Event Notification Report for December 6, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/03/1999 - 12/06/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36471 36483 36484 36485 36486 36487 36488
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36471 |
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| FACILITY: PALISADES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/28/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:50[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 11/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DALE ENGLE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD GARDNER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| "B" TRAIN LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (LPSI) FLOW RATES FOUND DEGRADED |
| DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING. |
| |
| "WHILE PERFORMING QO-8B (LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION FLOW TESTING), IT WAS |
| DETERMINED THAT FLOW TO TWO (2) OF FOUR (4) LOOPS (VALVES-MO-3012 & MO-3014 |
| [RIGHT CHANNEL]) WAS INADEQUATE. THE FLOW RATES WERE BELOW THE DESIGN BASIS |
| FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. [THIS] CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED DURING |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING WHILE THE PLANT WAS IN COLD SHUTDOWN. THIS IS |
| REPORTABLE PER 50.72(b)(2)(I)." |
| |
| THE DESIGN FLOW RATE IS 1720 GPM. THE AS-FOUND FLOW RATES THROUGH VALVES |
| 3012 & 3014 WERE 1650 AND 1500 GPM, RESPECTIVELY. THE "B" TRAIN LPSI HAS |
| BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE PENDING CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH IS TO BE |
| DETERMINED. THE UNIT IS NOT IN A TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT IN THAT LPSI IS |
| NOT REQUIRED FOR CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS. THE SURVEILLANCE TEST WHICH |
| IDENTIFIED THIS CONDITION IS PERFORMED EACH REFUELING OUTAGE (APPROXIMATELY |
| EVERY 18 MONTHS). THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1813 EST ON 12/5/99 BY ROBERT VINCENT TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| * |
| |
| The licensee conducted extensive testing and analysis to better model |
| accidents and the performance of the LPSI system. They have determined that |
| the LPSI system flow rates are capable of meeting the requirements of |
| accident mitigation and are retracting this event notification. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NRC Headquarters |
| Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Geoffrey Wright). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36483 |
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| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [3] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:09[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:25[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BREIDENBAUGH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |STEVEN DENNIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| PERFORMANCE OF RHR LOGIC FUNCTIONAL TEST DEFEATS THE AUTOMATIC START OF ALL |
| FOUR RHR PUMPS. |
| |
| A review of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) logic system functional test |
| identified that during part of the performance of the test, the automatic |
| start of all four RHR pumps was defeated. Manual initiation remained |
| available. This test was last performed on both Unit 2 and Unit 3 in 1997. |
| This report is being made due to the loss of the automatic initiation of the |
| Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of RHR. This alone could have |
| prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36484 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:47[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCE SCHOENBACH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DALE POWERS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART OF THE RCS LEAK RATE DETECTION SYSTEM MAY BE OUTSIDE DESIGN BASES. |
| |
| "Callaway was contacted by Wolf Creek [see Event #36481] with a concern |
| regarding the Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and |
| Containment Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate System not [being] capable of |
| performing their design function in all cases. Further review by Callaway |
| determined this concern was also applicable to Callaway Plant. These |
| systems are required per Tech Spec 3.4.6.1b&c for the RCS Leakage Detection |
| Systems. The FSAR states [that] this system meets the requirements of Reg. |
| Guide 1.45, which requires the leakage detection system to be able to detect |
| a 1 gpm leak within 1 hour. The methodology used will not always provide |
| adequate leak detection to ensure a 1 gpm RCS leak will be detected in 1 |
| hour. |
| |
| "Therefore, Callaway may be operating outside its design bases since the |
| Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and Containment Air Cooler |
| Condensate Flow Rate System do not meet this design bases at this time. The |
| licensee is pursuing a software change to bring the systems into compliance |
| with the design bases well within the 30-day action statement requirement of |
| Tech Spec 3.4.6.1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36485 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TENNESSEE DIV. OF RAD. HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999|
|LICENSEE: JOHNSON CITY MEDICAL CENTER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45[EST]|
| CITY: JOHNSON CITY REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#: R-90005-L97 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KENNETH BARR R2 |
| |JOSIE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLES ARNOTT | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| NEW SOURCES FOR BRACHYTHERAPY DEVICE TOO LONG |
| |
| The State of Tennessee, Division of Radiological Health, received a call |
| from Mountain States Alliance DBA Johnson City Medical Center concerning |
| receipt of three new sources for brachytherapy treatment that did not fit. |
| The three sources, model number CDC.T1 Product Code CDCS.J4, which contain |
| cesium-137, were the same model number, but were 1 millimeter longer than |
| the original sources. The extra length would not allow the shielded storage |
| drawer to close. The medical center called Tennessee to inform them of the |
| problem and called the manufacturer, Amersham, in Illinois. The Division of |
