CHECK |
| VALVE - |
| |
| At 0505 on 05/23/00, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was |
| determined to be inoperable as a result of the discharge check valve being |
| stuck partially open. This condition was discovered during investigation of |
| a low injection header pressure alarm, and subsequent attempts to fill and |
| vent the discharge header were unsuccessful. It is believed that the check |
| valve stuck partially open when the system was secured after a low pressure |
| surveillance test at about 0305. The discharge check valve was mechanically |
| agitated at 0700, and reseated as evidenced by an audible sound and rise in |
| injection header pressure. |
| |
| At the time of discovery, the plant was in Operational Condition 2 with |
| reactor power at 4% and reactor pressure at approximately 500 psig. All |
| other safety related equipment was operable at the tune of discovery, with |
| the exception of the 'A' Residual Heat Removal Pump, which was aligned for |
| suppression pool cooling mode of operation. There was no significant impact |
| to overall plant safety as a result of this condition. |
| |
| Plant maintenance and engineering personnel are currently evaluating the |
| failure of the HPCI System discharge check valve. injection header fill and |
| vent is in progress to determine the amount of air that is present and |
| restore the system to an available condition. This information will be used |
| to determine if the safety function of the HPCI System was unavailable as a |
| result of the discharge check valve malfunction. |
| |
| A root cause investigation team has been assembled, and evaluation of system |
| and personnel performance is in progress. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify local |
| officials. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 6/8/00 @ 1219 BY CONICELLA TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| |
| |
| As discussed in the notification. the HPCI low discharge header pressure |
| alarm was received, prompting an immediate investigation. The discharge |
| check valve was mechanically agitated which resulted in the seating of the |
| valve and clearing of the alarm. Sticking of the discharge check Valve |
| provided a leakage path thus preventing the keep fill system from achieving |
| pressure sufficient to clear the alarm setpoint. The amount of mechanical |
| agitation required was minimal. HPCI was then removed from service to allow |
| maintenance troubleshooting on the valve. |
| |
| It is believed that the discharge check valve stuck in the partially open |
| position following the low pressure response time surveillance testing which |
| had been completed approximately two hours prior to the event. This was a |
| result of the low delta P across the valve associated with that testing. |
| Prior to the cited surveillance test, a different HPCl surveillance (HPCI |
| Flowpath Verification) had been successfully completed and HPCI had been |
| determined to be operable. Investigation of the valve revealed very minor |
| misalignment which may have been the cause at the slight binding. This |
| condition would not prevent the safety function of HPCI from being |
| performed. Following the investigation HPCI was removed from service and |
| the plant entered a 14 day LCO. The valve was repaired and HPCI was retested |
| and declared operable. The keep fill system was always sufficient. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The Reg 1 RDO (Moslak) was |
| notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37067 |
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| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:09[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/07/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICH DIBLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |TOM MOSLAK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| LICENSEE EMPLOYEE TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL DURING A RANDOM |
| FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST (24-HOUR REPORT) |
| |
| A non-licensed employee tested positive for alcohol during a random |
| fitness-for-duty test conducted on 06/07/00. The individual has been |
| relieved of duty and placed on indefinite suspension. The individual's |
| access authorization has been suspended, and the licensee is currently |
| reviewing the individual's activities. (Call the NRC operations officer for |
| additional information.) |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37068 |
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| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:11[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:31[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DEPUYDT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ED GOODWIN NRR |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION |MICHAEL CASE EDO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE PLANT HAD AUTOSTART OF THE EMERGENCY DIESELS ON BOTH UNITS |
| |
| On June 8, 2000, at 0931 hours, power was lost to the CD bus on each unit |
| during switching operations involving the #4 and #5 transformers in the main |
| switchyard. During the switching operation a loss of offsite power occurred, |
| affecting one train of 4KV electrical power in each unit and causing the |
| auto start of the CD EDGs on each unit. The EDGs started and loaded as |
| expected. |
| |
| Unit 1 is currently defueled. When power was lost, the Spent Fuel Pool |
| Cooling pump that was in service tripped. It was placed back in service 0953 |
| hours. The spent fuel pool temperature rose 1 degree from 84 to 85 during |
| this time. Temperature is now stable at 85 degrees. |
| |
| Unit 2 is currently in Mode 4. When power was lost to the CD bus, Reactor |
| Coolant pumps (RCPs) #22 and #23 tripped. Additionally, the 4 KV bus under |
| frequency signal caused the #21 and #24 RCPs to trip as designed. As a |
| result, Unit 2 was in the natural circulation mode using the steam |
| generators as a heat sink. RCS temperature at the time of loss of power was |
| 335 degrees and cooled to approximately 315 degrees during the time the unit |
| was in natural circulation. |
| |
| Offsite power was restored through TR5 at 1019 hours. #24 RCP was restarted |
| at 1047 hours, restoring forced circulation, #23 RCP was restarted at 1159 |
| hours. RCPs #21and #22 are still currently secured. The unit is stable and |
| equipment is being restored. |
| |
| An Event Response Team has been convened to assess the event, and develop |
| recovery plans. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37069 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:26[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSSEL LONG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |TOM MOSLAK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - CABLE SEPARATION ISSUE |
| |
| At approximately 1515 hours on June 8, 2000, operations determined that |
| plant cable separation criteria had potentially been violated which would |
| place the plant outside the design basis. Two wires were routed from a test |
| jack in the control rod cabinets located in the cable spreading room to a |
| terminal block in Rack C3 in the control room. The routing of the wires |
| takes them into cable trays in the cable spreading room that are carrying |
| control cables for channels 1, 2 and 3. This is in violation of the |
| electrical separation criteria defined in the FSAR. Corrective action is |
| being taken to remove the wires from the cable trays. A preliminary |
| evaluation indicates the wires were used during testing of the control rod |
| drive mechanism during initial plant startup. They are no longer in use. |
| This event was identified during an extent of condition walkdown for the |
| separation criteria violation identified in incident log 37043, dated May |
| 26, 2000. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37070 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KATHLEEN WORK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN PELLET R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| 24 HOUR REPORT - HIGH BATTERY ELECTROLYTE LEVEL |
| |
| On May 15, 2000, a surveillance test was performed on the E1A11 battery. |
| The electrolyte level in cell #18 was reported as + � inch above the high |
| level line on the cell which exceeds the Tech spec limit of < � inch, as |
| stated in Tech Spec Table 4.8-2, Battery Surveillance Requirements for |
| Category B. This condition was not recognized during Maintenance review of |
| the data. Tech Spec Surveillance 4.8.2.1.b.1 which allows 7 days to restore |
| electrolyte level within the Category B limits or declare the battery |
| inoperable was exceeded and the battery was considered inoperable. The LCO |
| for an inoperable battery, which is 2 hours to restore to operable or be in |
| hot standby within 6 hours, was not met. This was a violation of Tech Spec |
| 3.8.2.1.a. The condition was corrected on May 30, 2000. There is no safety |
| significance to this event. The electrolyte level in cell 18 at no time |
| compromised the ability of the E1A11 battery to perform its design |
| function. |
| |
| 24-hour notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, |
| paragraph 2.G. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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