Event Notification Report for May 9, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/08/2000 - 05/09/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36953 36981 36982 36983 36984 36985 36986
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36953 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WEBB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECTIVE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES |
| |
| Analysis of "B" steam generator eddy current results determined that more |
| than 1% of the Westinghouse HEJ sleeve laser weld repaired tubes were |
| classified as defective placing the "B" steam generator in the C-3 |
| classification per the Kewaunee Technical Specifications. Two tubes of 59 |
| inspected contained indications in the weld repaired region. There are 288 |
| total tubes in this population. The licensee plans to increase the |
| population size to 100%. |
| |
| The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/09/00 AT 1153ET BY TOM WEBB TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| Analysis of "A" steam generator eddy current results determined that more |
| than 1% of the tubes inspected in the hot leg tube sheet crevice region are |
| classified as defective, placing steam generator "A" in the C3 category per |
| Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification. Fifteen tubes out of |
| 833 inspected were characterized as defective. |
| |
| No scope expansion is necessary as 100% of the tubes for the hot leg |
| tubesheet crevice region have been inspected. |
| |
| Corrective Action: |
| |
| 1. Plug or repair defective tubes prior to returning to operation. |
| 2. Ensure plugging rate does not result in an unanalyzed condition. |
| |
| NRC R3DO (Brent Clayton) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36981 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MYERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED DURING TESTING |
| |
| The 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG ) automatically started due to a bus |
| undervoltage signal that was inadvertently caused when a procedural step was |
| misinterpreted. The EDG was secured. The licensee has informed the NRC |
| resident inspector of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36982 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:37[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/07/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:43[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: NICK CONICELLA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION DUE TO INADVERTENT STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL |
| SIGNAL |
| |
| "On 5/7/00 at 2243 hours, a Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) isolation |
| occurred due to an inadvertent Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) |
| initiation. At the time of the event, Hope Creek was in Operational |
| Condition 5, Refueling, with core reload activities recently initiated and |
| with all control rods fully inserted. SLC was not required to be operable |
| and was removed from service (injection line check valves were closed) when |
| the SLC initiation signal occurred. No sodium pentaborate was injected into |
| the Reactor Coolant System. Preliminary investigation into the event |
| determined that the SLC initiation signal resulted from activities |
| supporting required surveillance testing of SLC along with surveillances of |
| the Redundant Reactivity Control System (RRCS). The RRCS provides automatic |
| SLC initiation. Although the RWCU isolation instrumentation was also not |
| required to be operable at the time of the event, it was not removed from |
| service. The RWCU isolation due to a SLC initiation signal is an ESF |
| actuation. Both SLC pumps actuated as designed in response to the initiation |
| signal, however, a crack was observed in a weld in the 'A' SLC injection |
| line when the SLC pump was removed from service. Event investigation is |
| continuing and repairs to SLC are being initiated. The RWCU isolation signal |
| was reset and the RWCU was placed back in service. Core reload activities |
| are continuing." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36983 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 05/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:56[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY HAISLET |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM ISOLATION DURING TAGOUT |
| |
| While performing a tagout on the 'A' train of the post-accident sampling |
| system (PASS) H2/O2 sampling system, solenoid isolation valve SV-5065-20B, |
| which is a 'B' train valve, closed unexpectedly. The licensee restored the |
| 'A' train of PASS H2/O2 monitoring to service and closed the redundant |
| solenoid isolation valve in the 'B' train. The licensee declared valve |
| SV-5065-20B inoperable. |
| |
| After review of system electrical diagrams, the licensee determined that the |
| closure of valve SV-5065-20B was appropriate, although its closure was not |
| anticipated in the tagout procedure. The NRC resident inspector has been |
| informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36984 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:22[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/05/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 21:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC WALKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| |
| At 2130 CDT on 5/05/2000, the C-337 Unit 3 Cell 2 Freezer/Sublimer A-valve |
| failed to open while in TSR mode F/S 3 which requires operability of the |
| A-valve in order for the valve to open if required to do so upon actuation |
| of the Freezer/Sublimer High-High Weight Trip System. An operator was |
| attempting to place the Freezer/Sublimer into mode F/S 2 which does not |
| require operability of the High-High Weight Trip System. The |
| Freezer/Sublimer was unable to enter Mode F/S 2 due to inability to open |
| A-valve because of mechanical failure. Actuation of High- High Weight Trip |
| system did not occur. However, had it been required to do so while in mode |
| F/S 3, there is potential that the A-valve would not have opened as required |
| if actuation of system occurred. Upon discovery of valve failure, |
| Freezer/Sublimer was placed in mode F/S 4 which does not require operability |
| of the High-High Weight Trip system. |
| |
| The valve failure was caused by a failure of the motor operator in this six |
| inch valve. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. See |
| related event 36985. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36985 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:22[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/05/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 21:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC WALKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF A SAFETY SYSTEM |
| |
| |
| At 2130 CDT on 5/05/2000, the C-337 Unit 3 Cell 8 Freezer/Sublimer A-valve |
| failed to open while in TSR mode F/S 3 which requires operability of the |
| A-valve in order for the valve to open if required to do so upon actuation |
| of the Freezer/Sublimer High-High Weight Trip System. An operator was |
| attempting to place the Freezer/Sublimer into mode F/S 2 which does not |
| require operability of the High-High Weight Trip System. The |
| Freezer/Sublimer was unable to enter Mode F/S 2 due to inability to open |
| A-valve because of mechanical failure. Actuation of High-High Weight Trip |
| system did not occur. However, had it been required to do so while in mode |
| F/S 3, there is potential that the A-valve would not have opened as required |
| if actuation of system occurred. Upon discovery of valve failure, |
| Freezer/Sublimer was placed in mode F/S 4 which does not require operability |
| of the High-High Weight Trip system. |
| |
| The valve failure was caused by a failure of limit switch on the valve. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. See |
| related event 36984. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36986 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/08/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:56[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 05/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:25[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOSEPH GIAR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/08/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - FOULING OF THE REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER |
| HEAT EXCHANGER (RBCCW HX). |
| |
| Surveillance testing has identified fouling of the Salt Service Water (SSW) |
| side of the RBCCW HX. The extent of the fouling on one of the two heat |
| exchangers would prevent design basis containment heat removal post-accident |
| at maximum design basis ultimate heat sink (UHS) temperature (75�F). |
| Engineering evaluation has determined that design basis heat removal can be |
| achieved with UHS temperature less than 70�F. Periodic evaluation will be |
| performed to ensure that additional fouling has not further degraded the |
| heat exchangers heat transfer capability. |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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