Event Notification Report for January 12, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/11/2000 - 01/12/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36579 36580
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36579 |
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| FACILITY: WNP-2 REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/11/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:47[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 01/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:50[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SIMS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JEFF SHACKELFORD R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 1-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF THE DEDICATED LAND LINES TO STATE/LOCAL |
| AGENCIES FOR REASONS UNKNOWN. |
| |
| "THE DEDICATED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION LINK TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES IS |
| LOST. NO PROJECTED TIME OF REPAIR." |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT |
| INSPECTOR. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36580 |
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| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/11/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:26[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:52[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE WHEELER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JEFF SHACKELFORD R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| POSTULATED CONDUCTOR-TO-CONDUCTOR SHORT IN FIRE PUMP CONTROL CIRCUITRY COULD |
| INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF THE PLANT TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING A FIRE. |
| |
| "During preparation of the permanent plant modification to replace a |
| Temporary Modification associated with LER 96-009-03, another configuration |
| was found that could inhibit the ability of the plant to safely shutdown |
| following a fire. For an Alternate Shutdown Fire (10 CFR 50 Appendix R |
| Section III.L) in the Cable Spreading Room fire area, the Diesel Fire pump |
| is relied upon to provide emergency backup gland seal water to the essential |
| service water pumps. A fire scenario in the cable spreading room assumes of |
| a loss of offsite power (which disables the normal gland water supply) as |
| well as concurrent hot shorts which disable the emergency gland seal water |
| supply MOV's (because their control cables are routed through the Cable |
| Spreading Room). A multi-conductor cable located in the Cable Spreading Room |
| carries 24 VDC start control circuits and 120 VAC annunciator power |
| circuits. The postulated fire scenario requires the assumption that the fire |
| could cause a conductor to conductor short within this cable such that the |
| 24 VDC circuits would be energized by the 120 VAC power. This would disable |
| the automatic starting capability of the diesel fire pump (the currently |
| credited emergency backup gland seat water). A fire watch has been posted |
| in the Cable Spreading Room as a compensatory measure. The Cable Spreading |
| Room fire area is the only fire area affected by this configuration. The |
| operator's ability to recognize and correct a loss of gland water to the |
| Service Water pumps would not be impaired. Sufficient procedural guidance is |
| provided for the post-fire restoration of the essential service water pumps |
| such that loss of gland seal water would have been detected prior to service |
| water pump damage. Fire fighting activities would have immediately indicated |
| loss of the fire pump. A modification to separate the starting circuits from |
| the power circuits is being pursued. CNS has conservatively concluded that |
| this postulated scenario is reportable under 10CFR50. 72(b)(2)(iii)(A). |
| |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
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