| Radiological Health called the State of Illinois for their information. |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36486 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:05[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:00[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: E. G. WALKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY |
| CONTROL |
| |
| "On 12-3-99, at 1300 CST, the C-333 Seal Exhaust and Wet Air Station pumps |
| were discovered to be hard-piped to the building lube oil supply in |
| violation of NCSE.014. The NCSE (Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation) |
| credits an air gap as a design feature of the lube oil piping to prevent the |
| potential for backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil |
| system. |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, significant quantities of oil |
| contaminated with uranium enriched to greater than 1.0 wt. % 235U assay |
| would have to backflow into the unit lube oil system and collect in the Seal |
| Exhaust and Wet Air pumps with the oil reservoir filled above 4.75 inches. |
| In order for oil to backflow, the pump reservoir would need to be filled to |
| absolute capacity, operator level checks would need to fail to detect and |
| correct the overfilled condition, and the oil would need to backflow through |
| multiple closed valves and overcome the elevation head of the oil lines. |
| Therefore, it is not considered credible that contaminated oil intrusion |
| into the unit lube oil system has ever occurred. |
| |
| "The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) relies upon an air gap |
| being installed in the oil fill line to the Seal Exhaust and Wet Air pumps |
| to prevent backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil |
| supply system. There are no double contingency arguments for this scenario |
| because the scenario is considered incredible with the installed air gap. |
| |
| "NCSA (Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval) GEN-01 was immediately initiated |
| on discovery of the problem to ensure nuclear criticality safety |
| implementation. Initiation of a modification package to correct the |
| deficiency was implemented in accordance with NCS engineering approval." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36487 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/04/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:17[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL T. MURPHY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/04/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACTUATION OF TWO UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL RADIATION MONITORS DURING |
| PERFORMANCE OF VENTILATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE TESTING |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "At 2230 [CST] during normal Unit 1 [and] 2 [reactor coolant system] |
| sampling, a [high] radiation and [emergency safety feature (ESF)] actuation |
| signal was received on [radiation monitors] 2R-30 and 2R-37 ([auxiliary |
| building] normal exhaust monitors). Normal exhaust was off, and [the |
| auxiliary] building special ventilation system was in operation while |
| performing [surveillance procedure] SP-1172, Monthly Ventilation System |
| Operation. Alarm response procedures were completed for high radiation on |
| 2R-30 [and 2R-]37. [The] duty chemist was informed, the sample was secured, |
| and 2R-30 [and 2R-]37 levels [then] returned normal. At 2255 [CST,] the |
| actuating signals were reset, and all equipment returned to normal." |
| |
| The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to |
| the high radiation and ESF actuation signal. The cause of the ESF signal is |
| under investigation. At the time of this event notification, both units |
| were operating at 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36488 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/04/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:04[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:10[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/04/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF MODERATION CONTROL |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: |
| |
| "At 1610 hours on 12/03/99, operations personnel in the X-333 Process |
| Building identified a piece of unattended cascade equipment (33-8-6 stage-1 |
| converter) which had an uncovered 'A'-line flange. This violated requirement |
| #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states; 'Openings/penetrations made during |
| maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for |
| moderator collection and moist air exposure when unattended.' This |
| constitutes the loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and |
| interaction controls maintained throughout this event. Moderation control |
| was reestablished at 1800 hours under the direction of Nuclear Criticality |
| Safety (NCS) personnel by covering the opening." |
| |
| "This is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01: 24-hour criticality |
| control." |
| |
| "There was no lose of hazardous/radioactive material or |
| radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: This event has a low safety significance. |
| Although the control credited toward making moderation intrusion unlikely |
| was lost, no actual intrusion of liquid moderation occurred. Interaction |
| and mass controls remained in place." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): For a criticality to occur, additional U-235 |
| would have to be added to the system." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Mass, moderation, and interaction are controlled. The mass and interaction |
| controls were maintained, but moderation control was lost." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): UO2F2 [was] equal to or less than |
| 3% enriched U-235." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Mass, moderation, and interaction are |
| controlled. The mass and interaction controls ware maintained, but |
| moderation control was lost." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Moderation control was reestablished at 1800 hours [on] 12/03/99 under the |
| direction of NCS personnel by covering the opening." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department |
| of Energy site representative. |
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